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A HORNBOOK TO THE
NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
The revision of tne substantive criminal laws of North Dakota
was ordered by the Legislative Assembly in 1971.1 The revision was
carried out by the Committee on the Judiciary "B." The committee
was composed of legislators as well as judges and attorneys serv-
ing as citizen members.2 The committee presented the 1973 Legis-
lative Assembly with Senate Bill 2045, the main body of the revi-
sion, and three alternative sex crime bills.3 The main body of the
revision and one of the sex crime alternatives were approved and
become effective on July 1, 1975.4
Committee Counsel originally presented the members with two
methods of approaching the revision. Either working through the
present criminal code and revising in that order or using an already
developed model criminal code as a starting point.5 The former was
originally adopted,6 however, in the fourth committee session, the
Proposed Federal Code was accepted as model for the revision
process.
7
The committee was concerned with providing a legislative his-
1. H. Cow. REs. 3050, 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws 1392.
2. N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Report 80 (1978).
3. 1973 N.D. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 1244-46.
4. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws chs. 116, 117.
5. Minutes of the Committee of Judiciary "B", N.D. Legislative Council, June 28, 1971
at 3. [Hereinafter cited as Minutes "B"
]
.
6. See Minutes "B'B, supra note 5, June 28, 1971 at 3-4 and Sept. 20-21, 1971 at 3-17.
7. Minutes "B", supra note 5, Jan. 24-25, 1972 at 28. Professor Kraft, UND School of
Law, made the original suggestion. Mr. Wolf supported the proposal on the grounds that
1.) legislative approval would be more likely, 2.) future federal case law would be an aid
to Judicial construction, and 3.) committee work would go faster. Id., at 26-27. Mr. Wolf's
second justification may not come to pass. What this "Hornbook" refers to as the Pro-
posed Federal Code is the result of six years of study by a commission established by the
Congress. It has been introduced as S.1 and is currently in committee. The administration
has offered an alternate Federal criminal law revision as S.1400. The two proposals differ
in many respects. For example, S.1400 establishes a death penalty and eliminates the in-
sanity defense except where the insanity precludes the finding of a mental element of the
offense; while S.1 has no death penalty and establishes an insanity defense very close to
that proposed by the American Law Institute. For detailed comparisons refer to Hearings
on S.1, 716, 1400 and 1401, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V (1973).
While the committee may be subject to some criticism for over devotion to the Pro-
posed Federal Code, they did accomplish a badly needed major revision of North Dakota
criminal law in a relatively short time and small expense by adopting the combined views
of some of the most knowledgeable persons in the field of criminal law. The committee is to
be congratulated for their fine work.
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tory to facilitate judicial interpretation of the Code. s Toward this
end, minutes were kept at each of the meetings.9 This "Hornbook"
has drawn heavily on these minutes in discussing the revised cri-
minal code. The documents associated with the Proposed Federal
Code have also been used where coverage in the minutes was brief. 10
This raises the issue of what impact these materials have on
judicial interpretation in North Dakota. It is apparent that only
statutes of unclear meaning are subject to judicial interpretation.1
The United States Supreme Court has stated "the meaning of the
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language. . .(of)
the act .... and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is
to enforce it according to its terms.' '1 2 Such statements have been
subject to criticism on the grounds that if the meaning was so plain
there would be no litigation on the point.13 Where statutes are am-
biguous North Dakota courts may refer to, among other things, ob-
jectives of the legislation, and legislative history.
1 4
Statements in committee minutes have been infrequently used by
state courts in the process of judicial interpretation; but a majority
approve of the procedure. The dearth of application may be due
more to lack of records rather than judicial reluctance.1 6 The fed-
eral courts have made frequent use of committee hearings as aids
to interpretation.1 7
Reports and notes of commissions established to prepare revi-
sions of statutory law are often referred to as aids to statutory con-
struction.1 s In that the Committee on Judiciary "B" was composed
in part of voting citizen members selected because of their exper-
tise in the field and that it was specifically directed to revise North
Dakota's criminal law, it resembles a law reform commission more
than a legislative committee. Bridging the gap between federal doc-
uments and state law presents no difficulty in North Dakota. In
Sorlien v. N. D. Workman's Compensation Bureau9 the North Da-
8. Minutes "B", supra note 5, Sept. 20-21, 1971 at 11.
9. Copies of the minutes are available for examination at the UND Law Library.
10. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON T1-E REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL RE-
PORT (1971) and WORKING PAPERS (1970). A caveat to total reliance on such materials may
be had by reference to the Uniform Commercial Code and its official Comments. It has
been claimed that these comments, in some cases, expand or restrict the code provision
beyond or within the statutory language. Part of this may be the Insertion, by draftsmen,
of their own views despite contrary commission consensus. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 12 (1972).
11. Gibson v. First Nat'l Bank of Bismarck, 97 N.W.2d 671, 674 (N.D. 1959). See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 1-02-05 (1959).
12. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
13. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 48-49 (4th ed. 1973).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (Supp. 1973).
15. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 13, at 209.
16. See lausch v. Nelson, 13.1 N.W.2d 519, 529 (N.D. 1965).
17. E.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892).
18. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 13, at 208.
19. 84 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1957).
NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL CODE HORNBOOK
kota Supreme Court referred to a United States Senate Report as
an interpretive aid when construing North Dakota social security
statutes which were drawn from a federal counterpart.
2 0
This "Hornbook" was written with three purposes in mind. First,
to analyze major portions of the revised criminal code (New Code)
21
and suggest appropriate alterations; second, to facilitate its impli-
mentation by providing interested persons with a comparison be-
tween the New Code and the Old Code; and finally, to aid attorneys
and judges in the interpretation of the New Code by providing ref-
erences to legislative materials in an accessible format.2 2 The Old
Code has more case law precedent behind it than any other body
of North Dakota law.23 It is hoped that this project will facilitate
the development of case law dealing with the New Code.
20. 84 N.W.2d at 577-78. See also Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 734, 24 N.W.2d 737,
747 (1916).
21. Throughout, the revised code will be referred to as the New Code and the statutory
scheme which it replaces will be referred to as the Old Code.
22. To the extent that any of these goals are realized the student authors are indebted
to: Mr. John Graham, Legislative Council; Professor Larry Kraft, UND School of Law;
Professor Thomas Lockney, UND School of Law; Mr. Owen Anderson, Special Projects
Editor; and Dean Robert K. Rushing, UND School of Law.
Student contributors are: Mr. Ken Dalsted, Violence to the Public Order and Vire-
arms; Mr. James Henrichsen, Detention, Arson and Sexual Offenses; Mr. Robert Johnson,
Inchoate Crimes, Homicide and Sexual Offenses; Mr. Joseph Larson, Robbery and Burglary;
Mr. Robert Manley, Introduction, Sentencing and Culpability & Complicity; Mr. Dale Sand-
strom, Responsibility and Justification & Excuse; Mr. Keith Wolberg, Theft and Forgery &
Other Frauds.
23. Minutes "B", supra note 5, June 28, 1971 at 3.
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I. SENTENCING
Among the objectives of the New Code are:
By definition and grading of offenses, to define the limits and
systematize the exercise of discretion in punishment and to give
fair warning of what is prohibited and of the consequences of vio-
lation;
To prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the serious-
ness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in re-
habilitation possibilities among individual offenders;
* . .
To prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons ac-
cused or convicted of offenses.1
To impliment these purposes, offenses are divided into five classes
each with a maximum penalty.
1. Class A felony, for which a maximum penalty of twenty
years' imprisonment, a fine of ten thousand dollars, or both,
may be imposed.
2. Class B felony, for which a maximum penalty of ten years'
imprisonment, a fine of ten thousand dollars, or both, may
be imposed.
3. Class C felony, for which a maximum penalty of five years'
imprisonment, a fine of five thousand dollars, or both, may
be imposed.
4. Class A misdemeanor, for which a maximum penalty of one
year's imprisonment, a fine of one thousand dollars, or both,
may be imposed.
5. Class B misdemeanor, for which a maximum penalty of
thirty days' imprisonment, a fine of five hundred dollars, or
both, may be imposed.2
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-02(2), (3), (5) (effective July 1, 1975).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
Perhaps the most discussed aspect of the criminal code revision was the proposal that
the New Code include a penalty for offenses less serious than class B misdemeanors for
which a fine, but not imprisonment, would be appropriate punishment. See Minutes of the
Committee on Judiciary "B", N. Dak. Legislative Council, Jan. 24-25, 1972 at 9-10, Sept.
21-22, 1972 at 18-20 [hereinafter cited as Minutes "B"]. The proposal is not included in the
New Code.
The Committee on the Judiciary "A" has the assignment of revising the criminal
statutes not changed by S. Bill No. 2045, Forty-third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota
(1973), and serving as a forum for revision of that bill. Minutes of the Committee on Ju-
diciary "A",yN. Dak. Legislative Council, May 28, 1973, app. A at 1 [hereinafter cited as
Minutes "A"]. In response to these duties it has been proposed that N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-32-01 (effective July 1, 1975) be amended to include an additional class oaf offense. The
new addition is labeled infraction and is subject to a fine of up to $500 or for the second
infraction within one year a sentence of up to thirty days as well as the fine. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-32-01(6) (proposed by Committee on Judiciary "A"). It is probably appropri-
ate to alter the culpability statutes to include infractions. This was done in earlier drafts
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This is a substantial change from the current statutory scheme in
which the penalty is either set out in the chapter defining the crime
or established by reference to the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy.8
Thus, the severity of punishment is determined either by reference
to a system recognizing only two classes of crimes or without ref-
erence to any classification system at all. The latter arrangement
has been attacked as resulting in sentences which are the products
of different generations' differing moral judgments.
4
The maximum penalties set forth are in terms of periods of im-
prisonment and monetary amounts of fines. The universal availa-
bility of fines suited to the seriousness of the offense and the absence
of minimum sentences are distinct changes from current statutes.5
The classification system in the revised criminal code is similar
of the New Code but was deleted when the concept was excised from the New Code. Min-
utes "B", supra Mar. 2-3, 1972 at 18, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 18, 20.
It has also been proposed that the New Code be amended to include provisions for a
special fine structure for organizations. The proposed fine structure is as follows:
1. For a class A felony, a maximum fine of fifty thousand dollars.
2. For a class B felony, a maximum fine of thirty-five thousand dollars.
3. For a class C felony, a maximum fine of twenty-five thousand dollars.
4. For a class A misdemeanor, a maximum fine of fifteen thousand dollars.
5. For a class B misdemeanor, a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01.1 (proposed by Committee on Judiciary "A").
3. Under current law every offense declared a felony Is punishable by imprisonment in
the penitentiary for from one to five years and/or a fine of up to $1,000 except where a
different punishment Is provided for by law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-10 (1960). The pro-
vision for misdemeanors follows the same form with imprisonment set at up to one year in
the county jail and maximum fine at $500. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-14 (1960). An overview
of title 12 reveals at least 19 different punishment categories in terms of imprisonment in
the penitentiary.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-13-first degree murder-life term
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-18-06-use of explosives to commit a crime-20 to 40 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-17-second degree murder-10 to 30 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-11-attempted robbery-up to 30 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-01-kidnapping-5 to 20 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-18-first degree manslaughter-5 to 15 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-09-01-preventing meeting of legislative assembly-5 to 10 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(3)-riot in disguise-2 to 10 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04 (4)--directing a riot-not less than 3 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-14-01 (1) (Supp. 1973)-perjury in felony trial-up to 10 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-14-01(2) (Supp. 1973)-perjury in a misdemeanor trial-up to 5 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-14-01(g) (Supp. 1973)-perjury in other situations-up to 3 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-11-indecent liberties-1 to 15 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-11-second conviction of Indecent liberties-not less than 5 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-08-first degree robbery-not less than 1 year
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-09-second degree robbery-1 to 10 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-06-larceny of an automobile-1 to 7 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-11-adultery-1 to 3 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-02-attempted suicide-i to 2 years
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-34-01-arson of a dwelling-2 to 20 years
Applicable fines run a similar gamit.
4. A Hornbook to the Code, 48 WASH. L. REv. 149 (1972-73).
5. Current law has no coherent system relating the amounts of fines to the gravity of
the offense. For example, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill is punishable by
a fine of up to $200 [N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-06-26, 12-26-07 (1960)], assault with intent to
kill not utilizing a deadly or dangerous weapon is punishable by a fine of up to $500 [N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-26-09 (1960)] and aggravated assault and battery is punishable by a fine
of up to $1,000 [N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-10 (1960)]. It is apparent from an examination Of
note 3 supra that minimum sentences set by statute are the rule rather than the exception.
6. NATIONAL COMMIssION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, FINAL REPORT §§ 3002,
3201, 3801 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Final Report].
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to that in the Proposed Federal Code.6 It appears to be a notable
stride toward implementing the above mentioned objectives. 7
The New Code sets out the following sentencing alternatives:
a. Deferred imposition of sentence.
b. Probation.
c. A term of imprisonment, including intermittent imprisonment.
d. A fine.
e. Restitution for damages resulting from the commission of the
offense.
f. Restoration of damaged property, or other appropriate work de-
tail.
g. Commitment to an appropriate licensed public or private insti-
tution for treatment of alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental
disease or defect.8
The court may impose any one or a combination of the above. It
is specifically stated that these alternatives do not exclude uncon-
ditional release. Apparently none of the sentencing alternatives may
exceed the durational limits set out for imprisonment. 9 While the
current statutory scheme does not specifically set out all the above
alternatives as presently available, those that are not could be im-
posed as conditions of deferred imposition of sentence.10
The revised criminal code provides for liberal credit against
sentences for any detention relating to the offense charged.1 1 Cur-
ent law has no such provision. The Proposed Federal Code is sub-
stantially similar to the New Code in this respect.
12
The language of the Proposed Federal Code1 8 is adopted by the
New Code 4 in delineating a special sanction for organizations. The
7. A multi-tiered statutory scheme correlating gravity of offenses to severity of punish-
ment Is especially important in North Dakota because of the lack of provisions for appellate
review of sentences. The North Dakota Supreme Court recently reitterated the position that
provided a sentence is within statutory limits, the Supreme Court has no power to review
the term imposed. State v. Holte, 87 N.W.2d 47, 49-50 (N.D. 1957). While the Board of Par-
dons may review and commute sentences such Is exterior to the judicial process. N.D. CENt,
CODE § 12-55-05 (1960). A motion favoring the concept of appellate review carried in the
legislative committee which drafted the revised criminal code but no action was taken pur-
suant to it in the New Code. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Aug. 25, 1972 at 57.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
9. Id. Refer to note 59 infra for details of typographical errors which make this inter-
pretation unclear.
10. Current North Dakota law allows the court to defer imposition of sentence for up to
five years or while the obligation exists in abandonment or non-support cases. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-53-13 (Supp. 1973). During this period the court retains the power to revoke the
order deferring imposition for violation of its conditions. State v. Jackman, 93 N.W.2d 425,
429 (N.D. 1958). For example in that case the conditions of the order deferring imposition
of sentence included that the defendant seek employment, refrain from use of Intoxicating
beverages, and obey the laws of the state including city ordinances. Id. at 428.
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
12. FINAL REPORT supra note 6, § 3205.
13. Id. § 3007.
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-92-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
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sanction would allow the court to require an organization convicted
of an offense to give notice of the conviction to the persons or class
of persons who ostensibly suffered injury because of the offense. 15
Current law has no comparable provisions.
A series of fourteen factors are suggested to judges as appro-
priate for consideration in sentencing decisions under the New
Code. 16 The provision emphasizes that such are not controlling on
the court's discretion17 and need not be referred to in the required
statement of reasons for imposing the sentence issued.'8 These fac-
tors are duplicates of those in the Proposed Federal Code. The dif-
ference is that the federal provisions are tied to a provision giving
preference to sentences not involving imprisonment.1 9
A. FINES
While fines are traditional items in a court's sentencing reper-
toire, they have recently encountered Constitutional difficulties. The
problems relate to inability to pay fines resulting in imprisonment
because of poverty.20 In an attempt to circumvent such difficulties,
the New Code provides that the court shall consider among other
factors the defendant's monetary situation in determining whether
to impose a fine. In this vein courts are authorized to allow pay-
ment of fines in installments.
2 '
15. Id.
16. N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-32-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
1. The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm to
another person or his property.
2. The defendant did not plan or expect that his criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious harm to another person or his property.
S. The defendant acted under strong provocation.
4. There were substantial grounds which, though insufficient to establish a legal
defense, tend to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct.
5. The victim of the defendant's conduct Induced or facilitated its commission.
6. The defendant has made or will make restitution or reparation to the victim of
his conduct for the damage or injury which was sustained.
7. The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity, or has led
a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present offense.
8. The defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
9. The character, history, and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely
to commit another crime.
10. The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treat-
ment.
11. The imprisonment of the defendant would entail hardship to himself or his
dependents.
12. The defendant is elderly or in poor health.
13. The defendant did not abuse a public position of responsibility or trust.
14. The defendant cooperated with law enforcement authorities by bringing other
offenders to justice, or otherwise cooperated.
Id.
17. Id.
18. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-02(5), -04 (effective July 1, 1975).
19. FINAL REPORT supra note 6, § 3101.
20. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) the practice of imposing a fine and converting
it to a term of imprisonment because of the defendants' inability to pay the full amount due
was declared unconstitutional. The decision was based on equal protection considerations.
Id. at 398.
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-05(1,2) (effective July 1, 1975).
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The imposition of an alternative sentence to be served if the fine
is not paid is specifically prohibited by the New Code.2 2 However,
current North Dakota law, unrepealed by the New Code, allows the
court to direct that the defendant be imprisoned until the fine is
paid. The period must be specified and may not exceed one day for
each two dollars due.23 Such a provision seems very close to alter-
native sentences in terms of result and might be Constitutionally
infirm under some circumstances. 2' In lieu of alternative sentences
the New Code allows imprisonment for a short period provided the
defendant fails to establish his default as excusable. 25 The provi-
sions of the New Code relating to fines are substantially similar to
those in the Proposed Federal Code. 26
B. PROBATION
Probation is a relatively more recent addition to the sentencing
bill of fare. Under current North Dakota law probation may be im-
posed in two ways. The first involves suspended execution of sen-
tence. The court pronounces the sentence, but its execution is held
in abeyance.2 7 If the offense is a misdemeanor, the court may place
the defendant on probation.2 8 If the offense is a felony, the court
must do so.2 9 In the case of a felony the court loses all jurisdiction
over the offender to the Parole Board. The Board may set rules and
regulations for the offender and may revoke the suspension and ter-
minate the probation for violation of these rules or the terms and
conditions imposed by the court. This automatically imposes the
original sentence. 0 In the case of a misdemeanor, the court retains
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960).
24. If N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960) is intended to Impose a substitute punishment,
It Is contrary to the apparent intent of N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-05(2) (effective July 1,
1975). If it is Intended as a method of collection, it Is probably constitutionally infirm if
applied to those unable to pay the fine. The provision In N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960)
that such imprisonment does not discharge the fine cuts against the collection theory. How-
ever, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44-33 (Supp. 1971), which provides that five dollars shall be
credited to the defendant's fines for each day of labor performed while serving a jail sen-
tence, supports the collection service concept. See Note, Imprisonment of Indigents for Non-
payment of Fines or Court Costs; the Need for Legislation that Will Provide Protection to
the Poor, 48 N.D. L. Ruv. 109 (1971-72).
25. In Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) it was specifically stated that the imprisonment
of a defendant with the means to pay who fails to do so is subject to no constitutional
infirmity. Id. at 400.
26. PIAL REPORT supra note 6, §§ 3301-3304.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-01 (1960).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-04 (Supp. 1973).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-06 (Supp. 1973).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-53-06, -11 (Supp. 1973); John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37, 42
(N.D. 1968). North Dakota practices in relation to revocation of probation under these
circumstances conforms with the mandates of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
That case requires a preliminary and a final hearing with substantial procedural safeguards
especially at the final hearing. Id. at 1761-62. North Dakota practice exceeds these guide-
lines In that a full record is made of both hearings. While there is no statutory authority to
appoint counsel, contact is maintained with the Public Defender's Office. Personal communi-
cation with Irvin M. Riedman, Chief Probation and Parole Officer and Clerk of the Board of
Pardons and the Parole Board. Revocations of probation by the Parole Board are appealable
to the District Court. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1960).
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jurisdiction. If the offender violates the conditions, the court may
continue the probation under the same or different conditions or may
revoke the order suspending the execution of the original sentence. 81
The second method under current law involves deferred impo-
sition of sentence. A judgment of conviction is pronounced, but sen-
tencing is held in abeyance. 82 If sentencing is deferred, the offender
must be placed on probation under the supervision of the Parole
Board, except in the case of a misdemeanor when the court specif-
ically waives direct supervision.3  The court retains jurisdiction
over the offender in relation to revocation or modification of the
probation.
8 4
The New Code has retained these methods of imposing proba-
tion85 as well as adding another. The method is simply a direct
sentence to probation. The court may impose such conditions of pro-
bation as it deems appropriate and may alter these conditions upon
notice to the probationer."8 The sentence is five years for a felony
and two years for a misdemeanor. The court may terminate the
probation with a discharge prior to the statutory time period.
87
The court retains jurisdiction over the probationer. If the pro-
bation conditions are violated, the court may invoke any sentence
originally available.8 8 The only explicitly stated mandatory condi-
tion of probation is "that the defendant not commit another Offense
during the period for which the sentence remains subject to revo-
cation."8 9 The New Code sets out fifteen conditions of probation
which a court may impose. It is specifically stated that the court's
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-03 (1960), -04 (Supp. 1973) ; N.D.R. CRIM.P. 32(f) (2).
32. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-53-13, -14 (Supp. 1973) ; John v. State, 160 N.W.2d 37, 42-43
(N.D. 1968).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-14 (Supp. 1973).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-17 (1960) ; N.D.R. CRIM.P. 32(f).
35. None of the statutes appropriate to the imposition of probation under the two methods
are repealed by the New Code. See S. Bill 2045, § 41, Forty-third Legislative Assembly of
North Dakota (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-83-04(1) (effective July 1, 1975). The New
Code specifically authorizes the court to impose deferred imposition of sentence, but in-
cludes no specific limitations on the sentence other than the general rule that no sentence
may exceed the durational limits set out in the Code. N.D. CENT. 'CODE § 12.1-32-02(1) (ef-
fective July 1, 1975). The unrepealed Old Code provisions relating to deferred imposition of
sentence use the term suspended imposition of sentence. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-53-13, -14
(Supp. 1973). This creates a condition of potential confusion with suspended sentences under
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-53-04, -06 (Supp. 1973). The two were distinguished in John v.
State, 160 N.W.2d 37 (N.D. 1968) which adopted the terms deferred imposition for the
former and suspended for the latter. This has become common usage throughout North
Dakota. Thus this discussion proceeds from the point of view that the deferred imposition
of the New Code Is identical to and subject to the same limitations as the deferred imposi-
tion of the Old Code. In any case, this should be statutorally clarified. See text accompa-
nying notes 47-53.
36. N.D. CENT. CODE §3' 12.1-32-02(1) (b), -07(1), (4) (effective July 1, 1975).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-06(1), (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(4) (effective July 1, 1975). Revocation of probation for
violation of conditions under such circumstances requires a hearing in open court with sub-
stantial procedural safeguards. N.D.R. CRIm.P. 32(f) (2).
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
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options are not limited to these suggestions.40 Two of these condi-
tions which may be imposed at the option of the court relate to
required visits by and reports to a probation officer.4  This would
seem to indicate that supervision by the Parole Board is not an
automatic condition of a sentence to probation. However, the New
Code amends N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-14 (Supp. 1973) as follows:
In the event the court shall suspend the imposition of sen-
tence of a defendant, the court shall place the defendant
on probation during the period of suspension. During the
period of probation the defendant shall be under the control
and management of the parole board, subject to the same
rules and regulations as apply to persons sentenced to pro-
bation or placed on probation under suspended sentence as
provided in this chapter.
(added portion underlined.)
While this can be interpreted as mandating Parole Board supervi-
sion over those who are sentenced to probation, it would be a strange
and ambiguous method of requiring such especially considering the
above discussed optional conditions of probation relating to super-
vision.
42
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(2) (effective July 1, 1975). The condltotns are as fol-
lows :
a. Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of
study or of vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment;
b. Undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a speci-
fied institution if required for that purpose;
c. Attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction, recreation, or
residence of persons on probation;
d. Support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
e. Make restitution or reparation to the victim of his conduct for the damage
or injury which was sustained, or perform other reasonable assigned work.
When restitution, reparation, or assigned work is a condition of the sentence,
the court shall proceed as provided in section 12.1-32-08 ;
f. Pay a fine imposed after consideration of the provisions of section 12.1-32-05;
g. Refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other Idangerous
weapon unless granted written permission by the court or probation officer ;
h. Refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of narcotics or of another
dangerous or abusable drug without a prescription;
I. Permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his home
or elsewhere;
J. Remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to
leave by the court or the probation officer;
k. Answer all reasonable inquiries by the probation officer and promptly no-
tify the probation officer of any change in address or employment;
1. Report to a probation officer at reasonable times as directed by the court
or the probation officer;
m. Submit to a medical 'examination or other reasonable testing for the pur-
pose of determining his use of narcotics, marijuana, or other controlled sub-
stance whenever required by a probation officer;
n. Refrain from associating with known users or traffickers in narcotics, mari-
juana, oi other controlled substances; and
o. Submit his person, place of residence, or vehicle to search and seizure by
a probation officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search
warrant.
Id.
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07(2) (1), (j) (effective July 1, 1975).
42. The interpretation requiring mandatory supervision of persons sentenced to probation
is strengthened by the New Code amendment to the duties of parole officers. It provides
that the duties of parole officers include;
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The first thirteen optional conditions of a sentence to probation
are drawn directly from the Proposed Federal Code. 43 The last
three relate to submission to medical checks for drug use, warrant-
less searches of residence and person, and prohibition of association
with known drug users.- The provisions "were, in part, inserted
upon the suggestion of Mr. Riedman," Chief Probation and Parole
Officer and Clerk of the Board of Pardons and the Parole Board.
45
The provision requiring submission to warrantless searches
would seem to run directly afoul of the American Bar Association
probation standards which provide that conditions should not be
"unduly restrictive of his liberty."46 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court in State v. Schosser-t upheld the validity of a simi-
lar condition imposed on a probationer under deferred imposition of
sentence.48 Such conditions of probation have been questioned on
practical as well as legal grounds. It has been persuasively argued
that searches under such waivers impede the rhabilative process
1. To have supervision over and to look after the welfare of persons who.
have been paroled from the penitentiary and of persons who have received
sentences to probation or suspended sentences and have been placed upon pro-
bation ( ( (after having been convicted of a felony) )) ;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-55-07 (effective July 1, 1975) (added portion underlined, excised por-
tion In parentheses). The minutes of committee discussion relating this section are rather
cryptic.
The Committee discussed Section 18 of the bill, and the fact that it would
result In the extension of Parole Board jurisdiction to supervision of persons
paroled after misdemeanor convictions. Mr. Riedman stated that he favored
such supervisory authority, but, practically speaking, could not get the money
for the 25 new agents which would be necessary in order to handle parolees.
Mr. Wolf suggested that the supervisory authority could be extended to the
extent that funds were available.
IT WAS MOVED BY MR. WOLF that the following language be added to
Section 18: "to have supervision over and to look after the welfare of per-
sons who are on probation after conviction of a misdemeanor to the extent
that resources and personnel are available ;". THIS MOTION DID NOT RE-
CEIVE A SECOND.
Mr. Webb noted that misdemeanants are now being supervised by parole
agents after conviction of a misdemeanor under the procedures allowing de-
ferred imposition of sentence. After further discussion, no action was taken to
amend Line 7, Section 18.
Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 24. It appears, based on Mr. Wolf's motion,
that the term parole was used when probation was intended. Thus it seems the Committee
intended to require supervision of all offenders sentenced to probation. The proposed Federal
Code has no such requirement and the requirement violates the American Bar Association
Probation Standards. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.1(C) (1970). Further-
more, as was noted in Committee, such wide use of supervision suffers from practical fund-
ing difficulties.
43. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 3103.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-07(2) (m), (n), (o) (effective July 1, 1975).
45. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 23.
46. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(b) (1970).
47. 202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1972). It should be noted that the New Code proovides for war-
rantless searches by probation officers, while the above case referred to searches by any law
enforcement officer. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-06(2) (0) (effective July 1, 1975). The sug-
gested limitation in the New Code would help limit the danger of police harassment. See
People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1063-64, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800-01 (Ct. App. 1973).
48. Id. at 139. The court relied heavily on People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 97 Cal. Rptr.
302, 388 P.2d 630 (1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1016 (1972) which proceeded primarily on
an "advance waiver of Fourth Amendment rights" theory. Id. at 765, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 305,
588 P.2d at 633 (emphasis in original). The "contract theory" of advance waiver has been
vigorously attacked as an incomplete analogy on the grounds that public policy should deny
the enforcement of contracts made under coercion. Note, Probation Conditions, 1 AM. J.
CRM. L. 235, 239, 245-46 (1972).
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which the probation was meant to foster.49 Similarly, the dissenting
Justices in People v. Mason 50 stated: "It is high time that we rec-
ognized that a person must have the freedom to be responsible if
he is to become responsibly free." 511
North Dakota's probation system presents an unusual situation.
The New Code adopts a modern arrangement in substantial har-
mony with the American Bar Association recommendations.52 How-
ever, the suspended execution and deferred imposition of the Old
Code are still retained.53 This creates a complex and potentially
cacophonous area in the North Dakota sentencing structure. Similar
systems have been attacked as containing "subtle terminological dif-
ferences" which accomplish "nothing of functional significance."
54
The characteristics of the mandatory probation associated with
deferred imposition of sentence are so similar to the sentence to
probation that there is scant purpose in retaining it. The New Code
should be amended to provide that deferred imposition does not re-
quire a condition of probation while still retaining the time period
limitation of five years.5 5 Probation under suspended execution of
sentence should also be abandoned. 5 ' The requirement of automatic
imposition of the original sentence 57 creates a serious lack of flexi-
bility. While a pre-determined sentence may act as a deterent to
probation violations, this can also be accomplished by an admoni-
tion from the sentencing judge that the maximum sentence would
be available in case of revocation.58 The deterence factor is out
weighed by the fact that different kinds and degrees of probation vio-
lations should be dealt with by a flexible variety of sanctions.
The New Code's provisions relating to probation are substantially
similar to those in the Proposed Federal Code.59 There is, however,
one major difference. In the Proposed Federal Code probation is ex-
plicitly designated as a starting point for judical inquiry into sen-
49. Note, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 129, 134-35 (1969-70).
50. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 388 P.2d 630 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016
(1972).
51. Id. at 770, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 809, 388 P.2d at 637.
52. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION (1970) ; CoRmparative Analysis of ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice with N.D. Laws, Rules and Practice, P-1 to P-28 (1973).
53. Refer to text accompanying notes 27-35.
54. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION 25 (1970).
55. N.D. CENr. CODE § 12-53-13 (Supp. 1973). Refer to note 35 supra.
56. This recommendation was included in a draft of the New Code, but the Committee
voted to delete the revocation of the appropriate portions of the Old Code. Minutes "B",
supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 22. Countervailing considerations include the possibility
that the Parole Board will be less likely than judges to impose imprisonment for relatively
minor probation violations. Personal communication with Irvin M. Riedman, Chief Proba-
tion and Parole Officer and Clerk of the Board of Pardons and the Parole Board. It should
be noted that approximately ten times as many offenders are placed on probation under de-
ferred imposition of sentence as under suspended execution of sentence. Id. This seems to
indicate a judicial preference for retention of jurisdiction over probatloners.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-11 (Supp. 1973).
58. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 281.
59. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, ch. 31.
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tencing alternatives. Probation is favored unless substantial reasons
exist for the imposition of more severe sentences.60 The New Code
does not make any similar explication while relating the probation
provisions; however, the inference of a similar trend might be
drawn from the section on "factors to be considered in sentencing
decision." 61 The determination to be made is "the desirability of
sentencing an offender to imprisonment" but, each of the factors
is phrased negatively, limiting the moral or social evil of the of-
fenser2 This section is drawn directly from the Proposed Federal
Code .
6
C. RESTITUTION & REPARATION
The specific authorization of sentences requiring restitution or
reparation is new to North Dakota. Prior to imposing such sentences,
the court must conduct a hearing to determine the offender's ability
to make payments or restore property, the victim's "reasonable
damages" which are specifically limited to "fruits of the criminal
offense and expenses actually incurred as a direct result of the crim-
inal action," as well as probability of the sentence serving a re-
habilative purpose.64 The New Code provides that if restitution or
reparation is a condition of probation the court may direct that
the award may be enforced as a civil judgment.65 There are no ex-
plicit provisions for collection under a direct sentence to restitution
or reparation. Thus a contempt citation is the only available means
of enforcement. 6
D. SPECIAL OFFENDERS
The classification of offenses in the New Code is a reflection of
the concern that many authorized prison terms are too severe. How-
ever, it is acknowledged that in some cases long prison terms are
necessary for public protection.6 7 The response in the New Code is
the authorization of "extended sentences" for "dangerous special
60. Id. at 277-78. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW,
II WORKING PAPER. 1269, 1307 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPER].
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
62. Id.
63. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 33101.
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-08(1) (effective July 1, 1975). There are apparently two
typographical errors in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (effective July 1, 1975). The first pro-
vides that restitution or reparation "shall be imposed in the manner provided in section
12.1-32-07." That section deals with probation, while -08 deals with reference subject. The
second provides that the duration of sentences may not exceed the terms in "section 12.1-32-
08." That section deals with restitution and reparation while -09 deals with terms of im-
prisonment. The source of the errors is an altered numbering in the final bill and a reten-
tion of the referencing numbers from an earlier draft. See Minutes "B", supra, note 2, Sept.
21-22, 1972 at 2. This should be corrected despite N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-06 (1959) which
provides that such errors shall be disregarded in statutory construction.
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-08(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
66. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 18.
67. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60 at 1269.
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offenders" convicted of felonies .6  Prior to imposing such a sen-
tence the court must find that the convicted offender is "a dan-
gerous, mentally abnormal person," "a professional criminal," "a
persistant offender," "especially dangerous because he used a fire-
arm, dangerous weapon, or destructive device," or a second-offender
where the current offense "seriously endangered the life of another
person" and the prior offense was similar in nature.69 The only com-
parable provisions in the Old Code relate to increased sentences for
second, third, and fourth offenses.70
The court may not find the offender a "dangerous, mentally ab-
normal person . . . unless the presentence report 71 including a
psychiatric examination, concludes that the offender's conduct has
been characterized by persistent, aggressive behavior, and that such
behavior makes him a serious danger to other persons. "72 The court
has the power to order the commitment for diagnostic testing, at
an appropriate institution, of any convicted offender for up to 30
days. The commitment may be extended for an additional period of
up to 30 days.s Similar grounds for extended sentences have been
questioned on the basis of diagnostic inadequacy in behavioral
sciences.T
4
The statutory test for "professional criminal" is "substantial in-
come or resources derived from criminal activity." 75 "Substantial
source of income" is defined as exceeding the return from a year's
labor at the minimum wage and "fifty per cent of the offender's
declared adjusted gross income. '7 6 Such a finding may be support-
ed by a showing that the offender holds or controls wealth which
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (effective July 1, 1975). The extended terms are as
follows:
a. If the offense for which the offender is convicted Is a class A felony, the
court may impose a sentence up to a maximum of life imprisonment.
b. If the offense for which the offender is convicted is a class B felony, the
court may impose a sentence up to a maximum of imprisonment for twenty
years.
c. If the offense for which the offender is convicted is a class C felony, the
court may impose a sentence up to a maximum of imprisonment for ten years.
Id.
69. Id.
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-18 to -21 (1960).
71. Presentence reports contain:
any prior criminal record of the defendant and such Information about his
characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his
behavior as may be helpful In imposing sentence or in granting probation or
in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as
may be required by the court.
N.D.R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (2). Presentence reports are prepared by probation-parole officers.
Currently three officers have this as their primary duty. Personal communication with Irvin
Riedman, Chief Probation and Parole Officer and Clerk of the Board of Pardons and the
Parole Board.
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
73. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
74. Smith, Recognizing and Sentencing the Exceptional and Dangerous Offender, 35 FED.
PEOB., Dec. 1971 at 3, 10.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
76. Id.
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is not explained as having a non-criminal source. Evidence for such
a finding must be shown in the presentence report.
7
7
Persistent offenders are defined as having two prior class B or
above felony convictions; or two convictions below class B, both of
which were committed while an adult and at different times, plus a
class B or above felony conviction. Convictions overturned on re-
view, found invalid at the hearing required prior to the imposition
of an extended sentence, or pardoned on grounds of innocence may
not be considered in the persistent offender determination. 8
The initiation of special dangerous offender proceedings rests
with the prosecutor. If the defendant is over eighteen years of age,
the prosecutor may file notice with the court at a reasonable time
prior to the trial or the acceptance of a guilty plea. This may not
be disclosed to the jury under any circumstances, nor to the pre-
siding judge prior to adjudication without consent of the parties.
The notice is subject to inspection by the defendant and his coun-
sel .
7 9
After determination of guilt and prior to sentencing a hearing is
held. The court is instructed to obtain a presentence report "except
in the most extraordinary of cases." 80 Examination of the presen-
tence report by the parties is allowed except in "extraordinary"
cases when the court may withhold all or a portion of it.8' At the
hearing, the offender is entitled to compulsory process and the right
of cross-examination. The standard of proof is preponderance of the
information presented at the hearing, at trial and in so much of the
presentence report relied on by the court.
8 2
The degree of judicial review available for the determinations
at the hearing is not clear. The statute makes no explicit mention
of such. However, the requirements relating to the recording of find-
ings, information relied on and bases for the particular sentence"8
may indicate that some sort of review process is anticipated despite
North Dakota's lack of appellate review of sentences.8
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(9) (effective July 1, 1975).
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
81. Id. The limitations on this practice are as follows:
In extraordinary cases, the court may withhold material not relevant to, a
proper sentence, diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of
rehabilitation, any source of Information obtained on a promise of confiden-




84, Refer to note 7 supra. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-06(5) (Supp. 1973) provides for re-
view of "an order made after judgment affecting any substantial right of the party." This
could be construed to include a finding that the defendant was subject to an extended sen-
tence.
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E. PAROLE COMPONENTS
The New Code provides for mandatory parole components based
on the sentence imposed. They do not come into effect unless the
offender has "served the whole term of imprisonment to which he
was sentenced." 85 The purpose of the provision is to prevent an of-
fender whose conduct has been such that he was denied parole from
being released without supervision. It was the original intent of the
drafters that violation of such parole would subject the offender to
imprisonment for the remainder of the parole component or one
year which ever was greater.86 Such a provision did not find its way
into the New Code. The current law relating to breach of parole,
unrepealed by the New Code provides that the Parole Board may
confine a parolee "in the penitentiary as provided in his sentence."
It further provides that "the Warden shall receive and reimprison
such person in accordance with the terms of his original sentence.
'8 7
Thus, unless the parole component was considered a part of all orig-
inal sentences, the Parole Board would have no way of enforcing its
regulations in such a case. The New Code provides that either the
Board of Pardons or Parole Board may terminate the mandatory
parole component.18
The Proposed Federal Code is similar in that "parole is con-
ceived as the natural transition between every prison sentence and
complete freedom."8 9 The language differs because the Proposed
Federal Code applies parole components to indefinite sentences and
to parole prior to completion of the full term of imprisonment-" The
New Code makes no provisions for indeterminite sentences and re-
peals the Old Code provisions relating thereto.,1 The New Code
follows the Proposed Federal Code in that provisions for good be-
havior sentence reduction are repealed.9 2 Thus the desire for an
early parole will be the chief motive for good behavior.
93
F. MULTIPLE OFFENSES
The New Code draws heavily on the Model Sentencing Act
9' in
relation to sentences for multiple offenses.
9 5 If the offenses are a
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-10 (effective July 1, 1975).
86. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1971, app. A at 3.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-59-15 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-10 (effective July 1, 1975). Credence is lent to theory
that the mandatory parole component is intended to be part of the original sentence by
doubts expressed in Committee that the Parole Board could constitutionally "terminate sen-
tences." (referring to mandatory parole components). Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22,
1972 at 23.
89. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 1331.
90. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 3201, 3403.
91. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-59-13, -13.1 (Supp. 1973).
92. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-54 (1960), FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 300.
93. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 300.
94. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, MODEL
SENTENCING ACT §§ 19-22 (1963).
95. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 22-23, 1972 at 12-13.
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"single criminal episode," the sentences run concurrently. If they
are not, the sentences run concurrently unless otherwise ordered by
the court.9 6 The merger of any sentence imposed on a probationer
or parolee with his term of supervision is mandated by the New
Code. Similarly, a sentence imposed on a person already imprisoned
by a North Dakota court is merged with the original sentence un-
less specifically ordered to the contrary.9 7
Under the New Code the aggregate term of consecutive sentences
is apparently intended to be limited to the maximum term allowed
for special dangerous offenders. 9 This provision was derived from
Kentucky law.9 9 The New Code limits consecutive sentences for mis-
demeanors to one year except when the offender is guilty of two or
more class A misdemeanors committed separately and each with
"a substantially different criminal objective."' 10 0 In such a case the
consecutive sentences may not exceed the limits for a class C fel-
ony.10 1 The New Code emphasizes merger and concurrent sentences
as do the Proposed Federal Code 0 2 and the American Bar Associa-
tion standards. 0 3 The emphasis is based on the therapeutic theory
of penology. The treatment plan should prepare the offender for a
smooth merger into outside society rather than the sort of a con-
secutive sentence.'10 4
G. JUVENILES
The New Code leaves the provisions of the Uniform Juvenile
Court Act'0 5 intact. Similar treatment is given to provisions relating
to the North Dakota Industrial School. 00 The New Code provides
that a minor convicted of a felony may be sentenced to the county
jail or the state industrial school.'0 7 This is a rewording of the Old
Code to take care of changed institutional names and thresholds of
adulthood. 10
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-11(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-11(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-11(9) (effective July 1, 1975). This subsection seems to
suffer from a typographical error similar to those described in note 59 supra. The sub-
section limits the maximum term by reference to § 12.1-32-08, however, that isection refers
to restitution and reparation. An earlier draft used the reference to "section 8" which at that
time described extended sentences. Minutes '"B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972. at 13. The
reference was carried over to the final draft without correction for section number changes.
99. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 13.
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-11(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
101. Id.
102. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 3204.
103. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 3.4,
3.5 (1968).
104. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, MODEL
SENTENCING ACT 34 (1963).
105. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (Supp. 1973).
106. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-46 (Supp. 1973).
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-13 (effective July 1, 1975).
108. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-13 (1960).
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II. CULPABILITY & COMPLICITY
A. CULPABILITY
The scheme of culpability in the New Code is based on the
terms intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, and will-
fully.109 Their definitions are drawn substantially from the Proposed
Federal Code.110 Intentionally and knowingly subdivide willfully as
defined by the Old Code."' Recklessly requires "conscious disre-
gard" of risk such as to be "a gross deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct." 1 2 According to the comments to the Propos-
ed Federal Code it is thus clearly distinguished from the tort con-
cept of recklessness. 113 Negligently requires the same "gross devia-
tion," but only in reference to an "unreasonable disregard."'1 4 The
"gross deviation" standard serves to distinguish it from tort negli-
gence."15 The Old Code definition of negligence is much more closely
related to tort negligence than the criminal standard of negligence
set out in the New Code.1" 6
109. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975). Their definitions are as
follows:
a. "Intentionally" if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his purpose to do
so ;
b. "Knowingly" if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or has a firm
belief, unaccompanied by substantial doubt, that he is doing so, whether or not
it is his purpose to do so;
c. "Recklessly" If he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly unjusti-
fiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant
facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct, except that, as provided in section 12.1-04-02, awareness
of the risk is not required where its absence is due to self-induced intoxica-
tion ;
d. "Negligently" if he engages in the conduct in unreasonable disregard of a
substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such dis-
regard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct; and
e. "Willfully" if he engages In the conduct Intentionally, knowingly, or reck-
lessly.
'd.
110. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 302.
111. " 'Willfully,' when applied to the Intent which an act is done or omitted, Implies
simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or omission referred to .... .. " N.D.
CENT. CODE 12-01-04(1) (1960). The New Code distinguishes the person "who wills" (inten-
tionally, from the person "who is merely willing." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(1) (c) (effective July 1, 1975).
113. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. This distinction might be difficult to make) in some
fact situations. "Reckless disregard of safety" has been defined in terms of "knowing or
having reason to know" facts which would set a reasonable man on notice of an unreason-
able risk exceeding simple negligence. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Thus,
there is no need that the actor realize the danger, he need only fail to heed facts which
would notify a reasonable man. Id., comment c at 589. In contrast, under the New Code the
disregard must be "conscious." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02(1) (c) (effective July 1, 1975).
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(1) (d) (effective July 1, 1975).
115. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. Tort negligence Is that which falls below stan-
dards established to protect others from "unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). The "unreasonable disregard" of the New Code's negligence
make it closely akin to that portion of tort recklessness which is not included in the crimi-
nal recklessness of the New Code.
Under North Dakota law, gross negligence is the "want of slight care and diligence."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-17 (1959). The concept finds application in North Dakota's "guest
law." N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-15 (1972). Gross negligence has been judicially defined as
showing indifference to consequences which should have been foreseen. E.g. Holcomb v. Strie-
bel, 133 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1965). Thus, gross negligence is close to criminal negligence as
defined In the New Code.
116. The Old Code states that such terms "Import a want of such attention to the nature
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If the required degree of culpability is not specified and the of-
fense is not specifically excused from culpability requirements, then
the degree of culpability required is willfully, i.e., intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. Unless otherwise provided, the required de-
gree of culpability is needed with respect to every element of the
offense unless related solely to grading or statutorily required to
"in fact" exist. An exception is that where the required degree of
culpability is intentionally the degree need only be knowingly as to
attendant circumstances." 7
B. ACCOMPLICES
The New Code provides that accomplices are criminally liable
for the conduct of the actor who committed the offense. A person
is an accomplice if he, with the requisite culpability, caused another
to commit an offense; or if he intended that an offense be commit-
ted and aided another in its commission or failed to make the ef-
forts required by his legal duty to halt the commission. A co-con-
spirator is also an accomplice if he is associated with the offense
under the conditions described above. 11 It is further provided that
the term accomplice is not applicable to those made not account-
able for the conduct of others in the statutes describing the offense." 9
The fact that the actor, whose conduct the accomplice is being held
liable for, has not been punished for the crime is not a defense
for the accomplice. Neither is the fact that the accomplice is not of the
class of persons capable of directly committing the offense. These
"defenses" may be available if so provided in the description of the
offense.1
20
The New Code provisions, taken directly from the Proposed Fed-
eral Code,' 2' replace the traditional principal and accessory dichot-
omy. Principal includes both the actor and generally those in the
accomplice category. 2 2 Accessories are those persons who aid and
conceal the perpetrator of a felony with knowledge that he has corn-
or probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in act-
ing in his own concerns." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-01-04(2) (1960).
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1) (effective July 1, 1975). It should be noted that this
statute rejects the conspiracy doctrine of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
That case held that membership in a conspiracy is sufficient to create liability for all of-
fenses committed In its furtherance. Under the New Code mere membership Is not enough
to predicate liability for more than conspiracy. See I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at
155-57.
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(1) (effective 'July 1, 1975). This exception includes
those expressly or by implication made not accountable because they are victims or other-
wise. Id.
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
121. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 401.
122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-04 (1960).
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mitted a felony.123 The New Code provisions relating to "hindering
law enforcement" replace the accessory category.'
12 4
C. LIABILITY OF AGENTS & CORPORATIONS
Under the New Code a person who acts in the name of a legal
entity or in its behalf is criminally liable as if he were acting in his
own name or in his own behalf.1 25 If an organization fails to per-
form a legally required act, any person with "primary responsi-
bility for the subject matter" is accountable as if the duty was his.
1 26
Individuals who act as accomplices of such legal entities are subject
to punishment prescribed for natural persons guilty of the offense.
127
The Old Code has no similar provisions.
The New Code provides a detailed scheme of corporate liability
drawn from the Proposed Federal Code.128 Corporations are liable
for acts of agents within their scope of employment when the acts
are misdemeanors or offenses which do not require culpability. If
the offense is more serious, scope of employment and authorization
are required.- 9 The Old Code does not have a comparable scheme.
III. RESPONSIBILITY
A. JUVENILES
The New Code bars 32 prosecution of a person as an adult "if
the offense was committed when the person was less than sixteen
years of age."'13 This is consistent with the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act which North Dakota has adopted . 2 The New Code, unlike the
Proposed Federal Code, does not lower the age to fifteen for cer-
tain serious crimes. 33 Likewise, the New Code does not contain the
Proposed Federal Code's specific provision barring trial as an adult
without a court order, if the person was less than eighteen years
old at commission.
1 4
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-05 (1960).
124. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-08-08 (effective July 1, 1975) ; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6,
at 106.
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-03(1) (effective July 1, 1975). The actual statute uses
"legally accountable": rather than criminally liable. The statutory language might be ex-
tended to include civil liability. This was pointed out in Committee but a motion which
would have limited the accountability to "unlawful conduct" failed to pass. Minutes "B",
supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 25.
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
128. FINAL REPORT, suLra note 6, § 402.
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
130. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 38.
Being under age is denominated a bar; the prosecution need not introduce
any evidence as to a defendant's age unless the issue has been raised. By
making lack of age a bar, the question of when the issue is to be decided is
left to procedural provisions.
131. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
132. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1960).
133. The Proposed Federal Code lowers the ages of permissible prosecution to fifteen for
murder, aggravated assault, rape and aggravated involuntary sodomy. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 6, at 38.
134. Id., § 501. This is provided, however, by the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, N.D.
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Unlike the Proposed Federal Code, the New Code provides:
"Persons under the age of seven years shall be deemed incapable
of commission of an offense defined by the Constitution or statutes
of this state."' 1 5 This is intended to deny the person liability even
in juvenile court. 186 An almost certainly unintended effect of this pro-
vision may be to exempt from criminal liability corporations and
other entities during the first seven years of their existence.
13
7
The Old Code holds children under the age of seven incapable
of committing a "crime," but with no exemption for liability by way
Of juvenile "offense.' "Is The Old Code establishes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that children over seven years but under the age of four-
teen are incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of their acts and
therefore incapable of committing a crime.8 9 These Old Code age
provisions are essentially the common law rule.
140
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, however, has effectively barred
prosecution as an adult for any offense committed by a person un-
der sixteen years of age, with permissible juvenile court waiver for
adult prosecution if the person was sixteen or seventeen years old
at commission."'4
B. INTOXICATION
The New Code provides for a "defense" of intoxication only if
the intoxication "negates the culpability required as an element of
the offense charged. ' 14 2 If, however, the defendant would be held to
have acted "recklessly" had he been aware of the risk, and if he
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1960).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966), held that a juvenile court cannot
waive its jurisdiction over a youth to a criminal court "without hearing, without effective
assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons."
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
136. Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 27.
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (25) (effective July 1, 1975) provides for the New
Code: " 'Person' includes, where relevant, a corporation, partnership, unincorporated as-
sociation, or other legal entity."
The language of the Proposed Federal Code is clearly not relevant to corporations or
the like, since it is, in every provision, by reference to "prosecution as an adult," applicable
only to natural persons. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 38.
The Old Code provision, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01(1) and (2) (1960), likewise, by
reference to "children," makes it clear that it is only relevant to natural persons.
The New Code provision, "Persons under the age.of seven years shall be deemed in-
capable of commission of an offense...," contains no reference clearly indicating relevance
only to natural persons. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-01 (effective July 1, 1975). Arguably,
references to "persons" are relevant to corporations unless they are clearly not relevant.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01(1) (1960).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01(2) (1960). The North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted
this provision in State v. Fisk, 12 N.D. 589, 591, 108 N.W. 485, 486 (1906) :
The state may overcome the presumption, but to do so, it must show by
clear proof that the accused knew the wrongfulness of the act when he com-
mitted it. In the absence of such proof the presumption of incapacity must
prevail. The burden is upon the state in such cases to prove knowledge of the
wrongfullness of the act as an independent fact.
Id.
140. State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 589, 591, 108 N.W. 485, 486 (1906) ; W. LAFAVE & A. Scourr,
prANDBOOC ON CRIMINAL LAW 351 (1971).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1) (1960).
142. N.D. CENT. COoE § 12.1-04-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
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would have been aware of the risk had it not been for his self-in
duced intoxication, then he shall be held to have acted "reckless-
ly." 148
The intoxication section as proposed by the interim committee
and adopted by the Legislature provides a number of problems.
First, contrary to the statutory label, intoxication should not prop-
erly be considered a "defense." 1" The courts have long recognized
that when intoxication negates a necessary element of culpability,
no crime has been committed. 4 5 This section codifies the judicially
recognized admissibility of evidence of intoxication to this end, and
denies any defense of intoxication which is not established by the
section. It provides no "defense.'
14 6
Second, the New Code does not preclude intoxication from being
considered a "mental disease" within the meaning of the insanity
defense. 147 Third, the New Code does not define "intoxication.'14 8
143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975); see N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-02-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975) ; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
144. A defense Is a factor which exonerates a defendant from criminal liability for an of-
fense which has been committed. See Carter v. Eighth Ward Bank, 33 Misc. 128, 67 N.Y.S.
300 (1900).
145. State v. Koener, 8 N.D. 292, 295, 78 N.W. 981, 983 (1899).
146. Certain background may explain the origin of this problem. The interim committee
worked from the Proposed Federal Code § 502 which recognizes intoxication defenses in
cases of intoxication which is "not self-induced" and of the so-called "pathological intoxica-
tion," when "by reason of such Intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacked sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 502. The committee rejected this lan-
guage in favor of alternate language cited in the "comment" on the section. Id., at 39. This
decision was apparently based on a fear of great judicial problems with a defense of "path-
ological intoxication" and on a belief that the alternate language was more like the existing
North Dakota law and therefore more likely to meet legislative approval. Minutes "B",
supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 29-30. The Proposed Federal Code, while acknowledging
that "[elvidence of Intoxication is admissible whenever It is relevant to negate or establish
an element of the offense charged," leaves no doubt that this is not in the realm of defenses.
147. The Proposed Federal Code specifically excludes intoxication as a "mental disease".
FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, § 502(1). This omission from the New Code is apparently a
result of the interim committee's attempt to follow the proposed "alternate" suggested in
the "comments". FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 99. It is not clear, however, that the
interim committee correctly interpreted the "comment":
An alternative to this section preferred by some members of the Commis-
sion is as follows: "Intoxication Is a defense to the criminal charge only if it
negates the culpability required as an element of the odffense charged. In any
prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be
admitted whenever it is relevant to negate the culpability required as an ele-
ment of the offense charged except as provided In subsectin (2)." Under this
alternative subsections (3) and (4) would be omitted. [The subsection refer-
ences are to those of Proposed Federal Code § 502.]
The alternative provides that subsections (3) and (4) as contained in Proposed Fed-
eral Code § 502 be omitted. Reasonably, the subsections (1) and (2) of § 502 would be re-
tained and the "core" language of the alternative added. Somehow, the interim committee
apparently concluded they also were supposed to eliminate subsection (1) of § 502, and
hence the language precluding consideration of intoxication as a "mental disease" was lost.
148. The language of Proposed Federal Code § 502, which the interim committee deleted,
provides: " 'intoxication' means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting
from the introduction of alcohol, drugs or other substances Into the body". FINAL REPORT,
supra -note 6, § 502 (4a). In no way was the deletion necessary to effectuate the "alter-
nate". See note 11, supra. Nevertheless, the deletion apparently was based not on a re-
jection of the definition, but on an unreasoning adherence to an unexplained remark in the
"comments," which seem to imply that it is necessary to effectuate the alternate. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
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Fourth, the New Code uses, but fails to define, "self-induced intoxi-
cation.,, 14
Perhaps the most important change provided by this section is
to increase the culpability of an intoxicated person regarding find-
ings of "recklessness." A state of mind which is not culpable in a
sober person can be culpable in a person under "self-induced intoxi-
cation." 150 Thus the impact of this section is to deny defenses'61 and
to extend the criminal liability of the intoxicated.
152
The Old Code and North Dakota case law hold that intoxication
is not a defense. " ' Evidence of intoxication is, however, admissible
for three purposes: to show no crime has been committed, by ne-
gating the existence of a necessary intent;15 if some crime has
been committed, to determine which crime has been committed;1 55
and to determine if the defendant was capable of criminal conduct.15'
C. MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT
One of the areas of greatest controversy in drafting the New
Code was the "insanity" or "mental disease or defect" defense.,
15
Both the New and the Old Codes utilize a M'Naughten test, while
the New Code provides that the defense may also be established un-
149. For explanation of this problem, see note 148, supra. The language in Proposed
Federal Code § 502, which the interim committee deleted, provides: " 'self-induced Intoxi-
cation' means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into
his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he
introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would other-
wise afford a defense to a charge of crime". FINAL REPoaT, supra note 6, § 502 (4b).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
151. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-04-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
152. "No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxciation shall be
deemed less criminal by reason of his having been In such condition." N.D. CENT. CODE §
12-05-01. In considering this statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated "if the de-
fendant did in fact commit the crime with which he was charged, his intoxicated condition
would not avail, either to justify or excuse him." State v. Koerner, 8 N.D. 292, 294, 78
N.W. 981, 982 (1899). Apparently, Dakota Territory recognized an intoxication defense
similar to that of the Proposed Federal Code, see note 146 supra. Regarding intoxication as
"a defense, or excuse, or justification" was not precluded when the defendant "has lost
control of his will." People v. Odell, 1 Dak. 189, 194, 46 N.W. 601, 603 (1875). Since the
statutory language was unchanged, this was apparently eliminated by the above cited lan-
guage in Koerner.
154. "[lt rests on the underlying principle that the ultimate object of judicial inquiry in
every criminal prosecution is to determine whether a crime has been committed...." State
v. Koerner, 8 N.D. 292, 297, 78 N.W. 981, 983 (1899).
155. "[W]henever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent
is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime,
the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated
at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he com-
mitted the act.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-05-01 (1960).
156. "There is no degree of intoxication, however great, which, of itself, is recog-
nized ag rendering one incapable of forming a criminal intent. But there
may be a mental condition amounting to a species of insanity, superinduced
by long and excessive use of intoxicating liquors, which amounts to a legal
incapacity to commit crime. In such a case the jury passes upon the existence
of that condition, and, if the condition exists wherein the accused is legally
irresponsible, the law holds him guiltless of crime." State v. Koerner, 8 N.D.
292, 297, 78 N.W. 981, 983 (1899). This can more aptly be considered a
species of insanity defense than a species of intoxication defense.
157. See Minutes of Committee on Judiciary "B", Y. Dak. Legislative Council (1971-72).
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der an irresistable impulse test.158 The Old Code follows the tradi-
tional M'Naughten test formation, "59 holding incapable of commit-
ting a crime:
Mental deficients, incapable of knowing the wrongful-
ness of the act charged against them;
Lunatics, insane persons, and all persons of unsound
mind, including persons temporarily or partially deprived of
reason, upon proof that at the time of committing the act
charged against them they were incapable of knowing its
wrongfulness .... 160
In practical application of the statute, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has used the following:
The generally accepted test of responsibility for crime is
the capacity to understand the nature of the act alleged to
be criminal, and the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong with respect to such act. 61
The Proposed Federal Code "mental disease or defect" formu-
lation followed exactly by the New Code, 62 closely adheres to the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation. 6 8 The New
Code provides:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law. "Mental disease or defect" does not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise antisocial conduct. Lack of criminal responsi-
bility under this section is a defense.'"
The "M'Naughten" test of the New Code meets many objections
to the traditional formulation.
Most significant is the fact that the A. L. I. test only re-
quires a lack of "substantial capacity." This is clearly a de-
parture from the usual interpretation of M'Naughten and irre-
sistable impulse, whereby a complete impairment of cogni-
tive capacity and capacity for self-control is necessary. 65
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-03 (effective July 1, 1975) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01
(3) and (4) (1960).
159. The rule was originally established in M'Naughten's Case, 10 CL&F, 200, 210, 8
Eng.Rep. 718, 722 (1843):
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labour-
ing under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
Id.
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01(3) (1967). Prior to 1967 the subsection simply stated:
"Idiots."
161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-01(4) (1960).
162. State v. Throndson, 49 N.D. 948, 363, 191 N.W. 628, 634 (1922).
163. FNA.L REPORT, supra note 6, § 503.
164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
165. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw, 292 (1972).
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The test also substitutes "appreciate" for "know," and "criminality"
for "wrongfulness. '" 16
The "irresistable impulse" provision of the New Code16 1 is spe-
cifically disallowed by the Old Code:
A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts existing
in the mind of a person who is not shown to have been in-
capable of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts forms no
defense to a prosecution therefor.1"6
The major alternative approach, for the "mental disease or de-
fect" section, considered by the interim committee was, essentially,
elimination of the insanity defense, with mental condition becoming
a factor to be considered in the imposition of sentence after con-
viction.169 Under this approach, the New Code would have provided:
Mental disease or mental defect is a defense to a crimi-
nal charge only if it negates the culpability required as an
element of the offense charged. In any prosecution for an
offense, evidence of mental disease or mental defect of the
defendant may be admitted whenever it is relevant to ne-
gate the culpability required as an element of the offense. 7 0
Since there is no offense in the absence of an essential element,
this is really not a defense to a committed crime.
The alternate approach, doing away with the defense, was also
considered and rejected by the drafters of the Proposed Federal
Code. 171
166. The substitution of "criminality for 'wrongfulness' " in the Proposed Federal Code
was made "to include cases wherl the perpetrator appreciates that his conduct was criminal,
but because of delusion believes It to be morally justified." I WORKINO PAPERS, supra note
6, at 231 (1970).
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-05-02 (1960).
169. Minutes "B", supra note 2, January 24-25, 1972 at 25.
170. Minutes "B", supra note 2, May 11-12, 1972 at 5-6.
171. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 41, provides pro and con comments on this alternative:
Against this alternative and in favor of § 503 [adopted by North Dakota's
New Code] as it appears in the text, it is argued that a person maniacally
"intent" on committing murder or other crime would satisfy all the culpa-
bility requirements specified elsewhere in the Code. Yet he might be hopelessly
insane under uncontradicted psychiatric testimony, his insanity manifesting
itsef precisely in the crazed intent to kill or a mad illusion as to a Justificatioln
for killing. It Is further argued against the alternative that any effort to rb-e
fer the mental Illness issue to the general formulations on culpability could
lead only to a confusing and contradictory judicial interpretation of the culpa-
bility requirements, as judges were forced, without legislative guidance, to
develop a Jurisprudence related to mental illness under the rubrics of "intent",
"knowledge", and "recklessness". Opposition to the alternative also rests on
the view that It would be Immoral and inconsistent with the aim of a criminal
code to attribute "guilt" to a manifestly psychotic person.
In favor of the alternative, it Is argued that it integrates the insanity and
culpability provisions of the Code, and avoids the logical difficulty of finding
"culpability" present but nevertheless exonerating on the ground of mental Ill-
ness. Those who favor this view also believe It would facilitate jury considera-
tion of guilt, since only one standard of culpability would be employed. Far
from artifically limiting medical testimony, the alternative would direct it Into
intelligible legal channels and lead hopefully to the end of confusing dual no-
tions of "medical" and "legal" insanity.
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IV. JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
The New Code,'1 2 substantially following the Proposed Federal
Code,178 provides that behavior that is otherwise proscribed by law
is, under certain circumstances, justified or excused; 74 and that un-
less otherwise provided, such justification or excuse is a "defense,"
not an "affirmative defense.9
1 7 5
Even though a person is justified or excused "in using force
against another," if he "recklessly or negligently injures or creates
a risk of injury to other persons," the justifications afforded by this
chapter of the code ' s are "unavailable in a prosecution for such
recklessness or negligence.' 7 7 In other words, although in specific
cases certain uses of force may be justifiable or excusable, there is
no blanket protection from all consequences of the use of such force.
A person is never justified in "using more force than is nec-
essary and appropriate under the circumstances.
'17 8
The justifications and excuses provided in this chapter'79 apply
only to criminal law, in no way affecting remedies at civil law. 80
While the New Code essentially follows the Proposed Federal
Code, federal adoption of the Proposed Federal Code would in some
cases permit assertion of Federal Code justifications and excuses in
state and local prosecutions.' 1
Significantly, there is no provision for the so-called "choice of
Vance Hill, chief proponent of the alternative, provided the Interim committee with
additional rationale for its adoption, noting "that It is difficult for the layman to under-
stand why a defendant is acquitted by reason of Insanity, where the facts indicate that It is
perfectly clear the defendant committed the offense charged." Minutes "B", supra note 2,
March 2-3, 1972 at 30.
172. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-01(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
173. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 601.
174. A justification is a circumstance which actually exists and which makes
harmful conduct proper and noncriminal. An excuse Is a circumstance for
which the Code excuses the actor from criminal liability even though the
actor was not "Justified" in doing what he did.
Id.
175. The "comment," FINAL REPORr, supra note 6, at 44, notes:
"All Justifications and excuses are either defenses (the burden of disproof is on the
prosecutor) or affirmative defenses (the burden of proof Is on the defendant)."
176. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
178. N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-05-07(1) (effective July 1, 1975). According to N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-12(1) (effective July 1, 1975), " 'Force' means physical action, threat, or
menace against another, and Includes confinement.'
179. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
180. N D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975). In FINAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 44, the "comment," which deals with the same language as contained in the New
Code, states that "[c]onduct may be justified In a criminal context but may nevertheless
subject the actor to civil suit or dismissal from his job, or other noncriminal sanction."
181. While N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-01 (effective July 1, 1975) adopts the exact lan-
guage of the Proposed Federal Code § 601(1), (2) and (3), It omits Proposed Federal Code
§ 601(4) which provides:
The defenses of Justification and excuse may be asserted In a state or
local prosecution of a federal public servant, or a person acting at his direc-
tion, based on acts performed in the course of the public servant's official
duties.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 601.
This would over-ride any stricter state or local standards.
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evils" rule.18 2 The absence of the provision apparently is not the re-
sult of evaluation by the Interim Committee, but rather of perva-
sive adherence to the Proposed Federal Code.188
A. EXECUTION OF A PUBLIC DUTY
Under the New Code, execution of a public duty can act as a
justification for both public servants and private citizens. "Conduct
engaged in by a public servant in the course of his official duties
is justified when it is required or authorized by law."118' The phrase
"by law," apparently includes federal as well as state and local
law.u'
If a public servant directs a person to assist him, that person
is justified in using force to carry out the public servant's direc-
tion, "unless the action directed by the public servant is plainly un-
lawful."' 18 The choice of the word "directed" may create problems
as to the limitations on this justification.
1 8 7
182. Essentially, a "choice of evils" rule would justify the use of force if necessary to
avoid a greater harm. FINAL RPORT, supra note 6, at 43. The Model Penal Code Includes
the rule. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962). The "comment" on this section, FINALREPORT,
supra note 6, at 43, notes that "some Commissioners believe that a penal code is seriously
deficient if it does not explicitly recognize that avoidance of greater harm is, If not a duty,
at least a privilege of the citizen." Nevertheless, the "comment" indicates, at 43, that the
rule is not included
• ' • on the view that, while its intended application would be extremely
rare In cases actually prosecuted, even the best of statutory formulations (sea
N.Y.Pen.L. § 35.10) Is a potential source of unwarranted difficulty in ordi-
nary cases, particularly in the context of the adoption of the broad mistake if
fact and law provisions found In the Code.
The prevailing Commission view, "comment" at 43, is to rely, not on statutory codi-
fication, but on "case-by-case prosecutive discretion." Apparently, those favoring this ap-
proach axe content merely to "hope" that this discretion will not be abused, and, to "hope"
that it will serve the cause of Justice.
188. The Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 44, indicate that at least some
members felt the interim committee was relying too much on "National Commission in-
fallibility":
Judge Smith then noted that perhaps all the provisions of Chapter 600 of
the proposed FCC [Federal Criminal Code; N.D. CENT. ConEi 12.1-05 (effective
July 1, 1975)] were more comprehensive than was necessary in North Dakota.
IT WAS MOVED BY JUDGE SMITH AND SECONDED BY MR. WEBB that
Chapter 600 of the proposed FCC be deleted, and that the present North Da-
kota statutes dealing with justified or excusable use of force be substituted
for Chapter 600.
The Committee discussed this motion at length, and it was noted that Chap-
ter 600 was an integral part of the scheme of the proposed FCC. JUDGE
SMITH, WITH THE CONSENT OF HIS SECOND, WITHDREW HIS MO-
TION in favor of an indication on the record that he did not think the Com-
mittee should blindly accept any of the provisions of the proposed FCC simply
because they had been drafted by a National Commission.
Id.
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
185. The "comment" on this language in FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 44, which states:
The phrase "by law" Includes state law, so that a state sheriff, for example,
who levies execution on a shipment of goods in interstate commerce Is not
guilty of theft under the federal code. Federal supremacy prohibits a person
from relying on a state law which he knows contradicts federal law.
Id.
186. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
187. The interim committee follows the language of Proposed Federal Code § 602(2) for
this subsection, except for the substitution of the word "directed" for the words "being
taken" in the proviso "unless the action being taken by the public servant is plainly un-
lawful." The Minutes "B", indicate no discussion or explanation of this change contained in
the draft by Committee Council and adopted by the Committee, Neveretheless, the change
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A person is justified in using force in making a citizen's arrest
or preventing an escape, if the appropriate public servant is not
available. Such use of force is limited, however, to felonies involv-
ing force or violence, and to crimes committed in the person's pres-
ence which he would be justified in using force to prevent. 18 8 The
reference to crimes the person is justified in using force to prevent
alludes primarily to the justifications of self-defense, defense of
others and defense of premises and property.'8 9
The federal commentators note:
This section determines only the question of criminal lia-
bility in using force in such circumstances and does not
establish the authority to make the arrest or affect ques-
tions as to civil liability. Accordingly, it is the basis for ex-
cusing the use of force even when the actor is mistaken as
to the underlying facts. 90
The Old Code justifies the use of force by a public officer in the
performance of any legal duty, and by other persons assisting the
officer or acting at his direction.' 9' This is essentially as is provided
in the New Code, except that the New Code adds the limitation re-
garding directions of the officer which are plainly unlawful. 192 The
Old Code also allows the use of force in making a citizen's arrest. 9 3
The Old Code justifies force in cases of "any felony,"'' while
the New Code limits force to fe'lonies involving force or violence and
extends the justification to certain crimes committed in the person's
presence. 9 5
Use of "deadly force"'96 is justified when expressly authorized
may be a significant one, and It does cause problems. The important question is which ac-
tion must be plainly unlawful to deny justification? In the Proposed Federal Code, it is
"the action being taken by the public servant," which, It would seem, reasonably includes
the directions the public servant gives, as well as his overall course of action. Under this
interpretation, if either the overall course of action of the public servant or the directions
he gives are plainly unlawful, then justification is denied. Under the New Code, the im-
portant consideration is "the action directed by the public servant." Under this language,
is It only the action directed which matters? If the specific action directed by the public
servant is not Inherently unlawful, is the person justified, even if the public servant's overall
course of action is plainly unlawful? Or is the lawfulness of the direction to be evaluated
In light of the overall course of action?
188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
189. See FINeA REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
190. FrNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 45. See N.D. CENT. CODE §! 12.1-05-08 (effective July
1. 1975), which deals with excuse based on mistake of fact.
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(1)1 (1960).
192. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-02(1) and (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(3) (1960). The term "justified" is not used, but the sec-
tion provides that the use of such force is "not unlawful." Id.
194. Id.
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
196. Defined as:
"Deadly force" means force which a person uses with the intent of caus-
ing, or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing, death or ser-
ious bodily injury. A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury, by the pro-
duction of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor's intent is limited to
creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not
constitute deadly force. ...
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-12(2) (effective July 1, 1075).
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by law,'19 7 such as imposition of a death sentence. 198 Deadly force is
justified:
When used by a public servant authorized to effect ar-
rests or prevent escapes, if such force is necessary to effect
an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a per-
son who has committed or attempted to commit a felony
involving violence, or is attempting to escape by the use of
a deadly weapon, or has otherwise indicated that he is
likely to endanger human life or to inflict serious bodily in-
jury unless apprehended without delay .... 199
Recognizing, however, that a guard may not know the grounds on
which a prisoner is detained, the New Code justifies the guard's use
of deadly force necessary to prevent an escape, unless the guard
knows the prisoner is not a person described in the above language.200
The New Code also justifies deadly force when "used by a person
who is directed or authorized by a public servant," except if the
person knows that "the public servant is himself not authorized to
use deadly force under the circumstances. ' 20 ' Public servants may
also be justified in using deadly force under the other New Code
justifications .
202
This "public duty" justification of deadly force in the New Code
essentially adopts the corresponding provisions of the Proposed Fed-
eral Code, 20 3 but eliminates the separate "riot" subsection204 because
"it might not present an adequate restriction on the use of unrea-
sonable force in the course of a riot.
'20 5
The Old Code justifies deadly force when necessarily employed
in arresting or recapturing a person who has committed any felony,20 6
while the New Code requires a felony involving violence.2 0 7 The Old
Code permits deadly force if necessary to overcome "actual resis-
tence to the execution of some legal process or to the discharge of
any other legal duty,"208 but the New Code, except as already noted,
does not justify deadly force in such cases except in self-defense.2 0 9
This adopts the language of the Proposed Federal Code except for the deletion, prob-
ably as redundant, of one sentence:
Intentionally firing a firearm or hurling a destructive device in the direction
of another person or at a moving vehicle in which another person Is believed
to be constitutes deadly force.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 619 (b).
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
198. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
199. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (d) (effective July 1, 1975).
200. N.D. CENT. 'CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(e) (effective July 1, 1975). See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 6, at 51.
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (g) (effective July 1, 1975).
202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 through § 12.1-05-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
203. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 48-50.
204. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 49.
205. Minutes "B", March 2-3, 1972 at 43.
206. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-04(3) (1960).
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (d) (effective July 1, 1975).
208. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-04(2) (1960).
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
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B. SELF-DEFENSE
The New Code provides that a person is justified in using force
in self-defense against "imminent unlawful bodily injury, sexual as-
sault, or detention. '210 A person is not justified, however, in using
force to resist arrest, execution, or other performance of duty by a
public servant who is acting under color of law, "but excessive force
may be resisted." 21 ' Justification for resisting such a public servant
is denied even if it is later established that the resisted action was
in fact unlawful.212
Under the New Code, a person who has intentionally provoked
another is not justified in causing bodily injury or death to that
other person; 218 nor is he justified if he was the initial aggressor or
entered into mutual combat, unless the force he is resisting is clearly
excessive or he has clearly withdrawn from the encounter and the
other combatant continues to use force, and then he is only justified
in using "defensive ' 21 4 force. This is essentially the common law
rule.2'
The Old Code justifies the use of force in self-defense by a per-
son about to be injured, "if the force or violence used is not more
than sufficient to prevent such offense. ' ' 216 Unlike the New Code, the
Old Code does not deny justification for resisting unlawful arrest or
process.217 North Dakota case law permits the resisting of excessive
force by public servants. The North Dakota Supreme Court, in State
v. Carter,21 8 held that
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
211. N.D. CENT. COn § 12.1-05-03(1) (effective July 1, 1975). For this section, the New
Code follows the language of the Proposed Federal Code. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
45 (1971). The motivation for the Proposed Federal Code's elimination of the gen-
eral right to resist unlawful arrest is provided In I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 264:
This right to resist arrest has been severely criticized- in recent years. We pro-
pose to do away with this privilege to use force to resist an arrest by a pub-
lic servant. There are ample nonviolent remedies against improper official
action. The law should not sanction any rule which would lawfully put an
officer's safety at stake when he seeks to make an arrest.
At the state level, permitting resistance of excessive force was a controversial interim
committee concern. Committee minutes indicate that Mr. Wolf felt the language "excessive
force may be resisted" was questionable since it might allow persons being subjected to
arrest to use a subjective standard In determining whether to resist a peace officer. The
insertion of the qualifying language "only with force sufficient to prevent such excessive
force'" was finally rejected by a 5 to 4 vote, the majority feeling that N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-05-07(1) (effective July 1, 1975), dealing with limits on the use of force, takes care
of the situation. Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 33.
212. Id., at 33, states that Committee Council "noted that the language . . . prevents a
person from using force to resist even an unlawful arrest." The "comment," FINAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 45, on the same language in the Proposed Federal Code notes that the sec-
tion makes the 'legality of the arrest irrelevant. The purpose of this change Is to discourage
self-help for the resolution of such an issue."
213. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
214. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
215. FINAL REPORT, aupra note 6, at 45.
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(3) (1960). N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973)
justifies the use of "any means reasonably necessary" In self-defense.
217. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-26-03(3) (1960) ; 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
218. 50 N.D. 270, 195 N.W. 567 (1923).
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[S]hould an officer use more force than is necessary to
effect. . .an arrest and detention, then the person arrested
would have a right to resist under the law of self-defense. 219
The New Code justifies the use of deadly force "in lawful self-
defense.., if such force is necessary to protect the actor ... against
death, serious bodily injury, or the commission of a felony involving
violence. The use of deadly force is not justified if it can be avoided. 220
There is no justification for deadly force if safety for the actor and
others can be achieved by retreat "or other conduct involving minimal
interference with the freedom of the person menaced. ' 22' Except,
there is no duty of retreat for a peace officer in the performance of his
duty or for those assisting him,222 nor is there a duty of a person
to retreat from his own dwelling or place of work, "unless he was
the original aggressor or is assailed by a person who he knows also
dwells or works there."22
8
The Old Code justifies homicide by a person "[W]hen resist-
ing any attempt to murder him or to commit any felony upon
him .... ;,,p224 and justifies a person protecting himself "by any
means reasonably necessary. ' 225 North Dakota case law also recog-
nizes that "once the defendant has an opportunity for safe retreat,
he is no longer acting in self-defense," nor is violence following pur-
suit after one who has fled justifiable by the pursuer on the grounds
of self-defense.
226
North Dakota case law does require, for self-defense, "reason-
able apprehension of immediate and impending injury.
' 2
2T
Previous threats alone, unaccompanied with any present
hostile demonstrations, either real or apparent, neither jus-
tify nor excuse nor mitigate a killing. Neither does mere
apprehension of future danger.
2 28
Case law denies justification when "the defendant sought,
brought on, or voluntarily entered into a difficulty with the deceased
for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him. ... "22 The case
law does, however, recognize an "imperfect" class of self-defense:
But it is also the rule that if the defendant did not pro-
voke the quarrel with a felonious intent, but to commit only
a battery, amounting to a misdemeanor, and during the pro-
219. Id. at 283, 195 N.W. at 571.
220. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b) (1) (effective July 1, 1975).
222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b)(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
228. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b) (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
224. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05(1) (1960).
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (1971).
226. State v. Lehman, 44 N.D. 572, 584-85, 175 N.W. 736, 740 (1919).
227. State v. Carter, 50 N.D. 270, 283, 195 N.W. 567, 571 (1923).
228. United States v. Leighton, 3 Dak. 29, 31, 13 N.W. 347 (1882).
229. State v. Carter, 50 N.D. 270, 283, 195 N.W. 567, 571 (1923).
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gress of the controversy or fight found it necessary to take
the life of the deceased, in order to save his own, then he
can avail himself of such defense to reduce the crime from
murder to manslaughter.
230
C. DEFENSE OF OTHERS
The New Code justifies the use of force against another person
to defend any third person 231 who would be justified in defending
himself .2 2 This justification is denied to a person who has "by prov-
ocation or otherwise, forfeited the right of self-defense. ' 238 Both the
records of the interim committee2 and those of the federal draft-
ers, 23 5 whose work was followed, stipulate that defense of strangers
and defense of one's own family are equally justified.
The Old Code 2 36 provides for essentially the same justification
for defense of others as is provided in the New Code, with the
omission of a specific provision for forfeiture by provocation. Des-
pite this statutory omission of the Old Code, North Dakota case
law would seem to recognize the principle of forfeiture of such jus-
tification.
287
The New Code, following the Proposed Federal Code,238 provides
that deadly force may be used in the course of lawful defense of
others when necessary to protect the third person "against death,
serious bodily injury, or the commission of a felony involving vio-
lence." 2 39 There is a duty of the actor to seek to cause the protected
person to retreat if safety can be obtained by retreat.24 0
While the New Code justification of deadly force in lawful de-
fense of others extends to any person so defended, 4 ' the Old Code
restricts justification of such employment resulting in homicide to
the lawful defense of the actor's "husband, wife, parent, child, mas-
ter, mistress, or servant, ' 24 2 or "his family" or "another who is be-
ing the victim of aggravated assault, armed robbery, holdup, rape,
230. State v. Swift, 53 N.D. 916, 927, 208 N.W. 388, 392 (1926).
231. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
232. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-04(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
233. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-04(2) (effective July 1, 1975). I WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 60, at 265:
"The proviso Is necessary in order not to foreclose prosecution where a person pro-
vokes an attack to secure an opportunity to inflict 'defensive' injury."
234. Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 34. The minutes record that Commit-
tee Council noted that the section "allows both defense of strangers and the defense of one's
own family on the same basis." No committee discussion is Indicated. Id.
255. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 46.
236. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(3) (1960), § 12-27-05(2) (1960), and §' 12-27-05.1 (Supp.
1973).
237. State v. Carter, 50 N.D. 270, 283, 195 N.W. 567, 571 (1923), denies justification If
"the defendant sought, brought on, or voluntarily entered into a difficulty with the deceased
for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him." While the specific justification referred
to in this case is self-defense, the doctrine would, nevertheless, seem applicable.
238. ]FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
239. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (effective July 1, 1975).
240. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
242. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05 (1960).
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murder, or any other crime involving serious force or violence. ' 24 3
Although the Old Code provides no explicit statutory requirement to
seek to cause the retreat of the threatened party if it will result
in safety to all concerned, this would be a reasonable interpretation
of the general requirement that the force be necessary.
D. USE OF FORCE BY PERSONS WITH PARENTAL, CUSTODIAL, OR
SIMILAR RESPONSIBILITIES
The New Code, drawing on the Proposed Federal Code,2 " by par-
ents, teachers and other persons having custodial responsibility to-
ward a minor, and by the guardian of an incompetent person. The
force must be for the purpose of the child's welfare or discipline,
but need not be "necessary," so long as it is "reasonable. ' 24 5 "The
force used must not create a substantial risk of death, serious bodily
injury, disfigurement or gross degradation." ' 24 The Old Code justi-
fies a similar use of force toward a child, but the force must be
not only reasonable, but also necessary, and moderate in degree.
247
The New Code does not justify or excuse the use of deadly
force which results in homicide.4 8 The Old Code classifies as "ex-
cuseable homicide" the death of a child resulting by accident or
misfortune in lawfully correcting the child "by lawful means, with
usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent.' 249 It is
unlikely, however, that the "homicide" "excused" under the Old
Code, is homicide at all under the New Code, since the intent is a
necessary element of the New Code crime.
250
Under both the New and the Old Codes, a common carrier may
justifiably use force to maintain order. 25 1 Deadly force for such pur-
pose is not justified under either Code.
252
The New Code justifies the use of non-deadly force to prevent
suicide or to avert serious bodily injury to another.2 5 8 Similarly, the
Old Code justifies non-deadly force in preventing
243. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
244. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 605.
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) and (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
246. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) and (2) (effective July 1, 1975). This sentence re-
places the more permissive language of the Proposed Federal Code: "[The force used]
must not be designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk. (emphasis added),
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 605.
Apparently, if the force used does in fact create such a substantial risk, the justifi-
cation would be denied under the New Code. S9ee N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) and (2).
247. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(4) (1960).
248. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07, (effective July 1, 1975).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-03(1) (1960).
250. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-16 (effective July 1, 1975).
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(3) (effective July 1, 1975) and N.D. CENT. CODE §
12-26-03(5) (1960).
252. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (effective July 1, 1975) and N.D. CENT. CODE §
12-27-05 (1960).
253. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(5) (effective July 1, 1975) see N.D. CENT. COPE §
12.1-05-07 (effective July 1, 1975).
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an idiot, lunatic, insane person, or other person of un-
sound mind, including persons temporarily or partially de-
prived of reason, from committing an act dangerous to him-
self or to another .... 254
Not contained in the Old Code is the New Code's specific justi-
fication of the use of force, by a duly licensed physician or a per-
son acting at his direction, to administer a recognized form of treat-
ment2 55 if the treatment is administered in an emergency, 256 or with
"the consent of the patient, or, if the patient is a minor or an in-
competent person, with the consent of his parent, guardian, or other
person entrusted with his care and supervision, ' ' 25 7  or by court
order. 2 8 The force employed by the physician or his assistant in
such situations may include "deadly force, '259 "if such force is nec-
essary to administer a recognized form of treatment to promote the
physical or mental health of a patient.
' 260
E. DEFENSE OF PREMISES & PROPERTY
The New and the Old Code justify the use of force by a person
to prevent or terminate trespass or other unlawful interference with
property. 261 Under the Old Code, the property must be the person's
own property 262 or "in his lawful possession, 2 6 but under the New
Code, there is no requirement that the person employing force have
any interest in the property! 264
The New Code adds the explicit statutory requirement that
. . . the person using such force first [request] the person
against whom such force is to be used to desist from his
interference with the premises or property, except that a
request is not necessary if it would be useless or danger-
ous to make the request; or substantial damage would be
done to the property sought to be protected before the re-
quest could effectively be made.
265
254. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03(6) (1960) ; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05 (1960).
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
256. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(4) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
257. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(4) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
258. N.D. CuNT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(4) (C) (effective July 1, 1975). This provision was dis.
cussed at length by the interim committee and it is the specific intent of the committee
"that a physician is protected in operating upon a competent adult, when such operation is
ordered by a court." Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 44.
259. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 51, notes that this justification is.
• . . necessary because "deadly force" is defined ... as force, i.e., physical ac-
tion, which the actor knows creates a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury. Major operations create this risk.
Id.
260. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (f) (effective July 1, 1975).
261. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-06 (effective July 1, 1975) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03
(1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
262. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
263. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03 (1960).
264. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
265. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-06 (effective July 1, 1975). For the purposes of the justi-
fication chapter, the New Code provides that:
"Premises" means all or any part of a building or real property, or any
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This New Code requirement, essentially following Proposed Federal
Code 2 6 while not explicitly stated in the Old Code 267 might be a
reasonable interpretation of the requirement that the employment of
force be "necessary.
2 68
The drafters of the New Code chose not to include the Proposed
Federal Code restriction that "the use of force is not justified to
prevent or terminate a trespass if it will expose the trespasser to
substantial danger of serious bodily injury."2 "
The New Code justifies employment of deadly force only by:
.a person in possession or control of a dwelling or place
of work, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be
there, if such force is necessary to prevent commission of
arson, burglary, robbery, or a felony involving violence
upon or in the dwelling or place of work and the use of
force other than deadly force for such purposes would ex-
pose anyone to substantial danger or serious bodily in-
jury . ... 270
The Old Code justifies homicide by any person resisting any at-
tempt to commit any felony "upon or in any dwelling house in which
he iS, 1271 and in addition justifies all force "reasonably necessary"
to protect his real or personal property.22 Interestingly, the Old Code
seems to provide a broader justification for homicide in defense of
premises than it does for the employment of lesser force.2 7 8
F. MISTAKE OF FACT
If a person is mistaken as to the facts of a situation, and if the
facts had been as he believed them to be his conduct would have
been justified or excused, then, under the New Code, he is excused.2 7 4
structure, vehicle, or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or
used by persons for carrying on business therein.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-12(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
266. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 47.
267. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-03 (1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
268. I WORKINO PAPERS, supra note 60, at 260.
269. The federal commentators clarify the Import of this provision: "For example, a
ship's captain may not justifiably use force to remove a stowaway from his ship in mid-
ocean." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
The interim committee rejected the proposed language fearing that "trespass" might
be confused with burglary, and because adequate restraint was considered Imposed by the
requirement of N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(1) (effective July 1, 1975), that the force be
"necessary and appropriate." Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 88.
270. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2) (c) (effective July 1, 1975). For the purposes of the
Justification chapter, the New Code provides that:
"Dwelling" means any building Or structure, though moveable or temporary,
or a portion thereof, which Is for the time being a person's home or place of
lodging.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-12(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
271. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05 (1960).
272. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-05.1 (Supp. 1973).
273. Homicide justification may be predicated on presence, under N.D. CENT. CODE §
12-27-05 (1960), while the justification for employment of lesser force requires ownership,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-05.1 (Supp. 1973), or lawful possession of the property, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-26-03 (1960).
274. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-08 (effective July 1, 1975).
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If, however, negligence or recklessness suffices to establish culpa-
bility for the offense, a negligently or recklessly held belief will not
excuse the offense. 27 5 Excuse based on mistake of fact is a "defense"
or an "affirmative defense" "according to which type of defense
would be established had the facts been as the person believed them
to be.
'2 7 6
The language of the New Code excuse provision adopts277 with
only the slightest changes, Proposed Federal Code § 608 (1) .27 Not
included in the New Code is Proposed Federal Code § 608 (2) which
provides:
A person's conduct is excused if it would otherwise be
justified or excused under this Chapter but is marginally
hasty or excessive because he was confronted with an emer-
gency precluding adequate appraisal or measured reaction.2 79
There is no comparable mistake of fact provision in the Old
Code.280 North Dakota case law has recognized that a "justification"
can be extended to cover certain "mistake of fact" situations, at
least in cases of self-defense.
2 1
1
The Old Code does provide that no crime is committed in the
case of ignorance or mistake of fact "which disproves any criminal
intent. '2 2 In view of the further provision that "ignorance of the law
does not excuse from punishment for its violation, ' 28 8 the Old Code
is really only providing that, if a specific intent is necessary for an
offense, in the absence of the intent there is no offense. This would
275. Id.
276. Id.
,277. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 52.
278. Id., § 608(1).
279. In FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 52. The federal commentators note that the provi-
sion "incorporates a famous insight by Mr. Justice Holmes in Brown v. United States, 256
U.S. 335 (1921) ('Detached reflection cannot be expected in the presence of an uplifted
knife.')" Id.
The interim committee consideration leading to rejection of the provision indicates
concern over lack of adequate definition of "marginally hasty or excessive." Judge Erickstad
explained that he voted for deletioi because he believes
. . .that the essence of subsection 2 is covered in subsection 1, since the ques-
tion of whether a person acted negligently or recklessly would be based in
part on a determination as to whether that person was faced with an "emer-
gency.
Minutes "B", supra note 2, March 2-3, 1972 at 45.
280. During committee consideration that Committee Council stated that these New Code
mistake of fact provisions "would replace the essence of Section 12-27-03 although its pro-
visions are not exactly opposite to the provisions of Section 12-27-03." Minutes "B", supra
note 2, March 2-3, 1972, at 45.
In fact, the only similarity in the two provisions is that each deals with "excuse."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-03 (1960) deals with excuse based on accident or misfortune, with
no reference to mistake of fact.
281. State v. Hazlett, 16 N.D. 426, 442, 113 N.W. 374, 380 (1907), recognizes a subjective
test for mistake of fact in self-defense:
[T]he circumstances must be viewed from the standpoint of the defendant
alone, and that he will be justified or excused if such circumstances were suf-
ficient to create in his mind an honest and reasonable belief that he was In
such imminent danger.
Id.
282. N.D. CENT. CoDi § 12-02-01(5) (1960).
283. Id.
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be the case even without such a specific provision. Therefore, the
absence of such a specific provision in the New Code is without ap-
parent consequence.
G. MISTAKE OF LAW
While the Old Code provides that ignorance of the law does not
excuse from punishment for its violation, 284 the New Code establishes
as an affirmative defense "a person's good faith belief that conduct
.does not constitute a crime," provided the person acted in "reason-
able reliance" on a statement of the law.2 9 The statement of the
law must be contained in a "statute or other enactment; 286 a "ju-
dicial decision, opinion, order, or judgment; '28 7 an "administrative
order or grant of permission; ",288 or an "official interpretation of the
public servant or body charged by law with responsibility for the in-
terpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law. . . 29
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code,20 whose version of
this section the New Code adopts, express their intention that the
mistake of law defense is "not available for infraction where proof
of culpability is generally not required.
' 29 1
H. DuREss
The New Code establishes the affirmative defense of duress
where "the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was
compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury to himself or to another."2' 2 If, however, the offense is not a
felony, compulsion by force or threat of force is sufficient.2 93 A find-
ing of compulsion, within the meaning of this section, is precluded
unless "a person of reasonable firmness" would be rendered "inca-
pable of resisting the pressure." 4 The language thus requires, sub-
jectively, actual compulsion and, objectively, adequate compulsion.
The duress defense is not available, under the New Code, if the
person "willfully placed himself in a situation in which it was fore-
seeable that he would be subjected to duress."295 If the defendant
284. N.D. CENT CODE § 12-02-01(5) (1960).
285. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09 (effective July 1, 1975). The federal commentators note:
In most instances, it would be unreasonable for a layman to fail to consult a
lawyer, and would not be in good faith if he failed to make full disclosure to
him of all revelvant facts.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 53.
286. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
287. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
288. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
289. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
290. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 609.
291. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 53.
292. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
293. Id.
294. Id. The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code, whose version of this section the New
Code adopts, note regarding this section that " 'reasonable firmness' to resist commission of
a crime would vary with the nature of the crime."
I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 276.
295. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
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was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, the defense is
likewise not available "whenever negligence suffices to establish
culpability for the offense charged." 296
The Old Code, which recognizes duress "consisting of an actual
compulsion by use of force or fear ' ' 297 (a subjective test), does not
require the additional, objective-"person of reasonable firmness"
-test.2 9 Further, the Old Code, unlike the New, does not require
threats of imminent death or serious bodily injury for a duress de-
fense in felony cases, nor does the Old Code establish the "willful
or negligent" exceptions found in the New Code.29"
Under the New Code, there is no requirement that the compul-
sion be created by another person; rather, "compulsion" apparently
covers apprehension regardless of the source of the threat.800
I. ENTRAPMENT
The New Code permits the affirmative defense of entrapments0 1
when a law enforcement agent "induces the commission of an of-
fense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-
abiding persons to commit the offense. 8 02 This follows the language
of the Proposed Federal Code. 808
The test for entrapment is an objective one, based on proscrib-
ed behavior of law enforcement agents.8 0' The question is not
whether the agent's behavior actually caused the specific individual
296. Id.
297. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-05-04 (1960).
298. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-05-04 (1960).
299. Id.
800. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 54.
801. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1) (effective July 1, 1975).
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
303. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 58.
304. At the federal level, this section offers statutory enactment of the minority position
stated by Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) and by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 856 U.S. 369 (1958). Frankfurter stated:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct it-
self is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of govern-
mental power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to
commit the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if
the criminal conduct was the product of "the creative activity" of the law-
enforcement officials.
Id. at 382.
The majority of the court in both SorreMis and Sherman has favored the subjective
test In Sorreiis Mr. Chief Justice Hughes for the majority stated:
(T]he defense of entrapment is not simply that the particular act was com-
mitted at the instance of government afficials. . . . The predisposition and
criminal design of the defendant are relevant. But the issues raised and the
evidence adduced must be pertinent to the controlling question whether the
defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of
its own officials. . . . [a]nd If the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of en-
trapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his
own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
The Hughes theory for recognition of entrapment Is based on imputed legislative
intent:
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to commit the offense, but whether such behavior would be likely
to cause a "normally law abiding person" to commit it. 8 0 5
If the law enforcement agent merely affords an opportunity to
commit the offense, there is no entrapment. 06 "Law enforcement
agents," for the purposes of this section, include personnel of fed-
eral, state and local law enforcement agencies and persons cooper-
ating with them.8 07 Such agents have been held, in federal decisions,
to include paid informers,e0s those acting under promise of immu-
nity,80 and those acting under expectation of leniencyslO
Although the Old Code does not statutorily authorize the entrap-




The New Code's treatment of criminal attempt, criminal facili-
tation, criminal solicitation and criminal conspiracy closely paral-
lels the approach of the Proposed Federal Code. 12 The Old Code de-
votes a chapters 8 specifically to "attempt"; several additional pro-
hibitions of attempt are scattered through the Old Code.8 14 The in-
tention under the New Code is to have all attempts prosecuted under
the one section dealing specifically with criminal attempt.815
One must "do an act" or "engage in conduct" in order to be
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress In
enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be
abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of per-
'sons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and punish
them.
Id. at 448.
The Roberts-Frankfurter theory Is based soly on governmental wrongdoing:
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of, a clime
instigated by the government's own agents. No other Issue, nod comparison of
equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place
in the enforcement of this overruling principle policy.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932).
805. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
306. Id.
307. N D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
308. Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
309. Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1940).
310. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1958).
311. In State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655, 661, 102 N.W. 875, 877 (1905), the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that:
[A] detective may aid in the commission of the offense in conjunction with a
criminal, and that the fact will not exonerate the guilty party. Mere decep-
tion by the detective will not shield the defendant, If the offense be committed
by him free from the influence o instigation of the detective. The detective
must not prompt or urge or lead in the commission of the offense. The de-
fendant must act freely of his own motion....
Id.
312. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 67-74.
313. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-04 (1960).
814. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-16-05 (Supp. 1973) (attempt to escape from prison),
12-27-32 (1960) (attempt to kill by administering poison), 12-31-11 (1960) (attempted rob-
bery), 12-34-05 (1960) (attempt to burn property), and 12-37-07 (Supp. 1973) (attempt to
extort).
315. N. DAK. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT 85 (1973).
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,guilty odf .an attempt. Under the Old Code the -act must be: "done
with intent to commit a crime." 1116 Under the New Code a tperson
must,act, "with the kind of culpability otherwise required for com-
mission of a crime,"' 17 and "intentionally" 83  engage in certain con-
duct.
Under the Old Code, the act done must be one tending to effect
the -commission of the crime.3 1' Under the 'New Code, -the conduct
must be such that it "in fact, 'constitutes a substantial step toward
commission of the crime. 320 The definition 21 of "substantial step"
is intended to prevent a conviction based .on -the accused's mere
declaration of his criminal intent. 822
With wording identical to that of the Proposed Federal ,Code, 28
the New Codes24 eliminates the defense of impossibility. The drafts-
men of the Proposed Federal Code quote a summary of the reasons
for this position:
In all of these cases (1) criminal purpose has been clearly
demonstrated, (2) the actor has gone as far as he could in
implementing that purpose, and (3) as a result, the actor's
dangerousness is plainly manifested 
s25 .
A person who acts believing his act is illegalalthough it actually
is legal is not guilty of an attempt. 26
One who acts with the intent of aiding another 'person tocommit
a crime and who would be an accomplice if the crime were com-
mitted is guilty of criminal attempt under the New Code.3 27 This sub-
section of the New Code and similar language in the Proposed Fed-
eral Code 28 do not require that the conduct strongly corroborate the
316. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-04-01 (1960).
317. N.D: CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
318. Id. This term refers to the conduct, and does not imply an addition to the standard
of culpability for the attempted crime. Minutes "BO, supra note 2, April 6-7, 1972 at 6. The
identical use of the term in the Proposed Federal Code is designed to exclude from attempt
liability "attempts" where the result of the accused's conduct---even if that result is unin-
tended-is an element of the crime "attempted." For example, "The mere performance of
the negligent act is not an attempt to commit negligent homicide, even though death could
have resulted." I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 354 n.6 (1970).
319. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-04-01 (1960). This section also provides that one may be con-
victed of attempt when the intended crime itself was perpetrated, unless the court acts to
direct prosecution for the completed crime.
820. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
321. "A 'substantial step' is any conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firm-
ness of the actor's intent to complete the commission of the crime." Id.
322. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 357. The language, identical In the New Code
and the Proposed Federal Code, would "require that the conduct itself corroborate 'that the
actor means what he said." Id. "The requirement is that it have the corroborative quality,
not that It independently prove the actor's guilt." (Emphasis in original). Id. at 358.
323. FINAL REPORT, "upra note 6, § 1001.
324. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
325. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, Comment at 31 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960), quoted in I
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 361.
326. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01 (effective July 1, 1975). I WORKING PAPERS, supra note
60, at 361.
327. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
328. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1001.
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firmness of the accused'sf intent,829 nor do they prohibit an act other
than, aiding.880
The maximum punishment provided for attempt in the Old Code
is generally one-half of the maximum punishment for the attempted
crime;8 81 Under the New Code,83 2 classification of-and, thus, the
punishment for-criminal attempt is the same as that of the offense
attempted, with two exceptions: (1) if the attempted crime is a
class A felony, the attempt is a class B felony,88 and (2) if the
attempt did not "come dangerously close to commission of the
crime" 84 the attempt to, commit a class B or C felony is reduced
to an offense of the next lower class.
8 5
B. FACILITATION
The New Code,886 like the Proposed Federal Code 87 but unlike
the Old Code, 38 defines and prohibits criminal facilitation. Convic-
tion of this crime requires proof that the accused "knowingly" 88' pro-
329. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-03 (effective July 1,'1975) defines the liability of an ac-
complice; those liability provisions are applied to this attempt subsection. See I WORKICNG
PAPERS, supra note 60, at 360.
330. Soliciting and commanding are covered in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective
July .1, 1975).
331. ND. CENT. CODE §: 12-04-02 (1960). A variation provided for in this section -is that
where the attempted offense is punishable by less than four years' imprisonment in the
penitentiary the maximum punishment for the attempt is one year's imprisonment in the
county jail. Other sections (e.g., those cited in note 314 above) dealing with attempts pro-
vide for punishments which often depart from this pattern. If another crime Is committed
during the attempt, the individual may be punished for that crime. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12-04-03 (1960).
332. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12;1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975). The Identical provision in the
Proposed Federal Code is consistent with both the present Federal law and the penal philo-
sophy that it is the actor's "anti-social disposition" or "dangerousness" rather than merely
the result of his act which determines the appropriate sentence. I WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 60, at 364-66.
333. This makes the maximum term of imprisonment equal to one-half of the maximum
for the attempted offense. The maximum terms foir a class A felony and for an attempt to
commit a class A felony are, respectively, thirty and fifteen years in the Proposed Federal
Code, FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 3201, and twenty and ten years in the New Code, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
334. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975). This is a version of the dan-
gerous proximity doctrine. FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 68. It is meant to cover persons
who had engaged in the last proximate act in the commission of a crime. I WORKING PA-
PERS, eupra note 60, at 366. This issue is determined at sentencing to avoid confusing the
Jury with the preponderance of the evidence standard when the jury Is making the initial
determination of guilt or innocence. Id., at n. 35.
335. Under the New Code, the maximum sentence is reduced by half if the attempted
crime is a class B felony-from ten years to five; while if the attempted crime is a class
C felony the maximum term is reduced from five years to one year. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-32-01 (effective July 1, 1975). Under the Proposed Federal Code, the maximum Sentence
is reduced from fifteen years to seven if the attempted crime is a class B felony, and from
seven to one if the attempted crime is a class C felony. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 3201.
336. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
337. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1002.
338. The Old Code prohibits conduct which is, in effect, facilitation: e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12-16-11 (1960) (prohibiting certain acts done to "effect or facilitate the escape of a
prisoner"), and 12-33-05 (1960) (prbhibiting the furnishing of a weapon or drug to aid a
suicide).
339. Defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (effective July 1, 1975). He must know that
the other person intends to do a criminal act; it is not sufficient that he knows of the plan-
ned act without knowing that it is illegal I WosxrNG PAPERS, upra note 60, at 161. It ap-
pears that here ignorance of the law is a. defense.
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vided "substantial"840 assistance to one who intended to commit a
felony; 841 and that this person employed that assistance in commit-
ting "the crime contemplated, or a like or related felony."' 42 Facili-
tation is "an included offense to accomplice liability." 8
The accused has an effective defense if he is by statute not ac-
countable for the underlying felony; but it is not a defense that the
person whose conduct was facilitated was acquitted, was convicted
of a different offense, or is not subject to justice."4
If the facilitated crime is a class A felony, facilitation is a





Under the Old Code, one who advises and encourages the com-
mission of any crime is a principal in that crime.-8 The New Code
provides a special section"? covering criminal solicitation of a
felony. 48 The draftsmen of the parallel section of the Proposed Fed-
eral Code suggest that:
[S]olicitation may be viewed as an attempt to form a con-
spiracy. The solicitee either has not yet agreed (although
he has committed an overt act, such as coming back for
further discussions) or he has agreed but no overt act has
been committed sufficient to make the crime a conspiracy.849
Conviction of criminal solicitation requires proof of four ele-
ments. First, that the accused commanded, induced, entreated or
otherwise attempted to persuade 850 another to act as principal or ac-
complice in the commission of a particular felony.8 51 Second, that
340. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (effective July 1, 1975). This is determined by analysis
of the circumstances of the Individual case. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 161. One
factor which must be considered Is "the ready lawful availability from others of the goods
and services provided." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (effective July 1, 1975). This require-
ment of the Proposed Federal Code was questioned, but was carried over into the New
Code. Minutes "B"', supra note 2, April 6-7, 1972 at 8. The accused must have known that
his assistance was substantial. I WORKING PAPER, supra note 60, at 161. Proof of this
knowledge would, it seems, be difficult.
341. The draftsmen of the Proposed Federal Code indicate that the accused need not
know that the intended crime is classed as a felony. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at
161.
342. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
343. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1002. The distinction between the two offenses is
"shadowy." I WORKING PAPERS, supra, note 60, at 160. The draftsmen of the Proposed Fed-
eral Code expect that, "[FJacilitators will be charged as accomplices, but that the facilita-
tion offense will be available for conviction of the lessor offense in borderline cases." Id.
at 161.
344. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
345. Id.
346. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-02-04 (1960). The Old Code also has specific provisions cover-
Ina offenses of this general type; e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-09-10 (1960) (solicitation of
bribery), 12-14-14 (1960) (subornation of perjury), and 12-38-22 (1960) (soliciting swin-
dling).
347. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
348. The requirement that the crime solicited be a felony Is more restrictive than the "any
crime" provision of the Old Code. Minutes "B", supra note 2, April 6-7, 1972 at 9.
349. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 69-70.
350. There must be an "instigation," not just "mere encouragement." Id.
351. The limitation to a particular felony is an attempt to avoid free speech problems. Id.
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he so acted "with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of
that felony, under circumstances strongly corroborative of that in-
tent."85 2 Third, that the solicitee committed "an overt act in response
to the solicitation. " 858 Fourth, that the accused would not be the vic-
tim of the offense, that his conduct is not "inevitably incident" to
the commission of the offense, and that he is not statutorily exempt-
ed from guilt.854 The fact that the person solicited could not be
guilty of the crime is not a defense. 851
Solicitation of a class A felony is a class B felony; of a class B
felony, a class C felony; and of a class C felony, a class A misde-
meanor. 56 The New Code follows the grading system of the Proposed
Federal Code, which was set up with special concern for the "un-
successful" solicitor, since if successful he would be punished under
statutes dealing with the completed crime. 857
D. CONSPIRACY
The Old Code, 58 New Code 59 and Proposed Federal Code5 0 deal
specifically with criminal conspiracy. Unlike the Old Code, the New
Code does not deal specifically with out-of-state conspiracy to com-
mit treason against the state, 61 nor with protection for peaceable
assemblies.86
2
Conviction of criminal conspiracy under the New Code requires
proof: first, that the accused agreed868 "to engage in or cause con-
duct; 8  second, that this particular conduct "in fact, constitutes an
"The problem is in preventing legitimate discussion or agitation of an extreme or inflam-
matory nature from being misinterpreted as solicitation to crime." I WORKING PAPERS,, supra
note 60, at 375. The limitation to a felonay allows prosecution of only those "whose conduct
threatens a serious harm." Id. at 374.
352. N.D. CE-r. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective July 1, 1975). The words "promote or facili-
tate" are used to include solicitations of accomplices. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at
371. More than "mere words of the accused" is required. Id. at 372.
353. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective July 1, 1975). The dratfsmen of the Pro-
posed Federal Code rejected an alternative which would have required an overt act by the
accused. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 373-74.
354. N.D. CEar. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective July 1, 1975). One who could not be liable
as an accomplice would, thus, not be liable for solicitation. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note
60, at 376.
355. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
356. Id.
357. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 378-79.
358. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-03 (1960).
359. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
360. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1004. Most of the language in the New Code section
cited above is drawn from and so is identical to the language of this portion of the Pro-
posed Federal Code.
861. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-03-02 (1960). Minutes "B", supra note 2, Sept. 20-21, 1971 at 4.
362. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-03-03 (1960).
$63. The agreement must be with one or more others, but may be implicit rather than
explicit N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1, 1975). If the accused "knows or
could expect" that a co-conspirator has conspired or will conspire with a third person for
the same purpose, he is deemed to have agreed with that third person also. Id. "It is not
unreasonable to ask one who Joins with an ongoing criminal enterprise to run the risk of
having an unknown number of associates." I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 391-92.
Such a rule avoids findings of multiple conspiracies when members join separately and so
reduces evidentiary problems. Id. at 392.
364. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1. 1975).
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offense or offenses;"865 and third, that a person with whom he has
agreed has done "an overt act to effect an objective of the con-
spiracy."888
The New Code specifies that a conspiracy continues s until its
"objectives"' 856  have been "accomplished, frustrated or abandon-
ed."869 The conspiracy is abandoned if no conspirator has committed
an overt act to effect the conspiracy's objectives during the period
of limitations.8 7 0 For individual abandonment, "[lIt should be suf-
ficient if the conspirator makes a timely declaration of withdrawal
to his co-conspirator or the duly constituted law enforcement author-
ities."87'1 The fact that all other alleged participants in the conspiracy
were acquitted, convicted of a different offense or not otherwise sub-
ject to justice is no defense.8 72 Conspiracy is classified and punished
in the same manner as attempt. 78 A conspirator may, of course, be
liable as an accomplice.8 7 4
E. DEFENSES
Definitions and affirmative defenses for the inchoate crimes are
provided in the last section of Chapter 12.1-06.3 75 The definition of
an offense in the chapter does not apply to another defense defined
in that chapter. 876 The definitions of "attempt" and "conspiracy"
used in Chapter 12.1-06 are to be applied whenever those terms are
used outside the chapter. 77 This is not true of the terms "facilitate"
and "solicit.
87 8
365. Id. Under the Old Code the conduct apparently need not always be criminal. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-03-01 (1960). The Proposed Federal Code requires that the conduct be
criminal, although existing Federal law does not have that limitation. FINAL REPORT, supra
note 6, at 71.
366. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1, 1975). The act shows that the con-
spiracy "is neither a project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a
fully completed operation no longer in existence." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334
(1957). A "substantial step" is not required. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 71. The act
may range from an act which would be innocent In the absence of a conspiracy (Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957)], to the actual commission of the offense agreed
upon. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1940). The New Code eliminates the ex-
ception to the overt act requirement present in the Old Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-03-04
(1960). Minutes "B", supra note 2, April 6-7, 1972 at 10.
367. Duration is important because of its Impact on the liability of original and new co-
conspirators, the admissibility of statements by co-conspirators, and the application of the
statute of limitations. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 393.
368. Defined to Include "escape from the scene of the crime, distribution of booty, and
measures, other than silence, for concealing the crime or obstructing justice In relation to
it." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. I WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 895.
372. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
373. Id. Conspiracy is, thus, treated "as a species of multi-party attempt." FINAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 72.
374. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
375. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
376. Id. Thus, for example, "[O]ne cannot be guilty of an attempt to attempt, or a con-
spiracy to solicit." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 74.
377. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
378. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 74.
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Affirmative defenses are provided to charges of criminal at-
tempt, criminal solicitation and criminal conspiracy.879 The accused
must-if the affirmative defense is to be successfully relied upon-
have acted8 0 "under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal intent,"3 81 and must have avoid-
ed or prevented the commission of the crime attempted, solicited or
contemplated by the conspiracy.
3 2
VI. HOMICIDE
Chapter 12.1-16 of the New Code differs greatly from Chapter
12-27 of the Old Code, but is substantially identical to the homicide
provisions of the Proposed Federal Code.183 The New Code chapter
has only three sections, while the Old Code chapter has thirty-seven
sections. This reduction is in large part the result of the elimination
of degrees of murder and manslaughter and the use of terms and
offense classifications defined elsewhere in the New Code, with no
need for specialized treatment within the chapter on homicide.
There is no need in the New Code chapter for sections 884 deal-
ing with excuse and justification, as those concepts are dealt with
in an earlier chapter.3 85 Neither is there need for sections defining, 8 6
or listing classifications of,38 7 homicides; each of its three sections
defines a separate class. These classes are murder, 8 manslaugh-
ter,8 9 and negligent homicide.39 0
All three codes 91 agree in requiring as an element of the crime
of homicide the death of a "human being"-a person who has been
born and is alive.
3 9 2
A. MURDER
Both the New Code and the Proposed Federal Code consolidate
379. But not for facilitation, as its definition requires commission of the crime. Id.
880. Mere abandonment of an attempt Is sufficient, but only if it avoided the commission
of the attempted crime. N.D. CENT. Cone § 12.1-06-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
381. The New Code in this section also provides standards for the terms "voluntary and
complete." The renunciation must not be motivated by a belief that detection or apprehen-
sion has become more probable or the crime more difficult, nor Is a decision to postpone the
crime or substitute another victim or objective considered a renunciation. Id. There must be
a "repentance" or "change of heart"; "lack of resolution" or "timidity" is not sufficient.
I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 363.
382. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-05 (effective July 1, 1975). "The defense encourages vol-
untary abandonment of a crime prior to the causing of harm and also serves to moderate
the potentially broad scope of the inchoate offenses." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 74.
383. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 1601-1603.
384. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-27-02 to -06 (1960).
385. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
386. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-01 (1960).
387. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-02 (1960).
888. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
389. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
390. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
391. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-01 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1,
1975) ; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 1601-1603.
392. The term is so defined in the Proposed Federal Code, FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §
109 (p) but the corresponding section in the New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-04 (ef-
fective July 1, 1975), omits the term.
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first and second degree murder. Murder is a class A felony under
the New Code. 898 The two degrees of murder are consolidated in part
because of the elimination of the death penalty-for which such a
distinction is necessary-and also because of the blurring of the dis-
tinction based on premeditation-a distinction which ignores the fact
that a premeditated killing is not always the more heinous killing.8,'
Under the Old Code,89 5 homicide is murder under three circum-
stances; these are paralleled in the New Code, 96 but with impor-
ant changes. The Old Code deals first with a killing committed with
premeditation,897 while the New Code follows the Proposed Federal
Code in dealing first with a death caused "intentionally or knowing-
ly"898 and in using those modem terms rather than "malice afore-
thought"8 99 as a test for murder. Premeditation is not an element of
proof under the New Code.
Second, the Old Code deals with an act done without premedi-
tation but "imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved
mind, in disregard of human life."400 The New Code eiminates the
reference to a "depraved mind,'4 01 and covers deaths caused "under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of hu-
man life. ' 40 2 In addition to covering "generally all sorts of extreme
recklessness of life,"' 0 3 the Proposed Federal Code and the New Code
use this language to cover "transferred intent"-where the defend-
ant killed someone other than his intended victim. Proof that an act
was done with an intent to kill is proof of extreme indifference to
the value of human life.'40
393. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1, 1975). The maximum twenty years'
Imprisonment possible under the New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (effective July 1,
1975), is within the ten to thirty years' imprisonment provided for murder in the second
degree under the Old Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-14 (1960). The life sentence-and
limited death sentence-provisions for murder in the first degree contained in the Old
Code N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-13 (1960), are eliminated.
394. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, 173-74; II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 824.
395. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-08 (1960).
396. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
397. A premeditated killing is murder In the first degree under the Old Code, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-27-12 (1960). As It has no degrees of murder, the New Code eliminates the term
and Its definition. That definition, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-09 (1960), allows a design
formed "instantly" before the killing to be considered premeditation; similar treatment of
the term in federal courts has been cited as a factor destroying the usefulness of degrees of
murder. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 823.
398. These terms are defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
399. An error in the use of this term-in a standard federal homocide charge-resulted in
the reversal of a murder conviction. Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280 (8th Cir.
1967). Such problems, and the elimination of the term in several recent state codes, were
noted by the draftsmen of the Proposed Federal Code. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60,
at 825.
400. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-08 (1960). Such an act is murder even if there is no actual
Intent to injure others. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-72-10 (1960).
401. The New Code also eliminates the special provision, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-07
(1960), for jury consideration of an accused's domestic or confidential relationship with
the person killed, where determinations of cruelty or depraved mind are involved. As the
New Code does not have degrees of murder or manslaughter it does not require definitions
thereof with references to torture, as In N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-12 (1960), or cruelty, as
in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-17 (1960).
402. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
403. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 174.
404. Id. But this may be an oversimplification, in light of views expressed earlier. Tne
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Third, under the Old Code4 0 5 an act or omission punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary can give rise to the application of
a felony-murder rule. Only certain specified crimes result in appli-
cation of the rule under the New Code.406 Most of these crimes are
those which result in conviction of murder in the first degree under
the Old Code.40 7 The New Code eliminates mayhem as an underly-
ing crime,40 8 and adds treason, kidnapping, felonious restraint, and
escape to the list of specified underlying crimes.4°9
The New Code's section410 departs from the wording of the cor-
responding section of the Proposed Federal Code 1' in two areas. It
eliminates certain uniquely national crimes-war against the United
States, armed insurrection, espionage and sabotage-as underlying
crimes to which the felony-murder rule is applied. It also elimi-
nates, probably as surplus, the statement that the presence of ex-
treme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable excuse
shall render inapplicable the murder provisions other than the
felony-murder rule.
The New Code's felony-murder rule provides a number of limi-
tations on, and clarifications of, its application: the rule covers one
who commits or attempts to commit one of the nine crimes speci-
fied; the person killed must be someone other than one of the par-
ticipants in the crime; and, the person accused or another partici-
pant in the crime must have caused the death "in the course of and
in furtherance of" the underlying crime or "immediate flight there-
from. ' 412 If the accused was not the only participant in the under-
lying crime, an affirmative defense to the application of the felony-
murder rule is available.41 3 There is, however, "a heavy burden on
the defendant to establish his lack of culpability.'
1
doctrine was rejected as "both conceptually unsound and unnecessary." I WORKING PAPER,
Supra note 60, at 132. Liability for such a killing was to be determined "on the ordinary
basis of whether the offender had acted recklessly or negligently." II WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 60, at 825.
405. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-08 (1960).
406. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
407. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-12 (1960). The crimes specified in both this section and the
New Code are sodomy (aggravated involuntary sodomy in the New Code), rape, arson,
robbery, and burglary.
408. To which the "felony-first-degree-murder" rule would be applied under N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-27-12 (1960).
409. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1. 1975).
410. Id.
411. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1601.
412. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
418. The accused must show that he: (a) did not commit, solicit, command, Induce, pro-
cure, counsel, or aid in the homocidal act; (b) was not armed with a weapon "which under
the circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict serious bodily injury"; (c) reasonably
believed no other participant was so armed; and (d) "reasonably believed that no other
participant intended to engage In conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
414. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 174. Under a rejected alternate draft of the Proposed
Federal Code, the defendant need raise only a reasonable doubt as to his recklessness. II
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 826. Under the New Code, the defendant must support
his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Minutes "B", supra note 2, May
11-12, 1972 at 51.
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B. MANSLAUGHTER
The "misdemeanor-manslaughter rule" of the Old Code 15 is elim-
inated in the manslaughter section of the New Code.4 16 Under that
section, 41 7 which is identical to the manslaughter provision in the
Proposed Federal Code, 18 a person commits manslaughter if he
causes the death of another "recklessly, '41 9 or "under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable ex-
cuse." In order for the necessary "recklessness" to be found, "proof
that the defendant was aware that he was unjustifiably risking life
or limb is required.1420 Manslaughter is a class B felony in the, New
Code. 421
The term, "heat of passion," in the Old Code's definition of man-
slaughter in the first degree 2 2 is replaced by the more flexible test
of the New Code and the Proposed Federal Code. The arbitrary
limitations4 23 which developed under the old "sudden quarrel or heat
of passion" test are removed, but the excuse for the disturbance
must be reasonable and the defendant must not have culpably
brought it about.4 24 The New Code's treatment of a killing under
such circumstances results from a recognition that one who kills
only under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is not so
great a threat, nor so likely to be deterred by severe sanctions, as
is a cold-blooded kilIer.425
Under the Old Code, an unnecessary killing perpetrated "while
resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime or
415. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-17(1) (1960). The draftsmen of the Proposed Federal Code
termed this rule "arbitrary and undesirable." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 175.
416. This effectively eliminates the reported practice, under the Old Code, of using the
"misdemeanor-manslaughter" rule in motor vehicle homicides rather than the negligent
homocide statutes, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-27-35 to -37 (1960), which were enacted to cover
motor vehicle homicides. Minutes "B", supra note 2, Nov. 22-23, 1971 at 33.
417. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
418. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1602.
419. Defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(c) (effective July 1, 1975).
420. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 175. Under the Old Code, "culpable negligence" may
bring a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-19: (1960).
Under the Proposed Federal Code, "criminal negligence" without knowledge of the risk to
life leads to a negligent homocide conviction. II WORKINo PAPER., supra note 60, at 827.
421. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (effective July 1, 1975). The maximum ten years' im-
prisonment under the New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975),
is at the midpoint of the five to fifteen years' imprisonment provided for manslaughter in
the first degree under the Old Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-18 (1960), and is twice the
maximum provided for manslaughter in the second degree, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-20
(1960).
422. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-17(2) (1960).
423. Draftsmen of the Proposed Federal Code listed some such limitations. (a) "[M]ere
words, however, aggravating are not sufficient to reduce the crime from murder to man-
slaughter." Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896) ; (b) "[The passion] must
spring from some wrongful act of the party slain [emphasis added] .. " Collins v. United
States, 150 U.S. 62, 65 (1893) ; (c) Deeply felt affronts-e.g., mentally deficient man called
a "black nigger." Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946)-do not count.; (d) Nor
does a delayed reaction-victim returned to her first husband after living for more than a
year with defendant; shortly thereafter he drove to her office and shot her. Bell v. -United
States, 47 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1931). II WORKING PAPERS, upra note 60, at 828-29 nn. 8-10.
424. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1602.
425. II WOR nG PAPERS, supra note 60, § 827-28.
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after such attempt shall have failed" is manslaughter in the first
degree.426 There is no special provision in the New Code to cover
such killings. Nor do the New Code and Proposed Federal Code pro
vide-as-does the ,Old Code-specialized treatment of certain unusual
causes of death.4 27 An act which results in a death is instead ex-
amined in -relation to the requirements of culpability 28 and fitted in-
to one of the three classes of homicide. Both these codes also elimi-
nate the rule, present in the Old Code,42' that in order for a killing
to be murder or manslaughter the death must occur within a year
and a day after the causal act was done.
C. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
The negligent homicide section in the New Code' 83 is drawn from
the Proposed Federal Code 4 1 and is not, in contrast to the Old
Code, 43 2 limited to motor vehicle homicides. The New Code section
covers any homicide caused "negligently."
483
Under the Proposed Federal Code and the New Code, the negli-
gence .involved is greater than simple negligence.4 3 4 Such negligence
"may exist where the offender did not know of the risk to life but
was gravely derelict in failing to recognize it. . . . ,,485 Negligent
homicide is a class C felony under the New Code.
486
VII. UNLAWFUL DETENTION
Kidnapping, a crime which was only a misdemeanor at common
law, has today become one of the most severely punished offenses.'"8
The New Code defines the restraint offenses into three categories;
426. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-17 (1960).
427. The Old Code deals individually with deaths caused by a mischievous animal. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-27-22 (1960) ; by negligent operation of a steam engine, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-27-24 (1960) ; by an intoxicated physician, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-25 (1960) ; by a
spring gun or exploding device, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-26 (1960) ; or by overloading a
boat or vessel, N.). CENT. CODE § 12-27-34 (1960).
428. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
429. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-27 (1960).
430. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
431. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1603.
402. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-27-35 to -37 (1960).
433. The term Is defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(d) (effective July 1, 1975). It
is a greater degree of negligence than simple negligence, as understood in tort law. Minutes
"B", aupra note 2, Nov. 22-23, 1971 at 34.
434. It must be "a substantial and not merely a marginal default such as suffices for civil
liability." II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 830. The New Code section was referred
to as "in effect a gross negligent homocide statute." Minutes "B", supra note 2, May 11-12,
1972 at 50. The Old Code provision covers deaths resulting from driving in "reckles disre-
gard of the safety of others." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-35 (1960).
485. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 827.
436. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-03 (effective July 1, 1975). The maximum five years' im-
prisonment under the New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (effective July 1, 1975), is
the same as the .maximum under the Old Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-36 (1960), for
negligent homicide, and under N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-20 (1960), for manslaughter in the
second degree.
437. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 CoL. L. REnv. 640, 542 & n.l (1953).
North Dakota is one of only five states which does" not provide for life Impirsonment or
death for kidnapping. Id.
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kidnapping,4" felonious restraint 439  and unlawful imprisonment.440
.These, replace the lone section on kidnapping in the Old Code.441 The
New Code section on unlawful detention is similar to the Proposed
Federal Code with the exception that the New Code deletes the sec-
tion on usurping control of aircraft."
2
The section on kidnapping in the New Code is somewhat more
restrictive than that in the Old Code." 3 The New Code defines kid-
napping as an abduction with intent to do one of the following: (a)
hold for ransom, (b) use as a hostage, (c) hold in involuntary ser-
vitude, (d) terrorize, (e) commit a felony or (f) interfere with any
governmental function."' If the actor does not intend one of the
above, the offense is felonious restrait."5 The New Code carefully
delineates the crime of kidnapping so as to exclude the possibility
that the innocently motivated transportation of another or minor re-
straint might be prosecuted to maximum penalties." 8 Therefore,
kidnapping embraces only the most serious cases of unlawful re-
straint. By allowing for such variables as the actor's intent, the ex-
tent of the force used, the ultimate outcome, and certain defenses,
the drafters have provided for offenses ranging from a class A mis-
demeanor to a class A felony.
A. KIDNAPPING
Kidnapping is a class A felony, unless the actor voluntarily re-
leases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial. In that
case it is a class B felony."7 The Old Code provides a maximum
438. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
489. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
440. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
441. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-01 (1960). In the Old Code, the crime Is spelled "kidnap-
ing". THE MODEL PENAL CODE and the Proposed Federal Code spell the crime "kidnapping".
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 720 (W. Morris ed. (1969)
states that kidnapping Is spelled correctly In either form. "Kidnapping" Is the form adopted
by the New Code. See also II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 853.
442. The reason the drafters deleted this section is that "skyjacking" is preempted by
federal law for all offenses, except for intrastate flights of civil aircraft. Minutes "B", supra
note 2, May 11-12, 1972 at 59.
443. The essential elements of kidnapping are that a person willfully kidnaps another,
with Intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be detained against his will. State v.
Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 293 N.W. 219 (1940).
444. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
445. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-02 (effective July 1. 1975). See FINAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 184.
446. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 857. "[T]he broad list of kidnapping purposes
beyond kidnapping for ransom is based on the assumption that the victim suffers a substan-
tial loss of liberty from the culprit's acts, not just a brief restraint imposed for the purpose
of committing another crime."
It should be emphasized that every extension of kidnapping beyond kidnapping
for ransom depends for its Justification on the strict definition of remove and
confine, the modification of the basic penalty here proposed, and the provi-
sions of this Code restricting cumulation of punishments. In any other cir-
cumstances, it might be desirable to confine kidnapping to seizure for ran-
som. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1, Comment at 18 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1969).
Id. at 857 n.15.
447. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
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penalty of 20 years imprisonment. 4" 8 It has been questioned whether
the offender who releases his victim prior to trial should receive a
less severe penalty than the offender who doesn't release his victim,
because the culpability of both offenders at the outset of the of-
fense is the same.449 Such a provision is based on encouraging the
kidnapper to release his victim safely prior to trial because of the
graduated, sentencing provided by the New Code.450
To successfully prosecute the crime of kidnapping under the
New Code it is necessary to find substantial movement from where
the victim was apprehended. For example, if a person were restrain-
ed while robbers proceeded with a robbery, the crime would not be
kidnapping. However, if they confined the victim to a place where
he is not likely to be found, even if it is in his own home, the crime
would be kidnapping. 4 1
B. FELONIOUS RESTRAINT
North Dakota presently has no statute which specifically pro-
hibits those actions defined in the New Code under felonious re-
straint, a class C felony. 52 Under the Old Code these actions must
be prosecuted under the kidnapping statute' 58 if at all. This section
of the New Code may also be used to upgrade the offense of simple
unlawful imprisonment when committed under terrorizing circum-
stances, which would include any form of abduction.45 4
Regardless of the cause of unlawful restraint, whether an hon.
est mistake or a practical joke, a person who knowingly restrains
another takes upon himself a high responsibility for that person's
safety; the felony punishment seems appropriate when the restrained
person is kept in conditions which are dangerous to him. 455 This sec-
tion also provides a penalty for involuntary servitude, which is pres-
ently proscribed by the Constitution and the federal peonage and
slavery enactments. 56
C. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT
The New Code provisions for unlawful imprisonment are also
new offenses to North Dakota, since the Old Code does not speak
to the detention of others, other than when done under "color of
law". 5 7 The line between criminal and noncriminal restraint is de-
448. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-01 (1960). The Old Code does not make a distinction for safe
release prior to trial.
449. II W oRKrN PAPERs, supra note 60, at 863, 864.
450. Id.
451. For cases which do not amount to kidnapping, prosecution can be taken for either
felonious restraint or unlawful imprisonment, whichever is appropriate. Id. at 858-60.
452. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
458. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-01 (1960).
454. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 184.
455. II WoRKiwo PAPERS supra note 60, at 859.
456. U.S. CONS'r. amend. XIII, § 1, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 (1948).
457. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-17-06 (1960). See Minutes "B, supra note 2, May 11-12, 1972.
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termmed by the definition of the word "restrain" as used in the
New Code.458 Any removal unlawfully and without consent from a
person's residence or business is criminal; all other movement must
be a substantial movement or for a substantial period to be crimi-
nal. 459
It is an affirmative defense to unlawful imprisonment under the
New Code that the offender is the parent of the restrained person
and that restrained person is under the age of 18 years.460 This is a
new defense to North Dakota as there are no defenses specifically
enumerated in the Old Code.
461
VIII. ROBBERY
The New Code's robbery provision, identical to the Proposed Fed-
eral Code 46 2 is not at substantial variance with the Old Code, which
is declaratory of the common law.463 The larcenous element and the
element of force remain the significant factors of the offense.
Change, rather, is manifested in the scope of the crime and the
constitution of force.
4 6 4
Robbery, according to the New Code, occurs if "in the course
of committing a theft . . . a [person] inflicts or attempts to in-
flict bodily injury upon another, or threatens or menaces another
with imminent bodily injury. 4 5 Present are two elements: (1) the
458. 'Restrain' means to restrict the movement of a person unlawfully and without
consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty by removing him
from his place of residence or business, by moving him a substantial distance
from one place to another, Or by confining him for a substantial period. Re-
straint is 'without consent' If it is accomplished by: (a) force, intimidation,
or deception; or (b) any means, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is
a child less than fourteen years old or an incompetent person, and if the par-
ent, guardian, or person or institution responsible for the general supervision
of his welfare has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-18-04(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
459. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-04(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
460. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-18-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
461. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-42-01 (1960).
462. Recently enacted or proposed robbery statutes containing similar substantive
changes [to North Dakota] include:
N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW §§ 160.00-160.15 (McKinney 1967) ; PRELIM. REV. COLO.
CaiM. LAWS §§ 40-9-1, 40-9-2 (1964) ; PROPOSED CONN. PEN. CODE §§ 19-20, 91-6
(Comm. Rep. 1967) ; PROPOSED IOWA CaIM. CODE REv. § 711.1 (1967 Draft);
MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §§ 3301-3310 (Final Draft 1967) ; OHIO CRIM. LAW
REV. PEto., Draft of Robbery Statute, Memo No. 38-1, Oct. 10, 1968; PRO-
POSED CrnI. CODE FOR PA. § 1501 (1967) ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (P.O.D.
1962).
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 903 n.1.
463. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 692-704 (1972) ; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 279-285 (2d ed. 1969) ; W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CaIMSas § 12.09 (7th ed.
1967). N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-01 defines robbery as "the felonious taking of personal
property In the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." This is the common law definition of
robbery. Under common law, "[r]obbery consists of all six elements of larceny-a (1)
trespassory (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5) of another
(6) with intent to steal it-plus two additional requirements: (7) that the property be
taken from the person or presence of the other and (8) that the taking be accomplished by
means of force or putting in fear." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 692 (1972).
464. II WORKING PAPEaS, supra note 60, at 903-06.
465. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
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use of force (2) in the course of committing a theft. These elements
are substantially the same as the common law elements of the of-
fense4 66 and as such, retain the original thrust of the offense-to
penalize the use of force rather than the successful taking of prop-
erty.4 0
7
A. IN THE COURSE OF A THEFT
The most substantial change made by the New Code is the in-
creased range of the crime afforded by the second element "in the
course of committing a theft" phraseology.46 s This verbiage brings
within the parameters of the offense the use or threat of force dur-
ing escape; a factor resulting from defining the phrase as "an at-
tempt to commit theft, whether or not the theft is successfully com-
pleted, or in immediate flight from the commission of, or an un-
successful effort to commit, the theft."4 '9 Thus even if the offender
uses no force to obtain the property, he would be guilty of robbery
if he uses or threatens force in order to make good his escape.
4 7 0
466. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 35 states that "[tihe definition, of rob-
bery Is fairly simple, but does not work any radical changes from the definition of robbery
in Section 12-31-01." See II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 903. The New Code, just as
the "MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1, defines robbery in terms of the use of force or fear in the
course of committing a theft, without any stated requirement that the taking be from the
person or presence of the victim." (W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 696 n.26 (1972)).
The Impact of deleting a taking "from the person or presence of the victim" as a require-
ment Is apparently one of coverage and not one of substance. Moreover robbery coverage is
extended to all property under the control of the victim, regardless of the whereabouts of the
property, that the victim could have retained possession of but for the force used to over-
come his resistance.
467. See Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 35; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6,
at 204; II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 903. The II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60,
at 903 state that "Et]he element of force, more than the crime's larcenous element, is still
the significant fact, both in definition and in grading robbery." A reason for this is sug-
gested In the comments to the MODEL PENAL CODE:
The ordinary citizen feels himself able to guard against surreptitious lar-
ceny, embezzlement, or fraud, to some extent, by his own wits or caution.
But he abhors robbers who menace him or his wife with violence against which
he is helpless Or . . . . In addition, the robber may be distinguished from the
stealthy thief by the hardihood which enables him to carry out his purpose in
the presence of his victim and over his opposition-obstacles which might deter
ordinary sneak thieves.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 comment at 69 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
468. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 905. The MODEL PENAL CODE also uses the "in
the course of committing a theft terminology in defining robbery." MODEL PENAL CODE §
221.1 (1962).
469. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
See Carter v. United States, 223 F.2d 392, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 949 (1956), holding, in a case of felony-murder, that a robbery was
still in progress though there was a slight interval between the time money
was taken by force and a policeman was informed of the robbery, began his
pursuit, and was shot by the robber:
We have no doubt that the appellant had not secured to himself the
fruits of the robbery, but was still feloniously carrying away the stolen
money when [the policeman] began the chase. The delay was so slight
that the bandit had not been able to reach a place of seeming scurity.
Our proposal extends this concept so as to establish that the crime of robbery
can begin at some time during this point of escape as well as continue until
the escape is successful.
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 906 n.10.
470. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 906.
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This result is specifically contrary to the Old Code. 71 It is jus-
tified, though, because "the thief's willingness to use force against
those who would restrain him in flight strongly suggests that he
would have employed it to effect the theft had there been need for
it.,,472
But the terminology "in the course of committing a theft" does
not extend coverage to future acts of force committed at some in-
definite period of time.4 7 3 The words "immediate flight" in the defi-
nition of "in the course of committing a theft" refer to the period
of "aspyortation"-the period of time between the point at which the
robber has taken the property until the point at which "hot pursuit"
is broken off, or the perpetrator has, [at least] temporarily, ...
secured his loot."7'4 Therefore, a thief's use of force after "hot pur-
suit" has broken off could not be construed as robbery.
The "in the course of committing a theft" terminology also re-
quires a theft of property as defined by the new consolidated theft
provision. 7 5 A crucial requirement for such is the specific intent to
permanently deprive an owner of his property' 7 -the same require-
ment that exists for common law larceny.'77 Consequently, without
intent to steal, robbery cannot occur. Therefore, no taking under a
belief of right or taking for temporary use could constitute robbery,
even if attendant circumstances satisfy the force requisite.
7 8
When specific intent is required for a crime, as here, it is a
fundamental principle of criminal law that the criminal act and
criminal state of mind concur to form criminal conduct. 79 This con-
cept of concurrence of act and intent is adhered to with one excep-
tion in both the New Code and at common law, each taking an ex-
471. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-02 (1960). Which provides:
To constitute robbery, the force or fear must be employed either to obtain
possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking.
If employed merely as a means of escape, It does not constitute robbery.
Id.
Because the Old Code is declaratory of the common law, hereinafter, reference to
one will have equal applicability to the other unless otherwise stipulated.
472. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1, Comment 2 at 70 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960) cited at
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 906.
473. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 906.
474. Id.
475. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (effective July 1, 1975) and the section on theft in
this hornbook article.
476. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (effective July 1, 1975). That section provides that "the
intent to deprive the owner thereof" must be present. Id.
477. State v. Fordham, 13 N.D. 494, 101 N.W. 888 (1904) ; distinguished in State v. Thomp-
son, 68 N.D. 98, 277 N.W. 1 (1938) ; W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 12.10
(7th ed. 1967) ; W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 693-94 (1972) ; R. PERKINS, CIMI-
NAL LAW, 280 (2d ed. 1969) ; Note, Criminal Law-Forcible Taking of Money Under Bona
Fide Claim of Debt Held Not Robbery, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 248-49 (1955). The specific
intent required in robbery is the specific intent to steal.
478. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES 883-84 (7th ed. 1967); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, 693-95 (1972) ; Note, Criminal Law-Forcible Taking of Money Under
Bona Fide Claim of Debt Held Not Robbery, 27 ROcKY MT. L. PEv. 247 (1955).
479. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 5.02 (7th ed. 1967) ; J. I-TALL, PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 185-90 (2d ed. 1960) ; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW, 701
(1972).
NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL CODE HORNBOOK
ception in different circumstances. The New Code defines robbery
as including use of force during flight,4" 0 a time when the act of
theft and the intent to steal are not in concurrence. The common
law holds, although few cases are present on the following circum-
stances, that when a thief is responsible for a victim's incapacity,
even though incapacity precedes the intent to steal-thus no concur-
rence of intent and act-subsequent appropriation of the victim's
property is robbery.481 In short, this constitutes a "continuing" force
concept, a concept totally inapplicable to New Code robbery.482 This
inapplicability results by definition, because by definition, the crime
of robbery occurs the "moment a threat is made or force is used
to obtain property." In brief, this is a statement of the concurrence
concept. It is clear that an actor who incapacitates another by
whatever means, whether intentional or not, with no intent to steal
(or intimidates another without an intent to steal), and then takes
advantage of his victim by taking the latter's property is not a
robber. 88
B. USE OF FORCE
The use of force element, as defined in the New Code is the
"inflict[ion] or attempt to inflict bodily injury upon another or
[the] threaten[ing] or menac[ing] of another with imminent
bodily injury."' This proscribes "the use or threat of force only if
someone is actually injured or threatened with injury or actual in-
480. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at § 1721(3) (a).
481. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW or CRIMES, 884 (7th ed. 1967); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, CRImINAL LAW, 701-02, n.58 (1972) ; Note, Robbery-Mental Element at Time of Force
or Putting in Fear, 49 DICK. L. REv. 119-22 (1945) ; Note, Robbery--Corpse as Victim, 8
WAYNE L. Rxv. 439-40 (1962). The theory for holding this circumstance robbery
seem[s] to be predicted upon the idea that an unlawful force is set in motion
at a given point in time and that that force continues so long as the victim
remains incapacitated. If the thief takes advantage of this helplessness, which
he has created by his unlawful act, by stealing from the victim, the courts will
deem it robbery. Apparently, they feel that since the force "continues", the
required coincidence of act and intent can take place whenever the thief de-
cides to steal from the helpless victim. The courts, however, do not speak in
such terms, and so perhaps their reasoning is yet untold.
Note, Robbery-Corpse as Victim, 8 WAYNE L. Rtv. 440 n.14 (1962).
482. The "continuing force" concept has been commented on in the following manner:
The doctrine applied in these cases [where incapacitation precedes the intent
to steal] in order to obtain a conviction for robbery is very analogous to the
tort principle of trespass ab initto which has been expressly repudiated by the
criminal law. "Two elements of act and intent must co-exist. So, if the de-
fendant does an act in a non-criminal state of mind, a later arising criminal
intent cannot be referred back to that act so as to make it criminal . . .;
the doctrine of trespass ab initio has no place in the criminal law." "To consti-
tute a crime, act and intent must concur."
Note, Robbery-Mental Element at Time of Force or Putting in Fear, 49 DICK L. REv. 122
(1945).
488. If the incapacitation is legally justifiable, (e.g., self-defense) only theft is chargeable;
otherwise, theft plus whatever the circumstances warrant (e.g., assault, battery, man-
slaughter, etc.) is chargeable. The II WORKINo PPERS 906 n.9 illustrate this point by stat-
ing: "[lt would not be robbery ... if the culprit, motivated by a purpose other than that
of theft, renders an opponent unconscious in an assault, and, belatedly deciding to take the
victim's money, does so without further use of force. This would be theft added to the ag-
gravated assault, but not robbery.
484. N.D. CENT. CODE 1 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
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jury is attempted in the course of stealing property."485 Consequent-
ly, as in the present majority view, 8 6 pickpocketing and snatching
cases are eliminated, from robbery coverage.4 17 In terms of policy,
this is based upon the idea that when coercion of the victim is
absent, these types of "forceful" takings present "no special dan-
gers of violence." "The victim is not aware of the crime and no
conduct is compelled from him," and their seriousness may be
better measured in terms of theft through the amount of property
taken.4
8
Force, as proscribed here and in present law, may be actual or
constructive. 4'8 9 Actual force is the felonious taking of another's prop-
erty by violence49 ("inflict[ion] or attempt to inflict bodily in-
jury") .491 This also includes an internal application of force through
alcohol or drugs-analogous is the perpetration of battery by the ad-
ministration of poison.
s2
Constructive force is the "threaten[ing] or menac[ing] [of]
another with imminent bodily injury" 9 8 "for the purpose of over-
coming resistence to the relinquishment of property. 1 9  It "includes
nonverbal and implicit threats" as well as verbal threats of imme-
diate bodily injury. 95 Non-verbal and implicit threats which can be
sufficient to prove constructive force inclUde:
[a] [s]ilent display of a weapon, brandishing of a fist
while taking the victim's property, surrounding the victim
with hostile persons, . . . [or] a hostile tone of voice ac-
companied by a demand for property . .. .96
485. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 905.
486. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES, 889-90 (7th ed. 1967); W. LAFAvE &
A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 696 (1972) ; R. PREKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 282-83 (2d ed. 1969).
W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, Supra, illustrate.
[I]t is not robbery to obtain property from the person or in the presence of
another by a mere trick, and without force, or to pick another's pocket without
using more force than is necessary to lift the property from the pocket. Nor
is it robbery to suddenly snatch property from another, when there Is no re-
sistance, and no more force, therefore, than is necessary for the mere act of
snatching, or to strike property from another's hand and then snatch It up
and run off with it.
487. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 204; II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 905.
488. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 905.
489. Thus the two modes of robbery: "(a) by violence to the person, or (b) by putting
him in fear of some immediate injury." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 283 (2d ed. 1969).
490. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES §§ 12.13-12.14 (7th ed. 1967) ; W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, 698 n.41 (1972). W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra 697, provides an
example.
[O]ne may commit robbery by striking his victim with fist or weapon and
then, having thus rendered the victim unconscious or dazed or unwilling to risk
another blow, taking his property away from him.
491. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
492. W. LAFAvs & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, 698 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 283
(2d ed. 1969) ; Note, Robbery-Corpse as Victim, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 439 (1962).
493. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
494. II WORKING PAPERS, eupra note 60, at 905.
495. Id.
496. Id. The Committee on Judiciary "B", Y. Dak. Legislative Council, upon query
whether a factual situation involving a person who did not "threaten" his
victim, but rather politely asked for property on the person of the victim was
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This category includes the display of "unloaded guns, toy pistols,
pen knifes and the like" when used to facilitate a robbery or es-
cape.' 97 In like manner, pretense of having a "dangerous weapon
available for use in order to accomplish the robbery," or escape
therefrom, is a form of menacing with immediate bodily injury. 98
Moreover, the language defining constructive force contains the
phrase, "imminent bodily injury," a phrase which adds an element
of time and subject matter limitation to the definition. Hence the re-
quirement that the victim be put in fear of immediate physical
harm, rather than put in fear of some future harm.49  Present North
Dakota law defines robbery to include putting a person in fear of
a future unlawful injury if the threat is directed towards "the per-
son or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of his or
member of his family."50 0 The New Code eliminates both threats of
future physical harm and threats of harm to property; the threat
must be of immediate physical harm. The rationale for the change
is that thefts by threat of infliction of harm at some later time or
threat of harm to property (extortion) pose smaller risks of violence
and are already covered by the consolidated theft provisions.501
Another departure from the Old Code and common law notion
of constructive force in robbery, is the elimination of the classes
of persons to which a threat must be directed before robbery can ex-
ist.5°2 The New Code stipulates that any human being can be the
subject of the threat. It holds that the moment a threat of immi-
nent bodily injury is directed toward anyone in order to coerce the
holder of property to relinquish that property, robbery has been
committed. 0 8 Justifying this change is the Model Penal Code com-
mentary, which states:
robbery . . . when the victim was aware that he was in danger if he did not
turn over the property . . . noted [that] this would be robbery, since the
"threat" would either be considered as implied, or else would be covered by
the word 'enaces" ....
Minutes "B", note 2, June 20-21, 1972, at 39.
The federal drafters commented:
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D. Cal. 1955), hold-
ing that defendant's demand to a bank teller, when asking for the teller's cash,
to "do as I say there won't be any trouble," constituted an attempt at robbery.
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 289 (1957), quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
242, states: "[It.] is enough that so much force or threatening by word or ges-
ture be used as might create an apprehension of danger, or induce a man to
part with his property without or against his consent."
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 905 n.7.
497. Id. at 908.
498. Id.
499. FINAL REPORT, aupra note 6, at 204; II WORKING PAPERS, upra note 60, at 904.
500. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-04 (1960).
501. 11 WORKING PAPER S, supra note 60, at 904. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 subsection 2
(effective July 1, 1975) supersedes the old extortion provision. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05
subsection 1 (effective July 1, 1975) provides that theft accomplished by means of a
"threat . . . to inflict serious bodily injury on the person threatened or on any person" is a
class D felony. The same penalty is imposed for robbery by threat of serious bodily injury.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
502. W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'', CRIMINAL LAw 699 (1972).
508. II WORKING PAPERS, aupra note 60, at 904-06.
699
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if the threat is in fact the effective means of compelling
another to give up property, the character of the relation-
ship between the victim and the person whom he chooses
to protect is immaterial. 504
Lastly, no requirement exists for both the presence of actual
and constructive force. The elements of force, as in present law,
are framed in the alternative. 50 5 Therefore, if there is an attempt
or an infliction of bodily injury there need be no putting in fear
through threat or intimidation .500
C. GRADING
Robbery penalties under the New Code are predicated upon the
"dangers posed to the victim. ' 50 7 In so doing, the New Code recog-
nizes the crime's great potentiality for violence and bodily injury to
ordinary citizens; the crime's likelihood of sudden terrifying or vio-
lent encounters with which ordinary citizens are ill equipped to
* cope; the perpetrator's willingness to harm or threaten injury to
others for pecuniary gain. The New Code further acknowledges that
pecuniary loss is not the important or the significant consideration
when violence has occurred.508  This frames robbery as a crime
against the person, committed in callous disregard of the right to
remain safe and secure in person. It is no longer a crime against
property.
Robbery is graded into three levels of culpability.509 The first
level of culpability is a Class A felony and requires the use of
"deadly force". "Deadly force" is deemed present in three situa-
tions: first, "if the actor fires a firearm;" second, if he "explodes
or hurls a destructive device;" and third, if he "directs the force
504. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3, Comment at 74-75 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). The federal
drafters provide amplification.
The important considerations should be whether the actor intends to coerce
the owner into parting with his property by the threats he uses and whether
under the circumstances the threat is or might be effective. There is no pur-
pose served by calling it robbery if threats are directed against the wife or
child of the owner, but something else if the same threats are directed toward
the owner's fiance or a child of a complete stranger who happens to be pres-
ent. (MicI. REV. CRIm. CODE § 3310, Comment at 258 (Final Draft 1967).)
II WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 905 n.6.
505. That is, (inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury upon another) or (threatens or
menaces another with imminent bodily injury).
506. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW or CRIMES, 894 (7th ed. 1967) ; W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW, 698 (1972).
507. II WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 903.
508. Id. at 907.
509. In comparing the New Code grading system to the Old Code's, the Committee on
Judiciaxy "B" states that the New Code system "is similar to the present gradation, in Title
12, which breaks robbery into two degrees, punishing first-degree robbery by a maximum of
life imprisonment, and second-degree robbery by a maximum of ten years. Present law also
provides that if two or more persons commit the robbery, they shall be punishable by a
maximum of life imprisonment .... " Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 85-36.
The Old Code distinguishes first degree from second degree robbery by defining first degree
robbery as "the use of force, or by putting the person robbed in fear of some immediate
injury to his person" and second degree robbery as robbery "accomplished in any other
manner," N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-31-07; (1960).
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of any other dangerous weapon against another."5 10 It is irrelevant
whether or not actual injury occurs. 511 Any effort to seriously in-
jure another displays a "willingness to carry out . . . [a] threat
of death or serious injury," and thus warrants Class A felony
status
51 2
The second level of culpability is classified as a Class B felony
and occurs in four situations: first, "if the robber possesses or pre-
tends to possess a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous
weapon"518 "the possession of which under the circumstances indi-
cates an intent or readiness to inflict serious bodily injury; "514 sec-
ond, if he "menaces another with serious bodily injury;" third, if he
"inflicts bodily injury upon another;" and fourth, if he "is aided by
an accomplice actually present. '1 15 The first situation (possession of
a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon) "mani-
fests the dangerousness of the robber, even if the weapon is not
displayed."516 Pretense of having such an article to facilitate rob-
bery or escape "constitute[s] a form of menacing another with
serious injury.' " 7 Even "unloaded guns, toy pistols, pen knives and
the like," although possession is not indicative of "an intent or
readiness to inflict serious injury," when displayed "consti-
tute a form of menacing with serious injury.'1 8 In the sec-
ond situation, "menacing another with serious injury" "displays
a willingness and readiness to hurt the victim." 519 Although this man-
ifests less culpability than the use of actual force to overcome the
victim's resistance "overt threat[s] of great injury . . . evidence
the dangerous character of the culprit.11120 The dangerousness of the
robber in the third situation (infliction of bodily injury) is self-
evident. The final situation (robbery with accomplices) warrants a
high penalty because "where two or more persons commit the crime
it indicates greater planning and therefore a greater likelihood that
the criminals are professionals. There is also more likelihood that
violence may erupt, since each criminal reinforces the other." 52 '
The third level of culpability has Class C felony status and
arises "[w]hen no actual injury is inflicted, and no serious injury
is menaced . . ,22
510. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 subsection 2 (effective July 1, 1975).
511. 11 WORING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 907.
512. Id.
513. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 subsection 2 (effective July 1, 1975).
514. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 subsection 3(b) (effective July 1, 1975).
515. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 subsection 2 (effective July 1, 1975).
516. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 908.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 907.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 908-09.
522. Id. at 909.
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Though this conduct is serious enough, it is unlikely that
anyone committing it without attempting or threatening to
seriously injure another, without a weapon and without ac-
complices, deserves the highest penalties.52 8
IX. ARSON & OTHER PROPERTY DESTRUCTION OFFENSES
The New Code consolidates under arson 524 those offenses in the
Old Code which were classified under arson5 25 and a portion of those
classified under malicious offenses against property.5 28 These New
Code sections include arson, 527 endangering by fire or explosion,
5 2
failure to control or report a dangerous fire,5- release of destructive




The offense of arson as contained in the New Code, 533 is broad-
er than the arson offense under the Old Code. The Old Code is
limited to destruction by burning, 5 4 whereas, the New Code includes
both destruction caused by fire and also by explosion.
While human endangerment is the principal concern of the arson
section of the New Code, it makes no explicit distinction in the of-
fense based on human presence in the danger zone. "That policy is
based on the view that the means employed usually pose dangers
of conflagration, total destruction or irreparable damage, human en-
dangerment due to firefighting efforts, or significant pecuniary loss,
human inconvenience, or suffering. ' 535
The New Code section on arson does not extend to the burning
of the actor's own property, which is arson under the Old Code.5 36
The drafter's rationale for not including the burning of one's own
property as arson is that "[s]ince most destruction of one's own
property, if done with criminal intent, is done to perpetrate an in-
surance fraud; ,537 they believe it would be better dealt with under
the "theft by fraud" provisions of the New Code.5 35 If the actor had
523. Id.
524. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-21 (effective July 1, 1975).
525. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-34 (1960).
526. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12-41 (1960).
527. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
528. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (effective July 1, 1975). This section applies to en-
dangering of persons as well as property in excess of $5,000.
529. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
530. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
531. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
532. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
533. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-21 (effective July 1, 1975).
534. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 5.
535. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 194. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT 186 (1970).
536. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-34-01 (1960).
537. REPORT OF THE NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FORTY-THIRD LEoIsLATIvE As-
SEMBLY 88 (1973). See Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 5.
538. Id.
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the requisite criminal intent, his actions could also be prosecuted
under the attempted murder or murder provisions. If prosecution
under these two provisions was not possible or proved too difficult,
the actor could be prosecuted under the New Code section on en-
dangering by fire or explosion.5 39
Arson in the New Code is a class B felony for intent to destroy
a building.5 40 The Old Code makes a distinction in sentencing de-
pending on whether the offense pertains to a dwelling house or ad-
joining building or whether it pertains to another type of building.
Therefore, for arson of a dwelling house or adjoining building the
New Code provides for a ten year reduction in sentence from the
Old Code. The penalty for the burning of all other buildings remains
at ten years.5 1
Arson has not been graded in terms of the value of the property
destroyed because the offense would then be measured by the re-
sults of the offender's act, rather than his actual culpability or in-
tent. The Federal drafters felt that anyone who used a means which
could be so disastrous and indiscriminate with human life should be
faced with a stiff penalty, such as a class B felony, and rely on
judicial discretion for the sentencing of minimal acts.
42
The arson section in the New Code requires the actor to have
intent to destroy, whereas, endangering by fire or explosion requires
only that the actor have intent to start the fire or explosion. 543 The
Old Code merely requires the actor to have intent to burn in both
situations.- Thus the New Code raises the standard of proof requir-
ed for a conviction of arson.
B. ENDANGERING BY FIRE OR EXPLOSION
Endangering by fire or explosion is a section of the New Code
which is not contained in the Old Code. The New Code classifies
the offense as a class B felony if the actor places another person
in danger of death under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to human life. In all other cases it is a class C felony.
5
The New Code section on endangering by fire or explosion pro-
hibits intentionally starting or maintaining a fire or causing an ex-
plosion and thereby recklessly causing damage to property of another
539. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (effective July 1, 1975). This section "covers intentional
settings of fires or explosions to one's own property as well as another's, because reckless-
ness as to the consequences Is the key factor rather than, as in the arson provision, intent
to destroy." II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 880.
540. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
541. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-34-01 and 12-34-02 (1960). The maximum penalty for burning
a dwelling house or adjoining building under the Old Code is 20 years with a maximum
penalty of 10 years for burning all other types of buildings.
542. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 879.
543. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972, at 6. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01
(effective July 1, 1975).
544. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-34-01 (1960).
545. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
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in excess of $5,000.1 6 The $5,000 limitation, which is patterned after
the Proposed Federal Code, seems to be set rather high, especially
in light of the Old Code which provides that it is an offense when
the property has a value over $25.
" '
Endangering by fire or explosion in the New Code includes not
only those offenses in which a building or structure has been burn-
ed, but also those entirely independent of the burning of a building
since the building is not the essence of the offense, but rather it is
the endangering of human life which this section is intended to pro-
hibit.5
48
C. FAILURE TO CONTROL OR REPORT A FIRE
The New Code makes it an offense to fail to control or report
a fire if the offender started it or it was started with his assent.k 9
Under such a section a passerby or even a person charged with
protecting the property would have no legal obligation to report or
control the fire.550 This is not new law to North Dakota, however,
because it consolidates two sections of the Old Code and clarifies the
responsibilities of the offender.
51
D. RELEASE OF DEsTRucTivE FORCES
The catastrophe provisions of the New Code are new law for
North Dakota.55 2 Since catastrophe is defined as an event which
causes serious bodily injury to 10 or more persons or damage to 10
or more separate buildings or structures, or property loss in excess
of $500,000, there is some doubt whether these limits, which are
modeled after the Proposed Federal Code, 555 might not be excessive
for a sparsely populated and rural state such as North Dakota. The
question has also been posed as to whether such a provision is nec-
essary at all in North Dakota since these offenses could be prose-
cuted individually under other provisions of the New Code.55 How-
546. Id.
547. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-34-03 (1960). See Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21 1971.
at 6. "The $5,000 limitation poses a policy question for the Committee, because the present
offense of arson of personal property occurs when that property exceeds $25 in value.
... The Committee may wish to reduce the $5,000 limitation.
Id.
548. II WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 880.
549. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
550. "Consideration was given to extending liability under this provision to persons
responsible for the safekeeping of the property as well as to persons setting
dangerous fires. This was rejected on the ground that conviction of crime is
an unnecessary and harsh sanction for default in employment responsibilities."
WINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 196.
551. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 18-08-01 and 18-08-03 (1960). These sections when read together
make it a misdemeanor for a person to permit a lawfully set fire to spread. For a descrip-
tion Of a lawfully set fire, see N.D. CENr. CoDE § 18-08-02 (1960).
552. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
553. FINAL RPOR, supra note 6, § 1704.
554. These offenses could be prosecuted under the arson provisions of the New Code. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (effective July 1, 1975). See also Minutes "B", supra note 2, June
20-21, 1972 at 6.
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ever, it would seem that there are other valid reasons for this
statute, for as the federal drafters stated: "This... offense, .. , is
proposed to deal with widespread destruction or injury caused not
only by fire or explosion but also by other dangerous and difficult-
to-confine forces and substances. '" 555
Intentionally causing a catastrophe is a class B felony and if
anyone were to be killed during the catastrophe the actor could be
prosecuted for murder. 56
E. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
The New Code section on criminal mischief would replace sev-
eral sections of the Old Code which are contained in the chapter on
malicious offenses against property.55 7 Unlike arson, the emphasis of
the criminal mischief provisions is not on the method of destruction,
but rather on the resultant damage regardless of the means em-
ployed.5 58 In the New Code the offense is graded in terms of dollar
amount of damage; it being a class C felony to intentionally cause
loss in excess of $5,000, while it is a class A misdemeanor to in-
tentionally cause loss in excess of $500 and a class B misdemeanor
to cause loss up to $500.559 The Old Code provisions allow for punish-
ment up to 3 years for destroying works of art or literature, while
providing a one year penalty for destroying real or personal prop-
erty of another.5 60 The Old Code also provides for civil penalties of
treble damages for destroying property.561 The New Code does not
mention treble damages, however, it was the North Dakota draft-
ers' intention not to preclude civil liability.
56 2
F. INJURY TO PUBLIC SERVICE FACILITIES
The New Code section on tampering with or damaging a public
service565 consolidates various sections of the Old Code which make
it a felony to break or obstruct a water or gas pipe,5" or destroy
railroad property5 65 and a misdemeanor to destroy telegraph or tele-
phone lines, 566 and also includes additional types of public service
facilities not included in the Old Code. The New Code delineates
555. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 197.
556. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
557. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-41-01 to 12-41-04 and §4 12-41-06 to 12-41-18 (1960).
558. 11 WORSxING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 883. 'rhis is a general property damage statute
and is hinged on the resultant damage by any means.
559. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (effective July 1, 1975). Note, however, that method and
culpability also affect grading; it is a class C felony if tangible property of another is
damaged by an explosive or destructive device and it is a class A misdemeanor if the actor
recklessly causes loss in excess of $5,000.
Id.
560. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-41-03 (1960).
561. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-41-10 (1960).
562. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
563. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
564. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-41-05 (1960).
565. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-17-03 (1960).
566. N.D. CENT. CODE § 8-10-08 (1959).
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penalties from a class C felony for intentional destruction to a class
B misdemeanor for acts done with culpability less than knowingly
or recklessly.5 7
Consent is a defense which is new to North Dakota 56 8 as it is not
specifically provided for in the Old Code. Rather, it is implied in the
many sections566 which state "willfully and maliciously." The thrust
of the New Code would be to put the burden of consent on the de-
fendant, whereas under the Old Code, the prosecution has the bur-
den of proving "willfully and maliciously" which would impliedly
negate consent.
5 T °
The definition of "vital public facility" in the New Code includes
six specific types of installations.5 7 1 This somewhat limits the defi-
nition and it has been suggested that it could be considerably broad-
ened if it were to include a phrase such as "including but not
limited to" or "and other similar installations. ' 5 72 If it were so
broadened it would not only include those six specific installations
but also those installations which are of similar function but not
specifically mentioned in the statute.
The effect of the chapter on arson in the New Code is to con-
solidate four chapters of the Old Code into one in the New Code.
The New Code, patterned after the Proposed Federal Code, is much




Burglary under the Old Code, a statutory derivative of the com-
567. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-06(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
The offense is a class C felony if the actor engages in the conduct intentional-
ly, and a class A misdemeanor if the actor engages in the conduct knowingly
or recklessly. Otherwise it is a class B misdemeanor.
Id.
568. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-07 (effective July 1, 1975).
569. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-94-01, -02, -05, -06 (1960).
570. "This section makes consent an issue which the defendant must introduce into the
case rather than one which the prosecution must negate In every case in the( first instance."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 199 (1971).
571. These include "a facility maintained for use as a bridge (whether over land or wa-
ter), dam, tunnel, wharf, communications installation, or power station." N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-21-08(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
572. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 8 where Professor Lockney, Assistant
Professor of Law at the Unversity of North Dakota and a citizen member of the Committee
on Judiciary "B" states, " . . . the definition could be amended so that it reads 'vital public
facility' includes, but Is not limited to." Judge Pearce noted that he did not feel that the
definition of vital public facility is needed at all, but if it is to be retained, Professor Lock-
ney's suggestion would be an improvement. Id. There is a question as to whether such a
broadening of the statute would have constitutional implications, however, Professor Lock-
ney's suggestion was that "vital public facilities" be named in the statute with examples of
unnamed "vital public facilities" also given.
573. "Although other legal systems impose minor penalties for housebreaking and violation
of the dwelling, there is nothing resembling Anglo-American burglary in other legal codes.
• . . In foreign codes a 'burglar' is only guilty if he completes what he set out to do." Note,
Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 424, 427
(1951) ; Also Note, Reform tion of Burglary, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1969).
NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL CODE HORNBOOK 707
mon law, 5 14 requires the fulfillment of five elements. 575 There must
be (1) a breaking and (2) entering (3) of any structure (4) in which
property is kept (5) with the intent to steal or commit a felony.576
These elements are aimed primarily at the protection of property.
The New Code, identical to the Proposed Federal Code, 57 com-
prehensively deals with the willful entry or surreptitious failure to
leave buildings when there is a criminal intent. The offense is, also,
divided into two grades, differentiated by the presence or absence
of agravating circumstances.
There are five requisite elements under The New Code. An ac-
tor must (1) willfully enter or surreptitiously remain (2) in a build-
ing or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion
thereof (3) at a time when the premises are not open to the public
(4) and the actor is without license, invitation or privilege (5) and
intends to commit a crime therein.5 7 8
574. Common law burglary is defined as the breaking and entering of the dwelling house
of another in the nightime With the intent to commit a felony. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL,
LAW OF CRIMES 983 (7th ed. 1967) ; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 708 (1972)
R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 192 (1969).
575. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-35-02 (1960). A burglar under the Old Code is "any person who:
1. Breaks into the dwelling house of another by forcibly bursting or breaking
the wall or an outer door, window, or shutter of a window of the house, or
the lock or bolt of the door, or the fastening of the window or shutter;
2. Breaks into any dwelling house of another in any manner with the intent
to cdmnmit a crime;
3. Breaks into the dwelling house of another being armed with a dangerous
weapon or being assisted or aided by one or more confederates then actually
present;
4. Breaks into the dwelling house of another by unlocking an outer door by
means of false keys, or by picking the lock;
5. Enters the dwelling house of another in the nighttime through an open door,
window, or other aperture not made by him and breaks any inner door, win-
dow, partition or other part of the house with intent to commit a crime;
6. Being lawfully in a dwelling house, in the nighttime breaks an inner door
of the dwelling house with intent to commit a crime;
7. In the nighttime breaks the outer door, window, shutter or other part of
the dwelling house of another to get out of the same after having committed
a crime in such dwelling house;
8. Breaks into and enters at any time a building within the curtilage of a
dwelling house, but not forming any part thereof; or
9. Breaks into and enters at any time any building or any part of a building,
booth, tent, railroad car, motor vehicle or trailer, vessel, or other structure of
erection in which any property is kept, with intent to steal or to commit a
felony,
is guilty of burglary and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not less than one year nor more than ten years."
Id.
576. This differs from the common law in that no time limitation is present (in the night-
time).
577. Proposed State revisions of burglary and criminal trespass laws, similar to
those here proposed, include: N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW §§ 140.00-140.35 (McKinney
1967) ; PRELIM. REV. OF COLORADO CalM. LAws §§ 40-5-1 to 40-5-3, 40-6-4
(1964) ; PROPOSED CONN. PEN. CODE §§ 110-120 (1969) ; PROPOSED DEL. CRaM.
CODE §§ 510-518 (1967) ; MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE §§ 2601-2615 (Final Draft
1967) ; PROPOSED CRIM. CODE FOR PA. §§ 1401-1403 (1967) ; DRAFT OF TEXAS
PENAL CODE REVISIoNs § 221.1 (1967). The proposals derive from MODEL PENAL
CODE art. 221 (P.O.D. 1967).
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 892.
578. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
A person is guilty of burglary if he willfully enters or surreptitiously remains
in a building or occupied structure, or a separately secured or occupied por-
tion thereof, when at the time the premises are not open to the public and the
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The first element abolishes the breaking concept present in the
Old Code.57 9 An "entry, by whatever means," is sufficient. 80 Gain-
ing admittance through an open window or door or through an im-
properly gained key as well as insertion of a hand or instrument
into a building will suffice.581 The first element will also be satisfied
by a "surreptitious remaining." This occurs when an actor enters
a building lawfully, but remains through stealth or fraud.5 82
The second element limits the types of premises which are the
subject of burglary. While the Old Code includes a dwelling, "booth,
tent, railroad car, motor vehicle or trailer, vessel" or structure in
which property is kept, 88 the New Code limits the offense to build-
ings and occupied structures. The term building is used to denote
a permanent structure still in use while an occupied structure is a
structure used by people.5 84 However, they must be "types of prem-
ises in which individuals seek most to be secure in person and prop-
erty." 585 This means abandoned property or dilapidated structures
which clearly have no further usefulness can not be subject to bur-
glary coverage. 58 Specifically not subject to burglary are storage
structures for goods in the stream of commerce. 58 7 "Railroad cars,
actor is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain as
the case may be, with intent to commit a crime therein.
Id.
579. Il WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 60, at 892; Minutes "B", supra ndte 2, June 20-21,
1972 at 24, 26.
580. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 894.
581. Id.
582. The word "surreptitious" or "surreptitiously" has been defined in the following man-
ners: e.g., "[Aln act done fraudulently or without proper authority." Taylor v. S & M Lamp
Co., 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326 (1st Dist. 1961) ; "[DIone . . . acquired
. etc., by stealth, or without proper authority ... clandestine; .... (2) Acting, or doing
something, clandestinely; stealthy." Application of Joiner, 180 Cal. App. 2d 250, 4 Cal. Rptr.
667, 670 (2d Dist. 1960) ; "[Fjraudulently obtained. Falsely crept in. Obtained by falsehood,
fraud or stealth, by suppression or concealment of facts." Eastman v. New York, 134 F.
844, 852 (2d Cir. 1904).
588. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-35-02 (1960).
584. U WORKING PAPERS, supra nolte 60, at 895; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-06 (effective
July 1, 1975) :
1. "Occupied structure" means a structure or vehicle:
(a) Where any person lives or carries on business or other calling; or
(b) Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons. Any such
structure or vehicle is deemed to be "occupied" regardless of whether a per-
son is actually present.
585. Il WoRKING PAPERS, upra note 60, at 893.
See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 172 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1949), holding
that entry of an enclosed porch constitutes entry of the victim's apartment.
I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 893 n.5. LaFave and Scott's Criminal Law hornbook
provides another example:
The [Model Penal] Code provision covers entry of a "building or occupied
structure" which has not been abandoned, thus eliminating the prospect of a
burglary conviction for such acts as stealing from an unoccupied phone booth,
car or cave.
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 716-17 (1972).
686. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 895.
In James v. United States, 238 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1956), a burglary convic-
tion was reversed on a holding that an unoccupied house, in which the owner
did not live and did not intend to live, was not a dwelling house.
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 895 n.9.
587. II WORKING PAPERS, 8upra note 60, at 894. The New Code defines storage structure as
"any structure, truck, railway car, or aircraft which is used primarily for the storage or
transportation of property." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
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vessels, airplanes, trucks" and other vehicles carrying freight are
examples .5 1 "Passenger cars, enclosures such as fenced yards" and
"storage structures are [also] excluded from burglary cover-
age. .. .
Thirdly, premises open to the public are beyond burglary con-
sideration during the hours in which they are open to the public.
This includes department stores, supermarkets, shopping centers
and banks.5 90 The lawful entrance into such places is not made un-
lawful by a criminal mind.59 "1 There can be accountability only for
those acts thereafter performed on the premises. 5 2 Thus, a shoplift-
er could not be guilty of burglary.
The fourth element excludes licensed, invited or privileged en-
trances from consideration. As above, criminal intent is inapplica-
ble when entrance is properly authorized. Consequently, guests, de-
livery personel, repairmen or any person properly authorized to be
on the premises could never be guilty of burglary.
Finally, there is the intent requirement. Under the Old Code an
intent to steal or commit a felony is required.5 93 Under the New
Code, the intent to commit any crime is sufficient,594 including the
intent to commit a misdemeanor. 595 In effect, a blanket provision
covering unlawful intrusions of unclear purpose is formed.596
588. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 893.
589. 1d. at 894.
590. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 Tent. Draft No. 11 at 58 (1960). It states in part:
A person is "privileged" to enter. . . . if by license, custom or otherwise, the
general public is invited or permitted to enter; and it is not intended that a
proprietor of a store might enlarge the applicability of the burglary law by
posting notices that shoplifters are not welcome.
Id.
591. 11 WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 894 n.7.
See Wyche v. Louisiana, 894 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1967), concerning a State
cnarge of aggravated burglary in that defendant entered public premises with
intent to assault another, and did so assault him. The Fifth Circuit held that
the entry could not be deemed unlawful, because it was authorized under the
Federal law, i.e., the Civil Rights Act. At most, therefore, defendant committed
a simple assault, and could not be held for burglary. See also Mills v. United
States, 228 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1955), holding that if defendant entered an
office and took property from it believing be had the owner's permission t6 do
so, he could not be guilty of "housebreaking." But cf. Alford v. United States,
113 F.2d 885, 887 (10th Cir. 1940), holding that a scheme to take funds from
a bank customer's safety deposit box, by false representations, "is an offense
in the nature of burglary, entry of a bank with intent to commit a felony or
larceny therein, except that forcible entry is not made an element."
Id.
592. 1 WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 894.
598. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-35-02 (1960).
594. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 893. Minutes "B", supra nOte 2, June 20-21, 1972
at 24.
595. 11 WORKING PAPEas, supra note 60, at 893. "[T]he crime intended to be committed
does not include unlawful entry or presence crimes, such as criminal trespass or stowing
away." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 200.
596. II WORKING PAPERs, supra note 60, at 892-93.
See e.g., Hiatt v. United States, 384 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 998 (1968), holding that evidence of the defendant's breaking into a
sealed railroad car, his effort to flee on warning from an accomplice, his false
story, and his possession of pliers and a flashlight were enough to prove his
entry with intent to steal; Washington v. United States, 263 F.2d 742, 745
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), holding that the fact
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At common law and under the Old Code, there could be no bur-
glary if the intent was formed after completion of the breaking and
entry. The intent had to exist at the time of the breaking and
entry-whether formulated before or at the breaking.59 7 In similar
manner, the New Code requires that entry be made with the req-
uisite intent.598 A criminal intent formed after entry would not con-
stitute burglary.
B. GRADING
The theoretical basis for burglary under common law was the
protection of the right of habitation.5 99 Statutory provisions today,
like the Old Code, are not based upon the protection of the habita-
tion.600 Their basis is founded upon the pirotection of property and
the prevention of personal injuries.601 Also inherent is the underlying
desire to apprehend offenders before fulfillment of their criminal in-
tent.
602
Ostensibly, "protection of the sanctity of persons and property"
provides the theoretical basis for the New Code provision. 0 8 The pri-
mary aim is to prevent confrontations leading to violence.6 0 4 Justifi-
cation for this burglary provision, then, would be predicated upon
the significantly greater danger of an incidental crime occurring
defendant accosted a girl in the house he illegally entered did not preclude a
jury finding that his original intent was to steal: "[TIhe unexplained pres-
ence of appellant in the darkened house near midnight, access having been by
force and stealth through a window, is ample without more to allow an in-
ference that he was there to steal." Both of these cases might more easily
have been resolved if the required proof of intent was not limited to proof
that the intended crime was, specifically, larceny. Further, reliance on a bur-
glary provision, rather than the law of attempt, makes it easier to deal with
concepts such as impossibility of successful commission df the crime. Cf. Pink-
ney v. United States, 380 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967) ; "It was not neces-
sar'y to prove the contents of the safe, nor would it make any difference if
the safe had been proved to be empty. The elements of the offense charged
are the entry and the holding of an intent to commit larceny at the time of
entering. Success or failure of the venture is immaterial."
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 893 n.3.
597. Note, Crimes Against The Habitation, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 50, 57-58 (1955) ; Note,
A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 1009, 1016 (1951).
598. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
599. Note, Burglary: Punishment Without Justiflcation, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 391, 394 (1970)
Note, Reformation of Burglary, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1969). Note, Statutory Bur-
glary-The Magi Of Four Walls And A Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 433 (1951) illustrates
the concept of the right of habitation as follows:
The theory behind common law burglary was not so much to protect the
dwelling as a building but to protect its security. This security was far more
than the safety of the occupant behind locked doors; it represented the Inde-
finable Idea, existent in all climes at all times, that the home, as contrasted
to the house, was inviolable; that whatever terrors raged in the outer world,
every individual exercised his greatest freedom in that place where he con-
ceived and built his family, a place to which he Imparted part of his own soul.
Accord, 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834 (1955).
600. Note, Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
411, 431 (1951) ; Note, Reformation of Burglary, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1969).
601. Note, Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
411, 428-32 (1951) ; Note, Reformation of Burglary, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 211, 213 (1969).
602. Note, Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
411, 488 (1951).
603. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 894.
604. See II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 895-96.
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agaiht the persor under circumstances of confrontation, than the
corhmissioii of the same crime under other circumstances. Sanctity
and, Securify of the person and not of property is the main focal
p6htf. The theft provision protects the right of property. With this
in ioind, it is submitted that the New Code ought to apply only to
tlose situatiofis in which a grave danger of an incidental crime
against the 1efson is present.605
With the major danger of burglary posed as "[t]he risk of a
violent encounter with an intruder who is bent on criminality upon
enclosed premises," the New Code grades the crime "in accordance
v ith the degree of accentuation of that possibility."60 6 Consequently,
two grades defined through aggravating circumstances serve to de-
terniine the potential penalty. First, aggravation occurs if "the of-
fehs6 is c6mrhiitted at night and is knowingly perpetrated in the
dwelling of another." 607 Secondly, it occurs if "in effecting entry or
Ihile in the premises or in imniediate flight therefrom, the actor:
(l)- "iriflicts of attempts to inflict bodily injury or physical re-
strainif on another;"
(2) "menaces another with imminent serious bodily injury;"
(3) "is armed with a firearm or destructive device;" or,
(4) possesses a weapon "which under the circumstances indicates
an intent or readiness to inflict serious bodily injury." 60 18
If the burglary involves one of these, the offense is a class B felony.
All, other situations reside within the second grade and merit class
C felony status.6 9
These aggravation factors present a deterrent to a violent crime.
By instituting higher penalties for harmful or threatening conduct,
it "may induce the culprit to take measures to avoid dangerous con-
frontations with other persons."610 Supportive is the likelihood for
there to be planning and preparation prior to commission of the of-
fense.6 11
Although the New Code specifies no other considerations in de-
termining penalty imposition, judicial sentencing discretion is of
paramount importance. The Interim Committee on Judiciary "B"
expressly recognized this. "The Chairman noted that in most in-
stances the fact that penalty classifications are somewhat high will
be offset by the proper exercise of judicial sentencing discretion.
' 61 2
605. See Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 1009, 1025-26 (1951).
606. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 895-96.
607. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 896.
611. Id.
612. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 26.
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This sentencing discretion ought to be applied to levy lighter pen-
alties when the offender has perpetrated a crime in a manner not
likely to lead to crime against the person. First in this category is
the burglary of an unoccupied building. If the building is unoccupied,
a substantially smaller danger of personal injury to others is pres-
ent.""3 A second grouping is entry effected by insertion of a body
part or instrument. Entry gained thereby threatens less personal
danger because of the burglar's greater opportunity to flee and thus
smaller incentive to resist.6 14
The third is the absence of confederates. The threat to society
and the safety of the individual is diminished when there are no
confederates because moral support and courage reinforcement as
well as combination of effort are absent.6 5 Such distinctions serve
to steer burglary away from violent confrontations. This is consis-
tent with the ends of the new burglary code.
In the final analysis, the New Code "treats burglary as a most
serious offense in itself." 618 Although this analysis may result, and
has resulted in the past, in disproportionate cumulative sentences,61 7
proper application of the provisions on sentencing and multiple pros-
ecutions should avoid this undesirable and unjust result 6 1 8
XI. THEFT
A. CONSOLIDATION OF THEFT OFFENSES
The key feature of this section of the New Code,61 9 drawn sub-
stantially from the Proposed Federal Code,6 20 is the inclusion of sev-
613. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1009, 1029 (1951). This
Note also states:
Reason indicates . . . that the presence of occupants can often be determined.
And differentiation on the basis of occupancy would tend to channel burglaries
toward unoccupied dwellings.
Id., at 1030.
614. Id., at 1030.
615. Note, Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
411, 529 (1951).
616. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 896.
617. In II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 895 n.11 It is stated that:
In United States v. Carpenter, 143 F.2d 47, 48 (7th Cir. 1944), the de-
fendant received separate terms for entering an interstate freight car, larceny,
receiving and conspiracy. Despite the apparent harshness of the sentence, the
court hel d:
Congress defined and penalized every conceivable form of act, every
gradation of the process of burglarizing interstate commerce, when It
enumerated these many acts. It intended to make criminal any act there-
in recited. If two of the acts in any category were disclosed, two crimes
were committed.
Similarly, breaking Into a Post Office with Intent to commit larceny has been
held to be a separate crime from larceny itself. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S.
632 (1915). Under the bank robbery statute (18 U.S.C. § 2118), however, it
has been held that entry of a bank with Intent to commit robbery or larceny
is a lessor included crime to completion of a robbery or larceny in the bank.
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
618. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 896.
619. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
620. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1731-41.
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eral common law and Old Code offenses 621 under a general heading
of theft. The major change effected by the consolidation is express-
ed in the principle "that the theory underlying the proscription is
irrelevant so long as the defendant has been adequately forewarned
as to the proof with which he must contend.
' 622
Theft itself is divided into three categories: Theft of Property; 623
Theft of Services;6 24 and Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Deliv-
ered by Mistake.
62 5
In addition to the theft sections, the New Code delineates three
separate crimes that involve less serious, but nonetheless improper,
dealing with the property of another. These related offenses include
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle, 626 Misapplication of Entrusted Prop-
erty,6 27 and Defrauding Secured Creditors.6 28 Theft is "characterized
by an intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently or
substantially so, ' ' 629 whereas the less serious offenses involve "bor-
rowing of property under circumstances hazarding loss or dam-
age."62
0
The consolidation provision of the New Code has several advan-
tages over the Old Code. First, the "fair apprisal" nature of the
criminal charge should "accomplish the law enforcement objectives
of excluding the technical defense based on miscategorization and in-
creasing the efficiency of the criminal process consistent with fair-
ness." 681 Furthermore, the provisions are designed to "cover the
wide variety of means by which the inventiveness of the criminal
mind can operate.
63 2
The accused also benefits from the changes made in the classi-
fication of theft. Most notably, he possesses a clear defense of
double jeopardy under the New Code should he be charged with
theft and acquitted; he cannot be charged twice on two theories of
621. The offenses covered by the theft section of the New Code "include the separate of-
fenses heretofore known as larceny, stealing, purloining, embezzlement, obtaining money or
property by false pretenses, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen
property, misappropriation of public funds, swindling, and the like." N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-23-01(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
622. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 205. "The defendant may be found guilty of theft
under such an indictment, information, or complaint if his conduct falls under sections
12.1-23-02 to 12.1-23-04, so long as the conduct proved is sufficiently related to the conduct
charged that the accused is not unfairly surprised by the case he must meet." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-23-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975). This is designed to eliminate defenses which
have arisen because of technical difficulties with the common law definitions of larceny,
embezzlement, and obtaining money and property by false pretenses.
628. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
624. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
625. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04 (effective July 1,, 1975).
626. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
627. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-07 (effective July 1, 1975).
628. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-08 (effective July 1, 1975).
629. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 205. North Dakota has adopted the Proposed Federal
Code theft provisions almost verbatim; hence, the frequent references to the Commission
papers.
630. Id.
631. II WORKING PAPER, supra note 60, at 945.
632. Id. at 944.
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theft, e.g., both taking and retaining the same property.6 38 Further-
more, if the variance between the conduct charged and the offense
proved is too great, it might be argued either that the accused has
been unfairly surprised or that the grand jury had not authorized
a prosecution such as the one attempted.6 34
While the consolidation of theft is innovative in criminal' codes,
it is hardly a radical departure from the popular conception of the
generic term "stealing". With its balance of advantages to the crim-
inal justice system and to the accused, the consolidation provision
is a welcome feature in the New Code.
B. THEFT OF PROPERTY
Throughout this section of the New Code, the culpability require-
ment is "knowingly ... with. intent to deprive the owner thereof."8 35
Neither the Old Code nor the New Code makes explicit reference to
"permanent" deprivation in the definition of the offense. 36 However,
that element of permanency which is ordinarily associated with the
concept of theft is included in the definition of "deprive"6 7 and is
also manifested in deprivation which involves a high risk of loss to
the owner. Such high risk of loss typically occurs where there is (1)
an appropriation of the major value of the property, (2) a withhold-
ing of property with the intent to ransom it back to the owner, or
(3) a disposal of the property or an interest in property which
makes restoration highly unlikely (an embezzlement situation).638
The theft section of the New Code prohibits any unauthorized
control over the property of another;68 9 this singular treatment has
been effected through the definitions of "obtain" and "deprive.""
When considered together, the two words are basically equivalent
to the phrase "takes or exercises . . . control.""' 1 Thus, three oft
the most troublesome Old Code offenses-larceny, 642 embezzlement, 68
and obtaining property by false pretenses"4-which fit within this
633. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 206.
634. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 946. Refer to note 622, supra.
635. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1), (2), (3) (effective July 1, 1975).
636. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-01 (1960).
637. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(2) (effective July 1, 1975). Deprive ". . adds the ele-
ment of permanency about the acquisition that is normally associated with the concept of
theft, but it does not limit the definition to permanent deprivation only." II WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 60, at 920.
638. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 920-21. "Owner" describes any entity that has
the interest in the property which the actor is not entitled to violate. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-23-10(7) (effective July 1, 1975).
639. Id. at 922.
640. To "obtain" means to "bring about a transfer or purported transfer of an interest in
the property, whether to the actor or another .... " N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(5) (effec-
tive July 1, 1975). The Initial acquisition may have been either lawful or unlawful.
To "deprive" means essentially the exercise of control in the absence of a privilege
to do so. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(2) (effective July 1. 1975).
641. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
642. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-01 (1960).
643. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-36-01 (1960).
644. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-38-04 (1960).
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definition are clearly included in the New Code theft section.6"
The New Code also forbids obtaining property by "threat or de-
ception, '646 thereby replacing the standard definition of extortion."
Reflecting the desire to proscribe as much conduct as possible with-
in the paragraph, the New Code enumerates twelve types of threats,648
while the Old Code lists only four.64 9 Perhaps the greatest expansion
in the definition of threat lies in the explicit recognition of broadened
personal rights.65O
Union dues are expressly excepted from the definition of
threat. 61 The Federal drafters indicate that "the last sentence of
the paragraph defining threat bars the use of a defense to a charge
of theft by threat that the charge should have been bribery. " 6 1 2
The Theft of Property section653 also covers the activities involv-
ed in receiving, retaining and disposing of stolen property.654 The
actor must know that the property has been stolen and have the
intent to deprive the owner thereof. 65
Two new concepts are introduced into North Dakota law by the
Theft of Property section in the New Code.
First, the scope of the old larceny offense is increased by the
additional proscription against unauthorized transfers of interest in
real property.6 56 Larceny in the Old Code includes only the taking
of personal property.657 The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code,
which has provisions identical to the New Code on this topic, sep-
arately stated the unauthorized transfer of interests in real property
for two reasons: (1) to make it clear that an unauthorized transfer
of an interest in real property was meant to be included in theft
645. "Between the two terms-'obtain' and 'deprive'-the entire range of conduct between
an initial acquisition and a withholding after a proper acquisition is included." II WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 60, at 922.
646. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
647. "Extortion is the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-37-01
(1960). A necessary element is some form of threat by which fear is induced. State v.
Andelson, 66 N.D. 522, 528, 267 N.W. 121, 124 (1996).
648. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(11) (effective July 1, 1975). While robbery requires an
inflicted injury or an attempt to inflict injury or threatening or menacing another with
imminent bodily injury, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01(1) (effective July 1, 1975), threat
as it relates to theft "means an express purpose, however communicated, to: (1) cause
bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; . . ." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10 (11) (1) (effective July 1, 1975). (Emphasis added).
649. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-37-02 (1960).
650. Especially N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(11) (vi) and (xii) (effective July 1, 1975).
where the threats involved may also give rise to recovery in tort for invasion of privacy.
651. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(11) (xl) (effective July 1, 1975).
652. INAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 221. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(11) (xii) (ef-
fective July 1, 1975).
653. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
654. The paragraph replaces N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-19 (Supp. 1973) which provided for
a minimum punishment of one year and a maximum of five years of lmprisonment in the
state penitentiary for buying and receiving, with the requisite knowledge and intent ele-
ments, personal property in excess of one hundred dollars value.
655. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
656. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975),
657. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-01 (1960).
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of property, and (2) to support the distinction between real and per-
sonal property.658 That it is a transfer of an interest in real property
avoids interference with trespass and "other traditional real prop-
erty remedies." 8 9
The second new660 concept is found in the New Code definition
of deprive: that is, "to withhold property or to cause it to be with-
held . . . under such circumstances that a major portion of its ec-
onomic value, or its use and benefit, has in fact been appropri-
ated; .... ."681
Whether a major portion has in fact been appropriated is a ques-
tion for the jury in the individual case; the jury must decide "the
extent of risk involved in the particular use of the property.8 16 2 The
culpability of the actor then turns on the extent "to which he
created or intended to create a danger to the property [so] that
it would be permanently deprived from its owner. 668
The degree of likelihood that the property will not be restored
is determined objectively from the circumstances; the jury must
conclude that the necessary risk of loss was involved to merit a
conviction of theft.6"
Because of the requirement that the property has "in fact been
. . . appropriated,"6 15 the jury need not inquire into the possibility
of restoration. 6 6 "The crucial factual inquiry will be exactly what
use the actor intended when he took" unauthorized control of the
property. 667 In other words, the jury must determine "the degree of
culpability manifested by the actor in exposing the property to the
risk he created,' 6 6  and the risk created is a question of fact.
C. THEFT OF SERVICES
An actor commits theft of services either (1) by intentionally 66'
obtaining services which he knows are available only for compensa-
658. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 915-16.
659. Id., at 917.
660. Arguably, the concept of deprivation of economic value is not strictly new to North
Dakota law. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-41-07 (1960) makes the removal of materials which re-
duce the value of a building by more than twenty dollars a felony, regardless of the actual
value of the property taken; if the value lost Is less than twenty dollars, the taking is a
misdemeanor. But the application of the concept In the New Code Is of so great a change
in degree that It virtually equals a change in kind.
661. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
662. II WORKING PAPERS, aupra note 60, at 921.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(2) (1) (effective July 1, 1976).
666. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 921.
667. Id. Thus, "[t]he circumstances which led to the particular form of unauthorized con-
trol are relevant to [the defendant's] culpability-to the existence of the required mental
elements and to the grading of the particular offense-but are not relevant to the issue of
whether the objective conduct-the actus reus, to use the technical term-has occurred."
Id., at 915.
668. Id., at 921-22.
669. "Intentionally" has been defined as " ... a purpose to bring about a (permanent)
transfer of an Interest in property which the actor knew he was not entitled to Infringe
without consent." II WORKING PA's, suprq note 60, at 924.
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tion by means which are designed to avoid payment, Whether de-
ception, threat, false token or other methods are used; or (2) by
diverting disposition of services to which he is not personally en-
titled to his own use or to the use of another who is not entitled to
them.670
The definition of "service71 in the New Code assumes some-
thing of demonstrable and determinable value. If the service is not
ordinarily a thing of value, the culpability of the actor depends upon
whether criminal means are used to obtain the service. "Thus, mere-
ly deceiving a neighbor for the purpose of obtaining his 'services'
in driving one into town would not be an offense" under this sec-
tion of the New Code.6
72
Failure to pay or to make arrangements to pay when compen-
sation for services is ordinarily due immediately upon their rendi-
tion establishes a prima facie case that the services were obtained
by deception.8 78 One who "refuses to pay because he honestly con-
siders the service to be poor can present evidence which would
warrant withholding the case from the jury.1"8 74
The Theft of Services section expands the former larceny classi-
fication under the rationale that there "appears to be no good rea-
son to distinguish takings upon the basis of tangibility.8 7 5 This is a
welcome consolidation of offenses which have been punished under
specific criminal fraud provisions of the Old Code.678 Certainly, the
importance of services should be recognized in criminal codes in
more than a piece-meal fashion. In addition, a theft of services sec-
tion reflects a movement away from the narrow theoretical struc-
tures of common law theft as merely an offense against property.
D. THEFT OF PROPERTY LOST, MISLAID OR DELIVERED BY MISTAKE
In the thefts of property and services the actor himself is re-
sponsible for the initial loss to the owner. In contrast, under this
670. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (effective July 1, 1975). The typical offense under the
second paragraph of the section would involve a government official using public employees
for non-public work. Thus, it amounts to an exercise of control for Improper disposition of
services.
671. "'Services' means labor, professional service, transportation, telephone, mail or other
public service, gas, electricity and other public utility services, accommodations In hotels,
restaurants, or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, and use of vehicles or other property."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(9) (effective July 1, 1975).
672. FINAL REPORT, 8upra note 6, at 207.
673. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
674. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 207. And, since a prima facie case Is raised instead of
a presumption, the Jury need not be told of the special provision. "The purpose . . . is to
get the case to the Jury If such facts can be shown and to let the Jury draw whatever in-
ferences the evidence will support without special instructions on the subject." II WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 60, at 938.
675. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 207.
676. N.D. CENT. CODE: § 12.1-23-03 (effective July 1, 1975). This section specifically re-
places three sections of the Old Code: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-40-17 (1960) (larceny of
passenger ticket), 12-38-11 (1960) (evasion of hotel bill), and 12-38-13 (1960) (obtaining
tourist camp accommodations by fraud). Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972, at 36.
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New Code section 6 7 the actor is culpable when he learns of ,the na-
ture of the property and then knowingly disposes of or retains it
"with intent to deprive the owner.16 7
The actor must know either that the property has been lost or
mislaid 6l9 or that the property was misdelivered due to mistaken
identity of the receiver or a mistake as to the nature or quantity
of the property.68 0 Beyond the special knowledge requirement in each
situation, the actor must form an intent to deprive the owner of
the property and fail to take "readily available and reasonable
measures to restore the property to the person entitled to have it."681
The provisions of this section apply only after the actor has
learned of the special nature of the property. The critical issues are
then (1) whether or not the actor has the requisite intent to de-
prive and (2) whether or not he has failed to take reasonable
measures to restore the property to the owner.682 The mere lapse of
time is not the essential determining factor.
After an actor has learned of the nature of the property, he has
a duty to take reasonable steps to restore it to the owner;6 13 failure
to take such measures would raise at least an inference that the
requisite intent to deprive was present.6 8
A penalty to encourage the return of property is not inconsis-
tent with the underlying theory of theft as the taking or exercising
of unauthorized control over the property of another.
E. GRADING OF THEFT OFFENSES
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code used three principles
in grading theft offenses: (1) the nature of the conduct, (2) the
677. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04(10) (effective July 1, 1975). This section specifically
replaces two sections of the Old Code:
N.D. CENT. CODE H§ 12-40-08 (1960) (concealing lost goods) and 12-40-09 (1960)
(appropriation of lost property).
678. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
679. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
680. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
681. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04 (effective July 1, 1975). The Study Draft of the Pro-
posed Federal Code defined "reasonable measures" as either notifying the owner, if he is
ascertainable, or notifying a police officer that the actor has the property. But this was de-
leted from the final draft of the Proposed Federal Code as "unnecessary and limiting." II
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 939. "Variables such as knowledge of who is the owner
and the value of the property preclude setting forth a satisfactory definition of 'reasonable
measures.' " FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 208.
682. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 939.
683. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
684. Intent is not so difficult a problem as is knowledge. The Old Code has a similar
knowledge requirement; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-09 (1960). The annotator to the Cen-
tury Code has included a reference to State v. McCarty, 47 N.D. 523, 182 N.W. 754 (1921).
Perhaps more applicable to a determination of knowledge under both the Old Code and the
New Code Is a case in which the defendant was charged with receiving stolen goods, State
v. Marcovitz, 63 N.D. 458, 248 N.W. 481 (1933). The North Dakota Supreme Court noted,
"In attempting to solve this problem of knowledge, the jury cannot avoid taking into con-
sideration what a man of defendant's age, intelligence, and business ability would do and
learn." 63 N.D. at 465-66, 248 N.W. at 485. But "the test of a man's culpability is what he
himself knew and thought .... " 63 N.D. at 466, 248 N.W. at 485. Knowledge that property
is lost, mislaid, or misdelivered Is, of course, also a function of the extrinsic and readily
observable circumstances of the situation.
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value or character of the property, and (3) the status of the thief 8
North Dakota has adopted similar grading standards.
Under the New Code theft is a Class B felony if the value of the
property or services stolen exceeds ten thousand dollars. Similarly,
if the theft is committed by threats to inflict serious bodily injury
to the victim or to any other person, or by a threat to commit a
Class A or B felony, the theft is punished as a Class B felony.
86
Theft is characterized as a Class C felony if the value of the
property exceeds one hundred dollars.68 1 In special circumstances,
theft of property or services not exceeding one hundred dollars -in
value can also be a Class C felony.688
The character of the property stolen may also result in a Class
C felony status, notwithstanding value: firearms, ammunition, ex-
plosives or destructive devices, automobiles, aircraft or other -motor-
propelled vehicles; 6 9 counterfeiting materials and equipment; 9 0 a
key or other device stolen with the purpose of using it to gain ac-
cess to property intended to be appropriated, the value or nature
of which would meet felony standards. 91 The reasoning is that such
property is often stolen merely as a prelude to the commission of
another crime; the value of the property ceases to be its most sig-
nificant feature. 692 Since theft of government documents can disrupt
the orderly functioning of government, it is a Class C felony.0 98
All theft not previously categorized is graded as a Class A mis-
685. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 210.
686. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(1) (effective July 1, 1975). A Class B felony Is punish-
able under the New Code by a maximum incarceration of ten years, a fine of not more than
ten thousand dollars, or both. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
For extortion the Old Code provides a one to five year penitentiary term. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-37-03 (1960). For grand larceny requiring a property valuation in excess of one hundred
dollars under the Old Code, the penalty is from a minimum of three months in the county
jail to a maximum of ten years in the state penitentiary, or a fine of not less than five
hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or a combination of both. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-40-40 (1960).
687. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975). A Class C felony is
punishable by a maximum sentence of five years or a maximum fine of five thousand dol-
lars, or a combination of the two. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(3) (effective July 1,
1975). Under the Old Code petty larceny merits a fine varying from ten dollars to one
hundred dollars or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-40-05 (1960).
688. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975) makes theft by threat
committed by a public official or other individual a Class C felony if the value exceeds
fifty dollars; theft committed by a public servant in the course of his duties where the
value stolen exceeds fifty dollars is also a Class C felony, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12,1-23-05
(2) (c) (effective July 1, 1975). So, too, the "professional fence is always a felon because
he is vital to making theft lucrative." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 211. This comment
refers to the section in the Proposed Federal Code which is adopted In this state in N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (f) (effective July 1, 1975).
689. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (d) (effective July 1, 1975). Treating theft of a car
as a felony in all instances avoids difficult problems of valuation, a virtually Irrelevant Issue
since, regardless of the thief's intention to use the vehicle for mere transportation or to
re-sell it, "there is a substantial invasion of ownership rights ... " II WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 60, at 949.
690. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (g) (effective July 1, 1975).
691. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (1) (effective July 1, 1975).
692. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 211.
693. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(2) (e) (effective July 1, 1975).
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demeanor; 6 94 however, if the value does not exceed fifty dollars and
the theft was (a) not committed by threat, (b) not committed with-
in a confidential or fiduciary relationship, or (c) not committed by
a public servant in the course of his duties, the offense is further
reduced to a Class B misdemeanor.0
5
If "the actor has completed all of the conduct which he believes
necessary on his part to complete the theft except receipt of the
property,"696 the attempt is punishable as though the offense had
been completed. The belief of the actor that he has done all that
is necessary to fully carry out the theft distinguishes this equally-
graded attempt from lesser-graded attempts.
6 9 7
The additional rationales support grading attempted theft equal-
ly with the completed offense. First, the culpability, and hence the
need for rehabilitation of the actor, is just as great regardless of
the naivete of the victim.698 Second, the traditional definition of theft
included conduct that has typically been characterized as attempted
theft.6 19 And, finally, making both the attempt and its completion
punishable to the same degree will eliminate the defense that the
victim in fact did not relinquish the property because of the decep-
tion or threat.700
In determining the grade of the offense, the amount of the prop-
erty or the services stolen "shall be the highest value by any rea-
sonable standard . . "."70 The change from the common law con-
cept of theft as an offense merely against property to the modem
emphasis on culpability of the actor creates several perspectives
from which the value could be measured,7 0 2 but the standard used
must be "fair under the circumstances.
70 8
In a departure from the Old Code, under the New Code if it is
proven that several thefts were committed "pursuant to one scheme
694. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
695. N.D. CENT. CODE 4 12.1-28-05(4) (effective July 1, 1975). This subsection applies If
the prosecutor so classifies the offense in the charge or if a preponderance of the evidence
at sentencing establishes the required factors.
696. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(5) (effective July 1, 1975).
697. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (effective July 1, 1975). The actor's conduct in
equally-graded attempt situations has come "dangerously close" to completion of the of-
fense. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 211.
698. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 923.
699. Id.
700. Id. at 924.
701. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(6) (effective July 1, 1975).
702. They include:
what the actor actually stole, i.e., the actual value of the property involved;
what the actor believed he was stealing, i.e., the value of the diamonds he
thought he was stealing rather than the rhinestones he actually stole; what
the actor hoped he was stealing, i.e., the $500 he hoped was in the mailbag
rather than the $30 that was actually there [This viewpoint was deleted from
the Study Draft of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code]; or what the actor
could reasonably have anticipated to be there, even though he never particu-
larly addressed the value issue in planning his theft.
II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 954.
703. Id.
720
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or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several per-
sons," '70 ' the series may be charged as one theft and the amounts
aggregated to determine the grade of the theft. "The court is not
being permitted to aggregate unproven offenses; what is permitted
is for the court to consolidate six misdemeanor charges, for example,
into one felony sentence.
'7 0 5
In general, "the range of grading of the theft offenses under
[the New Code] is slightly higher than the range under current
North Dakota law."708 Considering, however, "the emphasis placed
on either the tremendous [in reference to the $100,000 division
point, later reduced to $10,000] value of the property stolen or the
risk of commission of a serious offense or infliction of serious bodily
injury . . ." the classification appears justified.70 T
F. RELATED OFFENSES
The lesser degree of seriousness, offenses involving "borrowing
of property under circumstances hazarding loss or damage,"7ea
-manifests itself in three sections of the New Code.
1. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
Under the New Code, if an actor "takes, operates, or exercises
control over an automobile, aircraft, motorcycle, motorboat, or other
motor-propelled vehicle of another," 70 9 knowing that he is doing so
without the consent of the owner, he is guilty of unauthorized use
of a vehicle. The offense is a Class C felony if the vehicle is an air-
craft or if the cost of restoring and retrieving the vehicle exceeds
five hundred dollars; otherwise, it is a Class A misdemeanor.7 10
Including this section in the New Code has the effect of pre-
cluding felony charges and convictions in joyriding cases. 11 That
purpose is present in the Old Code in diluted form. There felonious
larceny of an automobile or motorcycle is defined as requiring that
the vehicle be taken with intent to deprive the owner thereof, but
indicates that a taking without the owner's express or implied con-
sent is presumptive evidence of such intent.7 12 If an actor operates
a vehicle without the consent of the owner but without the intent
704. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05(6) (effective July 1, 1975).
705. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 955.
706. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 37.
707. Id.
708. FINAL REPORT, Supra note 6, at 205.
709. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
710. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-06(3) (effective July 1, 1975). Use of an aircraft is a
felony "not only because of the greater danger posed by an aircraft In the hands of one
who may not know much about flying and who is trying to avoid detection, but also be-
cause of the generally greater value of a plane and the greater distance that can be . . .
covered." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 212.
711. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 212.
712. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-06 (1960).
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to deprive the owner thereof, he is guilty under the Old Code of a
misdemeanor.
7 1 3
This section of the New Code relates to three basic situations:
(1) the simple unauthorized taking of a vehicle, (2) the borrowing
for one's personal use of a vehicle in his custody for repair, and
(3) the retention of a vehicle far past the time agreed for return. 1"
"In the last two types of cases, the use or retention must be a
'gross deviation' from the custody agreement for the conduct to be
criminal,"7 15 and that is a jury question.
In each instance, the actor must know that the owner did not
consent. Despite the absence of actual consent if the actor reason-
ably believes that the owner would have consented had he known of
the intended use, such is a statutory defensee.7 1  The jury determines
the reasonableness of the belief.7
17
The crucial factor differentiating this section from the theft sec-
tions is the absence of an intent to permanently deprive. The jury
will draw its inferences in major part from what it is that the ac-
tor does with the vehicle: where he abandons it, whether he aban-
dons it, and other factors.
7 1 8
2. Misapplication of Entrusted Property
The misapplication of entrusted property section7 19 of the New
Code is the second of a two-part approach designed to resolve prob-
lems posed by the mishandling of funds by public employees and
others. Centered upon the definition of deprive with its focus on a
disposal of property in such a manner as to make its restoration
unlikely, the first tier involves the offense of theft and is supple-
713. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-40-07 (1960). The Unauthorized Use of Vehicle section in the
New Code "does not require an intent to deprive the owner of his vehicle, while Section
12-40-06 [of the Old Code] does so require. To that extent, . . . [the New Code section]
would provide an easier burden of proof on the prosecution; however, the maximum po-
tential penalty is reduced correspondingly from seven years' imprisonment to one year im-
prisonment, unless the value of the use of the vehicle and the cost of restoriation exceeds
$500, in which case the maximum punishment under . . . [the New Code] would be the
same as current North Dakota law." Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 98.
714. 11 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 940.
715. Id.
716. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-06(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
717. It is hoped by the drafters of the Proposed Federal Code that this defense will keep
family arguments and disputes between friends out of court. They also suggest that the
"difficulty of disproving defendant's alleged reasonable belief may warrant converting this
defense to an 'affirmative defense,' which would put the burden of proof on the accused."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 212.
718. The jury determination, except in the case of aircraft, will include a finding of value
lost in retrieving and restoring the vehicle, thus classifying the offense as either a misde-
manor or as a felony.
In addition, the circumstances of the case may present possible charges of theft of
property or of theft of services. In the former situation, the intent to deprive the owner of
his property might be shown from the actions of the accused. II WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 60, at 940. "Obtaining the use of a car rental agency's car by fraudulent means and run-
ning up a $501 bill is a felonious theft of services . . . [while] similar use of the car of a
private individual would be felonious unauthorized use [if the cost of retrieval and restora-
tion exceeded $500]." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 212.
719. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-07 (effective July 1. 1976).
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mented- by a provision 72 0 making failure to account upon demand a
prima facie case of theft.
7 21
With the risk of loss or damage again the operative concept,
this section treats as a Class A misdemeanor "any disposition of
entrusted property that is not authorized and" that at the same time
exposes the property to a risk of loss or detriment. ' 722 Two types
of knowledge must occur: the actor must realize that he is dispos-
ing, using, or transferring an, interest in. the property in a manner
that;has. not been, authorized, and he must know that such action in-
volves "a risk of loss: or detriment to the. owner of the property or
to the government or other person for whose benefit the property
was entrusted.
7 2 8
The, differentiating factor between the charges of theft and of
misappliciationt of entrusted. property is- loss of control over use of
the- property. While- theft involves loss, of control; the misdemeanor
of" misapplicationi of entrusted' property does not, "but on the other
hand does involVe' exposure of the property to a risk of loss.
7 24
3. Defrauding Secured Creditors
Under the New Code, if an actor "destroys, removes, conceals,
encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with property subject to a
security interest with intent to prevent. collection of the debt repre-
sented by the security interest, ' 725 he is guilty of a Class A misde-
meanor providedi the value- of the- property exceeds, fifty dollars; in
all other cases the offense is a- Class. B misdemeanor.7 20
The' interplay of' the- exclusion of security interest from the, defi-
nition of- property 727 and the' judgment that interference with security
interests is a valid subject for the criminal law led to this section.
Because of the belief "that resisting the collection of a debt is not
to' be classed at the' same' l-vel' with appropriation of property. in-
terests of another,"7 - defraudihg- secured creditors is treated) as a
misdemeanor.
The specific intent requirement "focuses the offense more to-
720. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-09(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
721. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 213.
722. UI WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 974.
723. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-07 (effective July 1, 1975).
724. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 974.
725. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-08(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
726. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-08(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
727. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-10(6) (effective July- 1, 1975). Because security interests
are not Included in the definition of "property", "the 'theft' provisions would not Include the
intentional defeating of a security interest without a section similar to Section 12.1-23-08....
Title 12 does not contain a-similar offense definition; however, Sections 13-01-11 and 13-01-12
provide that it is a misdemeanor to fraudulently convey property to hinder or delay credi-
tors or to remove or dispose of property to defraud creditors." Minutes "B", supra note 2,
June 20-21, 1972 at 39.
728. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 213.
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wards theft-like conduct than toward conduct which has the appear-
ance of steps taken to postpone the payment of a debt. '72
9
Leaving the definition of security interests to the judiciary, the
drafters of the Proposed Federal Code nonetheless note that such
Interests "would ordinarily include workmen's and commercial
liens.,,,7o
F. DEFENSES AND PROOF AS TO THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES
Subsection 1 of this section3 1 of the New Code "delineates the
outer limits of the theft offenses, dealing with matters handled to-
day by the exercise of prosecutive discretion."
8 2
The claim of right defense, where "[t]he actor honestly be-
lieved that he had a claim to the property or services involved which
he was entitled to assert in the manner which forms the basis for
the charge against him. . ."" seems redundant, especially since
"knowingly" modifies all elements of the crime of theft, unless a
legislative intent to the contrary is expressed.73' The drafters of the
Proposed Federal Code concluded that the redundancy was out
weighed by the need to have the defense made explicit.
7 5
Its inclusion does have procedural consequences. The subsec-
tion does not require that "the prosecution . . . disprove the defense
unless and until the issue has been raised by evidence which is suf-
ficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the point."786 The prosecution
still has to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable,
doubt, so whether the subsection is viewed as a redundancy or as
a special defense seems to have little effect.7 8
7
The benefit in the claim of right defense is that it protects a
person who asserts a claim against another in compensation for a
wrong done to him. Such a claim would fulfill the technical defini-
tion of extortion, except that under Section 12.1-23-09(1) (a) an actor
is excused if he acts with claim of right to some property and with
a belief "that he was entitled to act as he did in order to get it.''78
If the victim of the offense is the spouse of the actor ("spouse"
729. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 974. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.10 (1962)
which requires that the actor Intend "to hinder the enforcement of . . . [the security]
Interest."
780. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 213.
731. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-09 (effective July 1, 1975).
732. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 214.
733. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-09(1) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
784. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(3) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
735. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 944.
736. Id.
737. Id. "In both instances, the defendant will have to offer some proof of the defense in
order to get an Instruction and' in order to get the jury to consider the matter seriously;
and in both instances, once the issue is in the case, it is the protecutton that must bear the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was dealing with
the property of another and that he had no right to act as he did." Id.
738. Id. at 943. Cf. MicH. REv. Czin. CODE § 3247(2) (Final Draft 1956) and MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.4 (P.O.D. 1962) which contain special exceptions related to extortion. Id.
724
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Includes "persons living together as man and wife"), and the prop-
erty taken constitutes property "normally accessible to both
spouses", such facts may be pleaded as a defense.7 3 9 This subsec-
tion "is intended to keep certain family arguments out of...
courts."7,o
A prima facie case of theft arises in certain situations.7 41 "Those
who regularly handle the money of others . . . are all placed un-
der a high duty of care and exposed to the possibility of a suc-





Where the prosecution establishes that a "dealer" ("a person,
whether licensed or not, who has repeatedly engaged in transactions
in the type of property involved"743) has acquired property for a
value far below its reasonable worth, a prima facie case arises that
the person knew the property was stolen.7 44 This subsection does not
exclude submitting the issue of knowledge where other common fact
situations, such as possession of recently stolen goods, "imply cul-
pable knowledge," given other "facts and circumstances. ' 7 4
XII. FORGERY & OTHER FRAUDS
A. Forgery or Counterfeiting
Chapter 24 of the New Code consolidates several sections of the
Old Code 74  into one offense known as "forgery" or "counterfeit-
ing."' 74  The consolidation is effected by the definition given to the
term "writing, ' 748 a definition which strains the English language
739. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-09(1) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
740. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 214.
741. They include occasions where a public official or anyone associated in any way "with
a financial institution has failed to pay or account upon lawful demand for money or prop-
erty entrusted to him as part of his official duties or if an audit reveals a shortage or
falsification of his accounts." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-28-09(2)(a) (effective July 1, 1975).
Since a prima face case, not a presumption is used, the jury is not told of the special pro-
vision. "The purpose . . . is to get the case to the jury if such facts can be shown and to
let the jury draw whatever inferences the evidence will support without special instructions
based on this statute." II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 938.
742. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 931.
743. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-09(2) (b) (effective July 1, 1975).
744. Id.
745. FINAL REPOET, supra note 6, at 215.
746. Generally, all of Chapter 38 of Title 12 of the Old Code is replaced by this section,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01 (effective July 1, 1975). N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-39-28 (1960)
is replaced by the criminal mischief section in the New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE § 512.1-21-05
(effective July 1, 1975).
747. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01 (effective July 1, 1975). The sources of definitions for
this Chapter include both N.D. CENT. CODE §3 12.1-23-10 (effective July 1, 1975) (theft) and
12.1-24-04 (effective July 1, 1975) (forgery and counterfeiting). "Forgery and counterfeiting,
as commonly understood, involve essentially the same conduct with different instruments as
their vehicle. .... Short of inventing a new generic term that would displace both [terms]
. . . the best solution appears to be to continue to pertit either term to be used, but to
remove the possibilly that any legal consequences will follow the choice of one word over
another." ]T WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 964.
748. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-04(2) (effective July 1, 1975). " 'Writing' is there defined
to include any kind of document (and objects such as coins as well) which is a 'symbol or
evidence of value, right, privilege or identification which is capable of being used to the
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but Which simplifies' the sthaufe and takes cognizance of the idea
that "essentially the same features make a coin as appropriate a
subjedt of forgery as paper money." 49 The broad scope of included
instruments facilitates covering "all forms of doctoring or falsifying
of instruments which make them appear to be what they are not."75
TWO types; of conduct are proscribed: "knowingly and falsely
niak[-ing]i,, compl-et[ing] or altdr[ing] any writing . . ,. and
"[k]nowingly utter[ing] or possess[ing] a forged or counter-
feited, writing. ' 7 52 In each, tyle the actor must act "with intent to
deceive or harm the government or another person, or with knowl-
edge- that he is facilitating such deception or harm by another per-
son. .... ".758
Since- uttering and possession are continued explicitly as crimi-
hall conduct, there is "some risk of convicting innocent possess-
Ors , '"7 " but the special knowledge and intent requirements should
preclude- any such- convictions.
7 5 5
If "[t]he actor forges* or counterfeits an obligation or other
security of the government. .75 or commits the of-
fense "pursuant to a scheme to defraud another or others of money
advantage or disadvantage of the government or any person.' " FINAL REPORT, supra note
6, at 223.
749
. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 963.
750. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 223.
" 'Falsely makes' covers the classic counterfeiting situation, as well as many other
Instances of forgery. The term . . . is meant in its more common meaning (as in 'making'
a pie)." The writing must be Indicated to have been made by someone other than the actor
and the other must either not exist or have not authorized the making. FINAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 229.
If the document is altered and the intent to deceive or harm Is shown, the materiality
of the alteration has no relevance to culpability. Thus, the section makes no reference to
materiality.
Id.
751. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(a) (effective July 1, 1975).
752. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(b) (effective July 1, 1975). "The term 'utter' Is
broadly defined in [Section 12.1-24-04(8)] to mean, in effect, any use of a writing which
has the effect of giving it currency." II WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 60, at 964.
753. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01 (effective July 1, 1975). Because they are clearer and
more inclusive, the words "intent to deceive or harm" are substituted for the more familiar
"intent to defraud." "The object of the deception or harm-the government or another per-
son-need not, of course, be the party with whom the actor is immediately dealing." fl
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 969.
"With knowledge that he is facilitating such deception or harm" is Included to cover
the situation where an actor is making, completing or altering the instrument for use of
another. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 223.
754. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 223.
755. Possession includes "receiving, concealing or any other exercise of control over the
writing in question. Lawful possession is not included within the offense as defined because
of the requirement that the possession be for the purpose of deceiving or harming another.
Other uses of the term in related sections of this proposal also require a mens rea that will
exclude innocent conduct." II WORkING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 964.
But the consultant to the Proposed Federal Code noted that unless the possession
sthtutes of this type are designed to sanction conduct that does not fulfill the definition of
attempt or Introduced as the basis for grading distinctions, "there would seem to be no
clear purpose supporting their inclusion in a Criminal Code." Id. at 965.
756. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975). "The term 'obligation
or other security of this state' means a bond, certificate of Indebtedness, coupon, fractional
note, certificate of deposit, a stamp or other representative of value of whatever denomina-
tion, issued pursuant to a statute." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-04(10) (effecive July 1,
1975).
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or property of a value in excess of ten thousand dollars,"7 57 his of-
fense is punishable as a Class B felony. In five situations, where
neither of the Class B felony requirements are met, the actor com-
mits a Class C felony. They include an offense committed under
"color of office"; 758 forgery or counterfeiting of foreign money or
uttering any forged governmental obligation; 75sa forging or counter-
feiting from "instruments designed for multiple reproduction; " 759
forging or counterfeiting government documents;7 60 and "a scheme
to defraud . . . others of money or property of a value in excess
of one hundred dollars. ' 761 All other cases are classified as Class A
misdemeanors .762
B. FACILITATION OF COUNTERFEITING
Anyone who knowingly makes or controls any "implement or
thing uniquely associated with or fitted for the preparation" of any
forged security or tax stamp or government document is guilty of
facilitation of counterfeiting.7 63 This subsection is intended "to apply
only to implements uniquely associated with the preparation of
[forged] documents-implements which are not normally put to
legitimate use."
'7 -
The New Code forbids the knowing photographing or copying of
money or other governmental security or obligation765  or of any
thing uniquely associated with the preparation of such documents.
7 66
Likewise, the knowing sale or possession of any such illegal copies
is an offense.767
757. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (a) (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
758. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (b) (1) (effective July 1, 1975). "The combination of
breach of trust and holding a position which can be so easily capitalized on to commit of-
fenses of this character is believed to justify such a classification." II WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 60, at 966.
758a. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(b) (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
769. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (b) (3) (effective July 1, 1975). This subsection "is
aimed at the professional forger. One who makes false documents by use of sophisticated
equipment of the sort described poses a danger to society much greater, it is felt, than the
offender who forges a single signature or completes a blank check without authority." FINAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 224.
760. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (b) (4) (effective July, 1, 1975). Here the integrity of
the government Is the value protected. II WORKING PAPER, supra note 60, at 966.
761. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (b) (5) (effective July 1, 1975). This punishment
classification is predicated on the Judgment that "the volume of criminal activity is an
appropriate index to its level of culpability...." II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 967.
762. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-01(2) (C) (effective July 1, 1975). "Thus, the maximum
punishments under Section [12.1-24-01] run from 15 years' imprisonment to one year im-
prisoment. The present maximum punishment for forgery in North Dakota is 10 years' im-
prisonment, so the FCC [Federal Criminal Code] gradation is not radically different." M1in-
utes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 45.
763. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
764. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 225. "There is the same redundancy [in this section]
. . that has been of concern in other contexts. . . . [I]f the conduct covered by these sec-
tions for some reason has not proceeded far enough towards the objective of forgery to con-
stitute an attempt, then questions could be raised either about the soundness of the general
attempt provisions (if the conduct should be criminal) or about whether the conduct should
be made criminal." (Emphasis in original). II WORKING PAPER., supra note 60, at 968.
765. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02(2) (a) (1) (effective July 1, 1975).
766. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02(2) (a) (2) (effective July 1, 1975).
767. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02(2)(b) (effective July 1, 1975).
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"[I] f the implement or the impression relates to . . . counter-
feiting.. an obligation or security of the government...
[the offense is a Class B felony;] [o]therwise, it is a class C
felony."76 8 In all such cases, "authorization by statute or by regula-
tion is a defense."'' 69
C. DECEPTIVE WRITINGS
Knowingly issuing a writing without authority to do so or know-
ingly uttering and possessing a deceptive writing with intent to de-
ceive or harm the government or another person is an offense.7 0
" 'Without authority' includes conduct that, on the specific occa-
sion called into question, is beyond any general authority given by
statute, regulation, or agreement."77 1 Thus, someone who knowingly
acts in excess of his authority is functionally equivalent to one who
acts without any authority at all; the actual, not the apparent, au-
thority is the key determinative.7 7 2 Basically, "the act of issuing an
instrument without authority is judged to be comparable to uttering
forged or counterfeit documents." 773 That the instrument is genuine
on its face does not affect the culpability; "the essence of the of-
fense is the breach of authority and the misuse of documents that
purported to be something that they were not."774
A "deceptive writing" is one which has either been "procured
by deception" or "issued without authority. ' 77 5 This offense is "sep-
arated from forgery, because the latter has traditionally dealt only
with instruments which are themselves defective. 77 6 Whether pro-
cured by deception or issued without authority, the writing in each
case is "in some sense 'false,' i.e., it is not in all respects what it
appears to be.
' 1777
"The offense is a class B felony if it is committed pursuant to
a scheme to defraud . . . others of money or property of a value in
excess of ten thousand dollars.' 778 It is a Class C felony if the
scheme involves defrauding others of a value in excess of one hun-
768. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-02(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
769. N.D. CENT. CODE I 12.1-24-02(3) (effective July 1, 1975). Under this subsection, "the
government need not negative the fact of authorization until the issue has been raised."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 226.
770. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
771. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-04(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
772. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 969. Since the authenticity of the document is
not at issue and the people who rely on the document will not be injured, it might be
argued that deceptive writings are not similar to forgery. But It is clear that "an agency
relationship should [not] insulate from criminal liability one who would clearly be a forger
if that relationship did not exist."
Td. at 969-70.
773. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 226.
774. Id.
775. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-04(13) (effective July 1, 1975).
776. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 227.
777. Id.
778. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
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dred dollars, 8' 9 or if the offense is made possible by one's office as
a public servant or an employee of a financial institution or under
color of office. 80 Otherwise it is a Class A misdemeanor.781
D. MAKING OR UTTERING SLUGS
"Mak[ing] or utter[ing] a slug with intent to deprive a sup-
plier of property or service sold or offered by means of a coin
machine or with knowledge that he is facilitating such a depriva-
tion by another person is an offense under the New Code. 82 If it
involves slugs exceeding fifty dollars in value it is a Class A mis-
demeanor.7 8 3 Otherwise the making or uttering is a Class B misde-
meanor.78 ' A slug is "a metal, paper, or other object . . . used in
a coin machine as an improper but effective substitute for a genu-
ine coin, bill, or token. .. .
Other than adding paper to the Old Code sections on the sub-
ject,7 8 6 this section adds nothing to North Dakota law. It does raise
the recurrent conceptual difficulty that the section is redundant,
especially since the gradation is similar to the theft provisions.7 817
Clearly this section could be eliminated, from the New Code and
the offense it describes would still be covered under theft by de-
ception or its attempt. It was included in the Proposed Federal Code
because "its principal jurisdictional base (machines designed to re-
ceive United States currency) goes beyond general Federal jurisdic-
tion over theft offenses." 788 No such rationale exists for the reten-
tion of the provisions in North Dakota.
XIII. VIOLENCE TO THE PUBLIC ORDER
A. RIOT
The thrust of the New Code's riot sections is to modernize the
law in light of psychological and sociological changes in society and
changes which have taken place in the organization, mobilization
and communications aspects of the modem law enforcement agency.
While the New Code is substantially the same as the Proposed Fed-
eral Code, certain variations are present reflecting needs of a less
urbanized area.
The proposed code approaches the crime of riot in a three stage
779. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-03(2)(b) (effective July 1, 1975).
780. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-0(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
781. N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-24-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
782. N.D. CENT. CODE 8 12.1-24-05(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
788. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-05(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
784. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-05(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
1785. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-24-05(3) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
786. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-38-15, 12-38-16, and 12-38-17 (1960) also classify the offenses
as misdemeanors.
787. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 231.
788. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 971.
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fashion: acts preparatory to a riot; acts during a riot; and acts
contrary to official action.
Under the New Code, riot is defined as: "a public disturbance
involving an assemblage of five or more persons which by tumul-
tuous and violent conduct create grave danger of damage or injury
to property and persons or substantially obstructs law enforcement
or other governmental function."7 89 The present definition is aimed
primarily at direct injury and potential injury to persons and prop-
erty and does not concern itself specifically with obstruction of gov-
ernmental functions.7 90 The problem of imposing criminal liability
for riot stems from defining the boundries of the First Amend-
ment, "the line past which dissent and protest [become] an in-
tollerable burden on a minimum need for order.1 791 Both the New
and Old Code definitions appear to satisfy the strictures establish-
ed by the Supreme Court by requiring a "grave or imminent law-
less action. '
792
B. ACTS PREPARATORY TO A RIOT
An individual is guilty of intent to riot under the New Code
if he:
"a) Incites or urges five or more persons to create or engage
in a riot; or
b) Gives commands, instructions, or directions to five or more
persons in furtherance of a riot.
' 7 98
The New Code section of Incitement to Riot attempts to encom-
pass all activities which occur prior to and are catalytic to a re-
sulting riot. Included in these activities are the old crimes of rout794
and unlawful assembly.795 Rout and unlawful assembly presently
789. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
790. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-03 (1960) : "Any use of force or violence, or any threat to
use force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by six or more per-
sons acting together and without authority of law, is riot."
791. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 1006.
792. State v. Russell, 66 N.D. 272, 264 N.W. 532 (1936). Strikers attempted to prevent
other employees from working, the court required and found clear and undisputed evidence
that there was force and violence and language which amounted to threats accompanied by
the "immediate power of execution." Id. at 534.
Likewise, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) where a: leader of the Klu Klux Klan
was convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute, the court reversed the conviction
holding the Constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press did not permit a state
to forbid the advocacy of the use of force as a violation of law; except, where such advocacy
was directed to inciting or producing "imminent lawless acion" and was likely to Incite or
produce such action. Id.
793. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
794. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-05 (1960). Whenever three or more persons acting together
make any attempt to do any act which would be riot if actually committed, such assembly
is a rout. Id.
795. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-06 (1960). Whenever three or more persons assemble with
intent or with means and preparations to do an unlawful act which would be riot if ac-
tually committed, but do not act toward the commission thereof, or whenever such persons
assemble without authority of law and in such a manner as is adapted to disturb the public
peace or excite public alarm, such assembly is an unlawful assembly. Id.
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carry misdemeanor penalties 9 6 as does simple riot in most in-
stances.7 7 One exception, in the case of riot, is a rioter who, "dir-
ected, advised, encouraged or solicited other persons who participat-
ed in the riot to acts of force or violence. . . . "7 Such actions would
result in a felony conviction under the Old Code where a riot did
in fact occur.
7 99
As with other riot sections, the legislative committee apparent-
ly sought a reduction of penalties as responsibility and culpability
diminished. 0 0 The New Code continues to appreciate the distinction
in potential danger between urging and inciting nonviolent, yet il-
legal, group action on the one hand and directing and commanding
large numbers of participants on the other. First, the offense is a
Class C felony if the individual commands, instructs, or directs a
riot and the riot involves one hundred or more individuals.8 0' Sec-
ond, the New Code provides for convictions of attempt, solicitation
or conspiracy 0 2 to commit the offense of incitement to riot only if
the person engages in conduct likely to result in a riot. 08 Finally,
in all other cases, it is a Class A misdemeanor. 04 For example, one
who incites a small group of persons to riot, but there is little
danger of a riot materializing at the time, could only be convicted
of a misdemeanor. In addition, it was noted by the legislative com-
mittee that, "one of the potential life imprisonment penalties (under
the New Code) applies if a murder, maiming, robbery, rape, or
arson was committed in the course of a riot. 05 This is in accord
with present law806 and the consultants report on the Proposed
Federal Code, both of which provide that, should such events
occur, they be prosecuted as such and not prosecuted under the
riot provisions.
Another change in the law is the required number of partici-
796. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-07 (1960).
797. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(5) (1960).
798. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(4) (1960).
799. Id.
800. M4nutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 54.
801. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01(4) (effective July 1, 1975). A staff memorandum to
the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Law in discussing the number
of participants to be required for the basic crime of riot states, "The critical number in the
20th Century should be the number of participants that would constitute a nonroutine mob
confrontation .... " II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 988. Recognizing the increased
danger to public safety which results as the number of participants in a riot increases, the
drafters felt that the sanctions should reflect this danger. Setting the number of rioters at
one hundred for conviction of the inciter of a Class C felony is a policy question for the
legislature. However, it must be observed that the federal drafters were thinking in terms
of the capabilities of an urban police force. Such a figure might overly tax the capabilities
of the majority of the police forces in North Dakota cities.
802. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06-01, -03, -04 (effective July 1, 1975).
803. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975).
804. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01(4) (effective July 1, 1975).
805. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 54.
806. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(1)\ (1960).
807. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 1017. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
242.
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pants. Presently, three persons must be involved in an unlawful
assembly or a rout and six involved in a riot.
808 The New Codes
adopts the Federal Code 10 proposal which requires five persons to
be involved in the riot. The legislative committee decided to follow
the Proposed Federal Code since "the selection of any minimum
number of persons to be defined as a riotous group was essentially
an arbitrary process."8"1
C. ACTS DURING A RIOT
Under the New Code, "A person is guilty of a Class C felony if
he:
a) Knowingly supplies a firearm or destructive device for use
in a riot;
b) Teaches another to prepare or use a firearm or destructive
device with intent that any such thing be used in a riot; or
c) While engaging in a riot, is knowingly armed with a firearm
or destructive device."8 12
Part (c) is similar to present North Dakota law which provides
for imprisonment for anyone carrying a firearm or dangerous weap-
on in the course of a riot.""' Parts (a) and (b) create new law in
North Dakota as presently there is no proscription against the sup-
plying of weapons to rioters or instruction in their use.8 14 The leg-
islative committee, in adopting the Federal Code wording, appar-
ently relied on the comments of the federal drafters. Thus, under
part A, an inciter of a riot, who supplied firearms, could be con-
victed of a Class C felony as an accomplice to any person who
used the firearm in the course of a riot.81 5 Recognizing the Consti-
tutional limitations, the final draft of the Federal Code requires that
the "teaching" be done with the specific intent to be used in a
riot. s18 Likewise, parts (a) and (c) require that the accused "know-
808. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-19-03, -05, -06 (1960). See notes 794 and 795, supra.
809. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
810. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1801(1).
811. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 55.
812. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
813. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(3) (1960). "Every person guilty of participating in a
riot shall be punished as follows: . . . (3) If such a person carried, at the time of such
riot, any species of firearm or other deadly or dangerous weapon, or was disguised, by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than ten years." Id.
814. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 54.
815. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 242.
816. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 243. (1) (b) The New Code follows exactly. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-02(1) (b) (effective July 1, 1975). The basic wooding of these sections
was derived from the riot provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 231-232.
The consultant to the drafters of this section questioned whether part (b) should he in-
cluded in light of " ... first amendment problems (need for clear and present danger) that,
arise in connection with any proscription of "teaching," and the practical consideration that,
whenever a punishable riot is actually facilitated by such teaching, the teacher will be im-
plicated as an accomplice or criminal facilitator." FiNAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 243. How-
ever, in United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972) the court rejected first
amendment arguments as to the vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1). The statute, by requiring
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ingly supply" and "knowingly be armed" for conviction.17 Some-
thing more than mere negligence is required in the supplying of
arms to a possible rioter. "As a general principle, negligence should
not be enough to convict of a felony."' 18
The sanctions imposed by the New Code for possession of a
weapon in the course of a riot represent a substantial reduction
from the Old Code. The New Code establishes a maximum of five
years imprisonment and/or a fine of $5,000;1"1 the Old Code, how-
ever, provides for a sentence of not less than two years nor more
than ten years.8 20 Retribution does not appear to be the goal of the
proposed code.82 ' Crowd psychology and sociology of a riot suggest
that the use of force or threats of sanctions tend to expand rather
than control riot velocity and frequency by means of actions and
reactions causing counter productive results .822
Like the New Code section on inciting riot, the section on en-
gaging in a riot separates that activity into degrees of culpability. 28
The legislative committee in adopting the Federal Code approach,
attempted to differentiate between degrees of culpability by identi-
fying the leaders and participants in the riot from those individuals
merely .present at the scene. The Old Code is directed at crowd
dispersal -at the scene of an unlawful assembly, rout or riot and
makes no distinction for those individuals who are present by acci-
dent. 24 Under the New Code, mere presence at the riot is specifi-
cally exempted as not a violation of the statute.8 2 5 The inclusion of
such an exemption prevents "round-up" type operations at the riot
scene which envelope rioters as well as those individuals present
for legitimate purposes. 28 One who engages in a riot is guilty of a
the "teacher to know or have reason to know" that the instruction will lead to unlawful use
in or in furtherance of a civil disorder, does not cover inadvertant conduct. The defendant
must have acted with intent or knowledge that the information disseminated would be used
in furtherance of a civil disorder, thus creating a clear and present danger.
817. FINAL REPORT, supsra note 6, at 243. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-02 (1) (a) (c) (effec-
tive July 1, 1975).
818. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAw, Study Draft 232 (1970).
819. N.D. CENr. ConE § 12.1-32-01(3) (effective July 1, 1975). N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-24-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975) Imposed a Class C felony upon conviction.
820. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(3) (1960).
821. 11 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 1010. The consultant's repclrt to the Commis-
sion Indicates that the general purpose section of the proposed code omits retribution as an
official objective of post conviction sanctions. The concept of increased sanctions is based on
the belief that they will deter potential offenders. The consultant continues to say that this
concept is based on two faulty assumptions; first, that a riot occurs in a "normal period"
when there are sufficient police both to enforce the law and act as a viable deterent; and
second, that the rioter has a "choice" to psychologically disassociate himself from the crowd
behavior pattern of which he is a part. 1d. at 1011.
822. Id. at 1012.
823. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
824. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-19-08, -09 (1960).
825. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
826. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 244. The drafters of the Federal Code identified four
considerations in arriving at the proposed classification of engaging In a riot:
1) the desirability of Congressional guidance to law enforcement, prose-
cuting and Judicial officials in discriminating among the mass of persons In-
volved in a serious riot;
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Class B misdemeanor under the New Code.8 27 Here again the New
Code sanctions represent a lessening of potential penalties from
current law wherein simple riot is punishable as a misdemeanor."2
D. ACTS CONTRARY TO OFFICIAL ACTION
Finally, the New Code deals with official actions directed to-
ward control of a riot: "A person is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor
if, during a riot ... or when one is immediately impending, he dis-
obeys a reasonable public safety order to move, disperse, or re-
frain from specified activities in the immediate vicinity of the
riot." 829 This section consolidates a series of Old Code provisions
directed at crowd dispersals, riot suppression and powers of law en-
forcement officials. 8 0 The basic thrust of the two codes is much the
same. One significant provision omitted from the New Code and the
Proposed Federal Code is the requirement that: ". . . [e]very
endeavor must be used . . . to induce or force the rioters to dis-
perse before an attack is made upon them by which their lives may
be endangered."8 s Such a requirement is essential in a riot condi-
tion, in which escape or dispersal routes are either nonexistant, not
visible in the midst of a panicked mob, to give those willing to dis-
perse a knowing physical possibility of responding to the dispersal
order.
822
The Proposed Federal Code requires that the public safety or-
der be made by one having supervisory authority over at least ten
persons. The New Code requires that the order be given by the
senior law enforcement official on the scene. 83 This apparently
gives authority to others with an interest in stopping the riot who
might not be a law enforcement officer; e.g., a city mayor.&4 The
New Code deletes the ten subordinates requirement of the Proposed
Federal Code which is designed for more urban areas.885
A person who disregards a proper order to leave a place of riot,
2) the availability of summary procedures for disposing of a large num-
ber of "petty offenses";
3) the considerable risk that a person may be convicted as a "participant"
when he may have been only a person who came on the scene with a view of
peaceful protest or demonstration, or an innocent observer trapped in a pressing
mob; and,
4) the diminshed culpability which has been pointed out as characterizing
participation in crowd actions.
Id.
827. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-08(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
828. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-04(5) (1960).
829. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
830. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-19-08, -09, -17, -19, -22 (1960).
831. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-22 (1960) ; see Mtnutes "BW', supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972
at 54.
832. 11 WORKINo PAPERS, &upra note 60, at 1027. The consultant to the drafters of the
Fededal Code urged the inclusion of such a provision in light of the practical realities under
a riotous condition. Id.
833. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
834. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 55.
835. Id.
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rout or unlawful assembly is guilty of a misdemeanor under the
Old Code. 36 Under the New Code it is a Class B misdemeanor.
83T
The Federal Code makes such an offense an "infraction" which re-
sults in arrest, fine and/or probation, but not jail sentence. 38 The
reasoning behind this reduction in sentencing appears to be the re-
sult of "one of the great lessons of recent riot experience: the need
for expediting the handling of large numbers of minor partici-
pants."8 39
E. DISORDERLY CONDUCT
The disorderly conduct section of the New Code basically con-
solidates current statutes by dealing with public fighting, unireason-
able noise, obscene language and gestures, obstruction of traffic or
use of a public facility, persistent following, loitering to solicit sex-
ual contact and finally a catchall provision covering the creation of
hazardous or alarming conditions which serve no useful purpose. " °
The basic thrust of the New Code is that there must be specific
intent to:
harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless dis-
regard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoy-
ed, or alarmed. 841
Under the Old Code such an intent requirement is present only for
a conviction for injury to the public peace, 84 2 disturbing a lawful
meeting8 43 and injury to public morals 8"4 which require a willful act
or one which grossly disturbs the public peace. Not repealed by the
New Code is a statute which provides:
Any person who commits an act which disturbs the
peace or constitutes disorderly conduct is guilty of a misde-
meanor.84 5
This section lacks any intent requirement and appears to be in con-
flict with the aim of the New Code. Consideration should be given
to its repeal when the New Code takes effect.
The wording of the New Code and Proposed Federal Code is
derived from the New York disorderly conduct statute.84 6 The three
836. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-08 (1960).
837. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-04 (effective July 1, 1975). This results in substantially
the same penalty.
838. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 271.
839. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 987.
840. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-81-01 (effective July 1, 1975).
841. Id.
842. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-01 (1960).
843. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-19-02, 12-11-23 (1960).
844. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-01 (1960).
845. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-05.3 (Supp. 1973).
846. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20 (McKinney 1967); See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.23
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). In a critique of the new New York penal law a commen-
tator has stated:
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statutes are substantially the same with two basic exceptions. First,
conviction under the New York statute and Proposed Federal Code
result in a violation or infraction.8 4 7 The New Code imposes a Class
B misdemeanor sentence which compares to the misdemeanor sen-
tence imposed by present law. It was the feeling of the Committee
that the offense should be classified as a crime or excluded from
the criminal code.8'8 Second, the Proposed Federal Code requires a
complaint by a private citizen before an arrest may be made for
use of obscene language or gestures, persistent following or loiter-
ing to solicit sexual contact.8 49 The federal drafters viewed the sec-
tion as a preventive measure to control harassment of the general
public, not to protect the sensitivities of police officers. s0 There -is
no such public complaint requirement in the Old Code nor is it
included in the New Code. However, as a practical matter, such a
complaint may be necessary for convictions, since the purpose of a
disorderly conduct statute is to protect the public from what it con-
siders dangerous or offensive conduct.851
XIV. FIREARMSs2
A. SUPPLYING ARMS FOR CRIMINAL AcTIVIrY
These New Code8 58 and the Proposed Federal Code Provisions 8"
do not attempt a complete revision of firearm statutes, but rather
It must be emphasized that in all cases of disorderly conduct one fundamental
precondition must always be satisfied: there must be an 'intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,' or at the very least, the defendant must
have been 'recklessly' creating the risk thereof.
I. Schwartz, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW PENAL LAW 32 (1967).
The thrust of this comment was carried forth In People v. Hill, 60 Misc. 2d 277, 303 N.Y.S.2d
265, 269 (1969) where the court stated:
It must be kept in mind that the prime purpose of the statute . . . is to pre-
serve public order and peace. To sustain a conviction the offensive conduct
must be public In nature and must cause inconvenience, anopance or alarm
to a substantial segment of the public, or be of such nature and character
that it would appear beyond a reasonabe doubt that the conduct created a risk
that a breach of the peace Is Imminent. . . . Perhaps more important, It must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to breach
the peace. (Emphasis In original).
847. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1967) ; FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1861.
848. Minutes "B", aupra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 15.
849. FNAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1861(4).
850. Id. at 269-70.
851. In State v. Lanfenberg, 99 N.W.2d 331 (N.D. 1959) the defendants were prosecuted
under what Is now N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-19-01 (1960) which requires for conviction a
willful and wrongful act which "grossly disturbs the public peace." The defendants were
arrested after a physical combat on a deserted street in Fargo, North Dakota. The police
learned of the fight only after a local hospital had treated one olf the participants for minor
cuts. No one but the participants saw the Incident and no citizen reports were received by
the police department. The court said that under the statute, there must.be proof that the
public peace was actually and grossly disturbed and that the tranquility or sense of security
of any resident of Fargo was disturbed by the incident.
852. The scope of this discussion is necessarily limited to a comparative analysis of the
three Codes and makes no attempt to consider the desirability of stringent gun control laws
in general. The question of gun control is a complex and emotional issue which can be
more appropriately considered in an independent study.
853. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-26 (effective July 1, 1975).
854. FINAL RbEnORT, supra note 6, §§ 1811, 1812, 1818 and 1814.
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seek to implement and adapt the existing statutory scheme into
that of the New Code.115 The Old Code's gun control regulations are
embodied in Title 62 of the Century Code and pertain primarily to
licensing 856 and authorized ownership.85 ' Presently, the code pro-
hibits the delivery of a pistol ". . to any person if there is reason-
able cause to believe that person is prohibited by law from posses-
sion of a pistol. ' '858 This prevents the sale of firearms to persons
under the age of seventeen, drug addicts, alcoholics, persons emo-
tionally unstable or persons convicted of certain felonies in the last
ten years.859 This general limitation is contained in the New Code; 60
however, it is only partially effective in achieving the objective of
the New Code to control "conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably
causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for
which governmental protection is appropriate. '"8 61 To meet this need,
the New Code expands upon the regulatory prohibition in Title 62.
Under the New Code, it is a Class C felony for one to "knowingly
suppl[y] a firearm, ammunition therefore, destructive device, or ex-
plosive to a person who intends to commit a crime of violence or in-
timidation with the aid thereof or while armed therewith .... '62
Thus, in addition to the limitations under present law, the New Code
seeks to place an additional duty or responsibility on the buyer and
seller to refrain from procuring or selling firearms, destructive de-
vices or explosives with "knowledge" of the buyer's criminal intent. 63
B. ILLEGAL FIREARMs BusINESS
In implementing present regulatory law, the New Code provides
that, "A person is guilty of an offense -if he knowingly supplies or
855. Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 18. In adopting the federal draft, the
committee was advised by counsel that the new section would not replace existing sections
in Title 12, but could either complement or replace sections in Title 62. By referencing the
New Code provisions of Title 62, the committee elected to use the New Code sections to
implement rather than replace Title 62. The Federal Code section derives much of its wording
from and Implements the regulatory provisions found in Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. app. § 1201-1203) and the Gun Control Ac'
of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 Title T, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5091-5872 Title II). II WoaKIxN PAPERs,
supra note 60, at 1047-48.
856. N.D. CENT. CODE §8 62-91-05 to -08, -15 to -18; 62-02-02, -04 to -05 (1960).
857. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-04 (Supp. 1973), 62-01-09, -11, -12, 61-02-03 (1960).
858. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-01-12 (1960).
859. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62-01-04 (Supp. 1973), 52-01-11 (1960).
860. N.D. CENT. CODE 8 12.1-26-02(1) (effective July 1, 1975).
861. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
862. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-01 (a) (b); § 12.1-26-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975) provides
that a crime of violence or intimidation are such crimes as defined in chapters 12.1-16
through 12.1-25 of this title when the crime is a felony. See Minutes "B", supra note 2,
July 20-21, 1972 at 18.
863. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(1) (b) (effective July 1, 1975) provides: "For the pur-
poses of this title, a person engages in conduct: . , .b) 'knowingly' if, when he engages in
the conduct, he knows or has a firm belief, unaccompanied by substantial doubt, that he
is doing so, whether or not it is his purpose to do so."
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procures a firearm, ammunition, or explosive material to ... a per-
son prohibited by regulatory law from receiving it. ''81 4 Thus, if it is
known that the ultimate possessor, whether the buyer or an intended
third party, is restricted by present law from obtaining such a
weapon, a sanction is provided even though no additional crime
is contemplated. The Proposed Federal Code is similarly intended for
use in connection with the present regulatory scheme which is di-
rected at the control of firearms and explosives in interstate
and foreign commerce as well as acquisition by small cate-
gories of individuals similar to those presently restricted un-
der North Dakota law.885 In discussing this New Code sec-
tion, there was some question within the legislative commit-
tee whether or not the definitions of firearms as found in Title
62 of the Old Code should be revised at this time.166 The final
result is somewhat confusing as the section specifically adopts the
definition of firearms to "pistols." Also adopted was the New Code
Section 12.1-01-04(10) which is to be used in this title unless a dif-
ferent meaning is plainly required. This New Code section greatly
expands the definition of firearms to include any weapon, not just
a pistol which, "will expel or is readily capable of expelling a pro-
jectile by the action of an explosive. . .,,8 The main regulatory
prohibitions under present law speak in terms of pistols only, and
make no restrictions on the sale or purchase of other types of fire-
arms to persons considered unsuited for ownership of such weapons.
The question evolves: what result if a person knowingly sells a shot-
gun to someone prohibited by regulatory law from receiving a fire-
ram? It appears that only under the latter definition would he be
in violation of the statute and subject to its sanctions. This conflict
should be resolved.
The New Code follows the Proposed Federal Code system of
grading offenses which ". . . endeavors to embrace the distinction
in present law that dealings in firearms by or supplying arms to
certain categories of unsuitable persons is more serious than deal-
ing by or supplying to persons of other categories.8 8 "The offense
864. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-02 (effective July 1, 1975).
865. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922 (f) and (g) (1970) with N.D. CENT. CODE J 62-01-04 (Supp.
1973).
866. Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 19.
867. This definition is similar to that found in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (3) which was specifically
adopted by the North Dakota Legisature in 1969 when enacting Chapter 62-05, Purchases of
Rifles and Shotguns in Contiguous States.
868. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 1055.
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is . . .a Class C felony if the offender was not licensed to deal in the
materials supplied, or if he engaged in the transaction in a manner
indicating his willingness to continue to take such action. In other
cases it is a Class A misdemeanor."'86 9 An example of such a mis-
demeanor would be minor procedural violations of regulatory li-
censing statues. In adopting this approach, the federal drafters
felt "there should be more discrimination than is provided under
existing law in distinguishing between felonies and misdemean-
ors. 8 7 0 The Old Code, for the most part, similarly determines the
harshness of the penalty by the seriousness of the offenses. However,
the Old Code contains a "catch-all" which provides for felony con-
victions for any provision in which no specific sanction is imposed.871
The New Code's blanket Class A misdemeanor for violations of reg-
ulatory law, with respect to sales to restricted individuals or li-
censing requirements not evidencing an intentional violation, assures
penalties more consistant with the gravity of the violation.872
C. TRAFFICKING IN LIMITED USE FIREARMS
Both the New Code and the Proposed Federal Code deal specifi-
cally with the trafficking in and receiving of limited use firearms.78
As with other New Code firearm provisions, this section is intended
for use with an existing regulatory scheme which utilizes licens-
ing, control over sale, receipt, and possession of limited use fire-
arms to achieve its objectives.
Under the Old Code, the regulatory prohibitions deal with, 1)
licensing procedures and, 2) limitations on who may sell, possess,
or receive a proscribed weapon.8 7' The Old Code provides that any-
one who sells, gives, loans, furnishes, delivers, purchases, has or
869. Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 18-19.
870. FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 249.
871. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-01-20 (1960). The specified punishment is imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than ten years. Id.
872. In commenting on the proposed classification of sanctions In the firearms sections,
the federal drafters observed that "the proposed sections endeavor, with respect to those
present firearm offenses which appear to be appreciably dangerous in and of themselves,
to provide felony treatment for the basic offense, but a misdemeanor version where it is
clear that the offense did not, In fact, involve any risk of physical harm or severe obstruc-
tion of 'firearm control measures." II WORKING PAPER, supra note 60, at 1051.
873. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-03(2) (effective July 1, 1975) defines trafficking to mean,
transfers to another person, possession with intent to transfer to another person, makes or
manufacturers, or imports, or exports; "limited-use firearms" are those weapons defined
in N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-01: " 'machine gun, submachine gun or automatic rifle' ... shall
mean and include a weapon, mechanism, or instrument not requiring that the trigger be
pressed for each shot, and having a reservoir, belt, or other means of storing and carrying
ammunition which can be loaded into the weapon, mechanism, or instrument and fired
therefrom at a rate of five or more shots to the second."
874. N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 62-01; -02, -03 (1960) as amended (Supp. 1973).
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possesses a limited use firearm is guilty of a felony.87 5 The New
Code, through its definition of trafficking, clarifys the meaning of
such a "sale" under present regulatory law to include within its
scope a manufacturer, importer or exporter as well as retail or an
individual transfer. 7 6
There exists few, if any, legitimate private uses of such wea-
pons. The federal drafters concluded that such weapons are:
intended to be totally suppressed among the civilian popu-
lation, fewer violations are trivial, and there is justification
for embracing more conduct than that identified .. .under
[prior sections'] felony sanctions. 7
By defining regulatory law to mean Chapter 62-02, the New Code
does not contemplate absolute "total supression." Present regula-
tion permits possession of such weapons, in the civilian sector in
North Dakota, by those licensed to possess for his own protection
or the protection of his servants and employees s' 8 and those licens-
ed to deal in such firearms. 78 Under the New Code, it is a Class
C felony to traffic in or receive a limited use firearm with "know-
ledge" that it is being transferred to the buyer in violation of reg-
ulatory law.880 Thus, even though a buyer had a valid license, if he
knows the seller violated regulatory law in the procurement and
sale, he too is held accountable. The Old Code provides for a max-
imum of ten years imprisonment and/or three thousand dollars fine
for possession, sale, or delivery of a limited use firearm without a
license. 81 Again, there is a significant difference in potential sen-
tences between the New and Old Codes.
D. POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS
The New Code makes it a Class A misdemeanor for a person to
possess an explosive, or destructive device in a government build-
ing without the written consent of the government agency or person
responsible for managing the building1s 2 The drafters of the sub-
875. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-06, (1960).
876. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-09(2) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
877. FINAL REPORT. supra note 6, at 250.
878. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-03, -05 (1960).
879. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-07(1) (1960).
880. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-03(1) (effetcive July 1, 1975).
881. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-06 (1960).
882. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-04 (effective July 1, 1975). A "destructive device" is de-
fined as 
" . . . any explosive, Incendiary or poison gas bomb, grenade, mine, rocket, missile,
or similar device." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-04(7) (effective July 1, 1975). An "explosive"
is defined as " . . . gunpowders, powders used for blasting, all forms of high explosives,
blasting materials, fuses (other than electric circuit breaks), detonators, and other detonating
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stantially similar Proposed Federal Code section felt that Congress
did not intend to penalize inadvertant, technical violations and sug-
gested that an affirmative defense that the explosive material was
possessed for a lawful prupose which would not undermine the en-
forcement scheme since, under that scheme, the burden of proof
would be on the defendant. s8 The North Dakota Legislative Com-
mittee did not specifically include such an affirmative defense. How-
ever, in discussing the proposed section, the Committee on Judici-
ary "B" felt that, "[t]his section is new law and is designed as
a deterent to deliberate bombings, allowing law enforcement of-
ficials to apprehend offenders prior to the actual planting or utili-
zation of such explosives. 88 4 Thus, the technical or inadvertant vio-
lation does not appear to fall within the drafter's intent in adopting
the federal draft.
The Proposed Federal Code and the New Code do not deal with
the actual bombing of a government building in this section; rather,
these sections deal with the prevention of such acts. The current
law has three types of preventive statutes. First, licensing statutes
provide that a license is required to possess any sort of bomb load-
ed with explosives or poisonous or dangerous gases.8 5 Second, state
law prohibits the making, keeping or carrying of explosives within
or through a city or village in violation of law or city ordinance. 86
But, if there are no such ordinances and state licensing laws and
regulations are complied with, there may be no violation under this
statute. Third, any attempt to destroy or burn a building with ex-
plosives requires that the explosive material be placed or distrib-
uted in, upon, against or near a building with intent to destroy it.s88
The attempt, successful or not, is a felony.888 The thrust and sen-
tencing of the New Code recognizes the potential danger involved
and is operative prior to what is classified as an attempt. It pro-
vides for a conviction of an individual who has not made any "ac-
agents, smokeless powders, and any chemical compounds, mechanical mixture, or other
ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packaging that ignition by fire, by friction, by
concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the compound, or material or any part thereof
may cause an explosion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-26-04(8) (effective July 1, 1975).
883. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 251.
884. Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 19.
885. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62-02-02: (1960).
886. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-18-02 (1960).
887. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-18-05 (1960).
888. Id. Old Code attempt law provides that any person who, with intent to commit any
crime, breaks into or enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a crime by the
use of an explosive Is subject to a felony conviction and imprisonment from twenty to
forty years. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-18-06 (1960). Whether the crime of "destroying the build-
ing" would be a "crime" contemplated by this statute has not been determined in the courts.
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tual, planting, or utilization of such explosive," but has advanced
to the point, by entering the public building with the explosive, that
he has created a public safety hazard.
XV. SEXUAL OFFENSES
These sections in the New Code presented the drafters with
more discussion and differences of opinion than any other por-
tion.8 9 So divergent were the views of the drafters that this por-
tion was not attached to the main revision bill, ° but was rather
presented to the legislature in the form of three alternative bills 91
to supplement the main bill.
Alternative No. 1 is similar to the Old Code in penalties while
its format is patterned after the Proposed Federal Code. Alterna-
tive No. 2 is the most progressive of the three bills, and Alterna-
tive No. 3 is a compromise between the other two alternatives. Al-
ternative No. 3 was passed by the legislature. 92
All three alternatives will be discussed in the context of the Old
Code and the Proposed Federal Code.893 Bigamy and incest will be
discussed independently, since they were identical in all three alter-
natives and similar to the Old Code. Prostitution will also be dis-
cussed separately since it was contained in the main revision bill.
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
All three alternatives begin with provisions regarding an actor's
mistake as to the age of the victim. If criminality depends on a
victim's being younger than fifteen, neither the actor's ignorance of
the child's age nor -his reasonable belief that the child was over
fourteen is a defense.6 94 However, if criminality results from the
victim's being a minor, the actor's reasonable belief that the victim
889. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972; Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21,
1972. This section seems to be the most troublesome to legislators the country over. As
Anthony Yturri states in commenting on Oregon's newly revised criminal code:
Probably no single part of the New Code presented a more difficult--or ex-
plosive-policy question than did the sex offenses article. An 'agonizing re-
appraisal' was made of statutes denouncing adultery and fornication, statutes
that had remained in force since 1864, as well as statutes prohibiting con-
sensual sodomy, lewd cohabitation, and seduction. We had to decide to what
extent conduct that is generally considered repugnant or immoral, but which
does not produce demonstrable harm to others, should be made criminal.
Yturri, The Three R's of Penal Law Reform, 51 ORE. L. REv. 434 (1972).
890. S. Bill 2045, Forty-Third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota (1973).
891. S. Bills 2047, 2048, 2049, Forty-Third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota (1973).
Bill 2047 is hereinafter referred to as Alternative No. 1, Bill 2048 is hereinafter referred to
as Alternative No. 2, and Bill 2049 is hereinafter referred to as Alternative No. 3 or as the
New Code, N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-20 (effective July 1, 1975). These alternatives were
formulated to permit the presentation of differing views and to improve the chances for
passage of the main bill. See Minutes "B", supra note 2, Aug. 24-25, 1972 at 12, 15-16;
Minutes "B", aupra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 33-35.
892. N.D. Session Laws, ch. 117 (1973).
893. Refer to Appendix "A" for a comparison chart of the three alternatives, the Old Code
and the Proposed Federal Code.
894. Alternatives No. 1, 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-01 (1) (a) (1973).
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was an adult is an affirmative defense.8 9 5 The Proposed Federal




Under the New Code, then, mistake as to age would be a de-
fense to a charge of corruption of minors, 98 but would not be a
defense for statutory rape. 99
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code did not allow a mis-
take as to age as a defense where the critical age is ten, as any
likely mistake "would still have the child below the age of pu-
berty."900 This rationale does not support the New Code provision,
where the critical age is fifteen.901
All three alternatives provide a broad exclusion for conduct with
the actor's spouse.90 2 This exclusion does not, however, apply if the
spouses are living apart under a decree of judicial separation9 3 or
if the spouse is charged as an accomplice "in an offense which he
causes another person to perform." 90 4
The New Code 0 5 thus continues the inter-spousal rape immunity
provided in the Old Code,90 6 and expands it to cover fellatio, cun-
nilingus and anal intercourse.9 07 The New Code's marital immunity
provision0 8 closely parallels the Proposed Federal Code,90 9 but does
not extend to "persons living as man and wife." '9 10
The definition of "sexual act" in Alternatives 2 and 3 (the New
Code) excludes conduct between spouses.9 1 The Proposed Federal
895. Alternatives No. 1, 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-01(1) (g) (1973).
896. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1648(a).
897. Id. at 192.
898. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01(6), 12.1-20-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
899. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01(a), 12.1-20-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
900. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 873.
901. The drafters of the Proposed Federal Code chose age ten in an attempt to set the
critical age prior to the onset of puberty. Id. at 869-70. They state, "As the child attains
puberty. . . . bona fide mistakes in age can be made." Id. at 873.
902. Alternatives No. 1, 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-01(2) (1973).
903. Id.
904. Id. Note that the quoted phrase, with its use of the term, "causes," is very similar
to a portion of the New Code's general accomplice liability section. N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-03-01(1) (a) (effective July 1, 1975). Does the fact that language paralleling to other
portions of that section is not included in the exception to the exclusion mean that a spouse
is exempted if he "aids" rather than "causes an offense against his spouse?" See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-02-05 (effective July 1, 1975).
905. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
906. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-01 (1960).
907. Id. These acts are included in the Old Code's definition of sodomy; there is no mari-
tal exemption provided for that offense. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-07 (1960).
908. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
909. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1648(2).
910. Id. This was intended to extend the immunity to "persons intentionally living In
common-law relationships." FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 192.
911. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-02(1) (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(l)
(effective July 1, 1975). It was in the context of this definition that elimination of the
inter-spousal immunity was suggested. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 18.
The severe damage to reputation which could arise from an inter-spousal sex offense charge
was pointed out, together with a suggestion that the victimized spouse should have an as-
sault charge available; committee action favoring continued immunity resulted. Id. at 18-19.
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Code excludes conduct between husband and wife from its definition-
of "deviate sexual intercourse.
912
All three alternatives follow the Proposed Federal Code918 in bar-,
ring prosecution of most94 sex offenses unless a complaint is made
within three months of the act's occurrence.91 5 If the victim is a
minor9e or otherwise incompetent, the three months are computed
from the time a "competent person specifically interested, in the
victim, other than the alleged offender, learned of the offense." 9"
B. SEXUAL IMPOSITIONS
1. Gross Sexual Imposition
Alternative No. 1 defines rape in the traditional manner of
forced sexual intercourse with the woman as victim, a class A
felony in most instances.9 18 This definition is similar to the Old
Code.9 19 Alternative No. 1 also defines aggravated involuntary sod-
omy as forced deviate sexual intercourse, an offense of the same
degree as rape.920 Both of these sections are similar to the Pro-
posed Federal Code.
92'
Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the New Code) define a new offense,
gross sexual imposition, which includes rape and other forced sex-
ual acts with either sex as victim. Gross sexual imposition is also
a class A felony. 922 This section in all alternatives, whether entitled
rape or gross sexual imposition, proscribes intercourse obtained
through the drugging or intoxification of the victim without the vic-
tim's knowledge, so as to render the victim incapable of apprising
himself or herself of the situation.923 The Old Code delineates rape
by degrees depending on the offender's age and in all cases pro-
vides for a minimum sentence of one year while setting no maxi-
mum.92a The Old Code also placed on the prosecution the burden of
proving that an actor under the age of 14 was physically capable
912. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1649(g).
913. Id. at § 1648(3).
914. The offenses exempted are adultery (which has its own time limit), unlawful cohabi-
tation, incest, and bigamy. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01(3), -09 to -11, -13 (effective July
1, 1975).
915. Alte-rnatives No. 1, 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-01(3) (1973). It should be noted that a "sub-
stantial body of opinion" among the drafters of the Proposed Federal Code opposes the re-
quirement for prompt complaint. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 192.
916. This provision in Alternative No. 1 applied to victims under age sixteen. Alternative
No. 1 § 12.1-20-01(3) (1973).
917. Alternatives No. 1, 2 and 9 § 12.1-20-01(3) (1973).
918. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-03 (1973). Rape is a Class A felony if in the course of tie
offense the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon the victim, or if the victim is under 15,
or if the victim is not a voluntary companion of the actor and has not previously permitted
him sexual liberties. Otherwise rape is a Class B felony.
919. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-01 (1960).
920. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-05 (1973).
921. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 1641, 1643.
922. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-03 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (effective
July 1, 1975).
923. Alternatives No. 1, 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-03 (1973).
924. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-30-04 to -09 (1960).
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of penetration. 2 5 This presumption has been eliminated by the New
Code.926
Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the New Code)927 introduce, as does
the Proposed Federal Code, 929  "the important distinction between
ravishment by a stranger and the troublesome category of rape by
a 'boyfriend'. 9 29 This latter category hinges on the degree of sexual
liberties previously permitted the boyfriend and punishable only at
the class B felony level,s 0 rather than at the very highest level as
in the former case.
2. Classifications
Alternative No. 1 has two separate classes of intercourse-sex-
ual and deviate sexualt' s Alternatives No. 2 and 3 place these two
types of intercourse in the same category-sexual act.932 There is
logic behind such categorizing because the penalties for the offenses
of sexual intercourse and deviate sexual intercourse are the same.
The use of the word "deviate" serves no purpose other than to
connote abnormal sexual intercourse and is not the meaning the
drafters intended.'81 Rather, they intended to include such acts as
fellatio, cunnilingus and anal intercourse. 984
In Alternative No. 1935 and the Proposed Federal Code 9 6 the dif-
ference between rape and gross sexual imposition is a matter of
degree, depending on the amount of force used. 93 7 The difference be-
925. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-02 (1960). It is presumed that a child under fourteen is not
physically capable of consummating the crime of rape, and physical ability to commit the
crime must be proved as an independent fact. State v. Fisk, 15 N.D. 589, 108 N.W. 485
(1906). An act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female under the age of 18 years
and not the wife of the perpetrator, is always rape; but the act may be rape in the first,
second or third degree. The degree depends solely upon the age of the defendent. State v.
Running, 53 N.D. 896, 208 N.W. 231 (1926).
926. N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 117, § 4 (1973).
927. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-03(2) (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(2)
(effective July 1, 1975).
928. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1641(2).
929. FNA.L REPORT, supra note 6, at 188.
930. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-03(2) (1973).
931. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-02(1), (2) (1973).
952. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-02(1) (1973).
933. rd. Minutes of the Committee on Judiciary "B*, North Dakota Legislative Council,
October 26-27, 1972 at Appendix "B".
The use of deviate sexual Intercourse seems to be a new expansion of the word
Intercourse-by definition sexual Intercourse means coitus or copulation; this
can only be done by the generative organs in a male and a female being Joined.
It has no relation to the mouth, anus, etc. The only way deviate sexual inter-
course could happen would be probably the more bizarre type-e.g., a male and
female hanging from the 18th floor of the State Capitol by their toes and
singing "Home on the Range" while copulating.
934. Id. NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNcIL REPORT, 95 (1973).. Fellatio, cunnilingus and
anal intercourse are used by the drafters to conote sexual contact between human beings
consisting of contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, and be-
tween the penis and the anus respectively.
935. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-03, -04 (1973).
936. FIAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 1641, 1642.
937. Minutes of the Committee on Judiciary "B", North Dakokta Legislative Council, June
20-21, 1972 at 15.
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tween aggravated involuntary sodomy 988 and involuntary sodomy9 9
also depends on the force involved. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 elim-
inate the need for four classifications by combining the classifica-
tions of rape and aggravated involuntary sodomy used in Alterna-
tive No. 1 which were both class B felonies into gross sexual impo-
sition and combining the classifications of gross sexual imposition
and involuntary sodomy used in Alternative No. 1 which were both
class C felonies into sexual imposition.
9 4 0
3. Sexual Imposition
The New Code provides for the offense of sexual imposition
when the victim is compelled to submit to a sexual act "by any
threat that would render a person of reasonable firmness incap-
able of resisting. ' ' 94 1 This offense was termed gross sexual imposi-
tion in Alternative No. 1 and there involved only a male forcing
sexual intercourse upon a female.94 2 Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the
New Code) use the term "sexual act" and the victim may be of
either sex.94 8
The threat involved is not the threat of "immediate and great
bodily harm" of the Old Code's rape section,9" or the "threat of
imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted
on any human being" of the New Code's gross sexual imposition
section.9 4 5 It is a nondeadly threat, such as threat of injury to rep-
utation."O
The crime is a "substantial physical and psychological abuse of
another human being," 9 7 but does not warrant the highest felony
penalty since it involves less physical danger to the victim." 8
4. Sexual Assault
Sexual assault is defined in all of the alternatives as offensive
sexual contact with another, a class B misdemeanor. 949 Under the
Old Code this is not punishable under sexual offenses unless the vic-
tim is less than 18, in which case it would be punishable by up to
15 years imprisonment.95
938. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-05 (1973) FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1643.
939. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-06 (1973) FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1644.
940. Alternative No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-03 and § 12.1-20-04 (1973). See REPORT OF THE
NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FORTY-THRD LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 93 (1973).
941. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
942. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-04 (1973).
943. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-04 (1973).
944. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-20-01(4). (1960).
945. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1) (a) (effective July 1, 1975).
946. II WORKING PAPER., supra note 60, at 870-71.
947. Id. at 87.
948. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 188.
949. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-10 (1973) ; Alternatives No,. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-07 (1973)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07 (effective July 1, 1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1647.
950. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-11 (1960).
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C. SEXUAL ACTS WITH MINORS OR WARDS
1. Statutory Rape
Statutory rape under the Old Code is sexual intercourse with a
female not the actor's wife who is less than 18.951 This would in-
clude intercourse with a female under 18 even if the male is also
under 18 and it was part of a teenage love affair, or even if in fact
the girl had seduced the boy.95 2 Statutory rape under all three al-
ternatives is a sexual act with a person under 15.95 Technically, this
is the only section which pertains to statutory rape; however, the
section on corruption of minors will apply when the victim is a
minor and the actor is an adult.9 " There was considerable discus-
sion in the Committee as to whether these age levels are appro-
priate or whether they should be lowered, possibly as low as ten
for statutory rape, so as to conform with the Proposed Federal Code.
955
Considering the trend toward an earlier onset of puberty and recent
studies which indicate earlier sexual experimentation by young chil-
dren, it would seem that 15 is the maximum figure at which this
age level should be set, with an age level set at 12, a more practi-
cal figure.956 Since a given age level is intended to express a strong
social condemnation of sexual acts with children, even those that
are nonforceful; such conduct is graded as a class A felony.
9 5 7
2. Corruption of Minors
The Proposed Federal Code does not define corruption of minors
as dependent solely on the age of the victim but rather on a five
year difference in the age of the offender and the victim, when the
victim is under 16.911 Thus, it is not an offense for young adults to
951. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-30-01(1) (1960).
952. State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 29 N.W.2d 665 (1947). State v. Klein, 200 N.W.2d 288
(N.D. 1972).
953. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-03(1) (d) (1973). This offense under this alternative is,
of course, limited to a male having coitus with a female victim. Id.; Alternatives No. 2
and 8 § 12.1-20-03(1)(d) (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(d) (effective July 1,
1975).
954. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-08 (1978) ; Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-05 (1973).
955. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 19.
956. "[Aill the studies show that many girls now are reaching sexual maturity at age 11
and many boys at age 12, where the average used to be a year or two later.* Sktatement
by Dr. William V. Lewit, Professor of psychiatry and pediatrics, quoted in N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1968 at 49, col. 4. See II WoRKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 871.
"The potential physical and psychic injury which an act of sexual intercourse may
cause to a prepubescent child is great. Moreover, the act of engaging In sexual relations
with a young child is Indicative of a mental aberration. Thus, anyone so subjecting a child
should be made susceptible to a lengthy term of imprisonment. However, choosing the
proper age below which we may condemn nonforceful Intercourse with a child as a major
crime Is difficult; there is no agreement on such an age, even in current law reform pro-
posals in the States. We here propose to set the crucial age at 10 years, as it was in the
common law, because despite the indication that twelve is the commonest age for ,the onset
of puberty, it seems wise to go well outside the average or model age, and it is known that
significant numbers of girls enter the period of sexual awakening as early as the tenth
year." II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 869, 870 quoting MODEL PENAL CODE §, 207.4,
Comment at 252 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
957. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 188.
958. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1645(1).
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engage in sexual activity among generational peers.9 59 However, if
the victim is under the age of ten, the actor could be prosecuted
under the statutory rape provision.960 This is a practical approach
because it is more readily enforceable than a statute which defines
an offense, which the police do not enforce and are not expected
to. 9 1
Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the New Code) provide for an offense,
under the corruption of minors provisions, if the actor is an adult
and the victim is a minor.96 2 A comparison of the statutes shows
that the Proposed Federal Code is narrowly defined and provides
for a stiff class C felony, 6 whereas, the two alternatives provide
a broader definition and provide for a lesser class A misdemean-
or.9 64 The Proposed Federal Code defines corruption of minors as a
person more than five years older than the victim engaging in sex-
ual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a victim who is
less than 16.965 Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the New Code) define cor-
ruption of minors as an adult engaging in a sexual act with a
minor.96 6 It appears that the Federal alternative might be more
appropriate if the goal is to prevent corruption of minors because
under its provisions it is not a crime for teenage lovers to engage
in sexual acts where one of the partners has just turned 18 and
the other partner is 17. This situation would subject the older part-
ner to punishment under the New Code.
9 6 7
3. Sexual Abuse of Wards
In all three alternatives and the Proposed Federal Code, sex-
ual abuse of wards has been changed so that either a male or
female may be the victim, whereas, under the Old Code only the
female could be the victim. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 (the New Code)
and the Proposed Federal Code provide for a maximum one year
punishment for sexual abuse of wards.9 66 The Old Code provides for
959. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 190.
960. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1641(1)(c).
961. As a representative of the F.B.I. stated: '"The Criminal Code of any jurisdiction
tends to make a crime of everything that people are against, without regard to enforce-
ability, changing social concepts, etc. The result is that the Criminal Code becomes society's
trash bin." THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENTS COMMIS-
SIO ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 107 (1967).
962. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-05 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CDD § 12.1-20-05 (effective
July 1, 1975).
963. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1645.
964. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-05 (1973). See Appendix "A".
965. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1645.
966. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-05 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05, (effective
July 1, 1975). For the conduct to be criminal under Alternative No. 2, however, the actor must
be at least three years older than the other person. Alternative No. 2 § 12.1-20-05 (1973).
967. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05 (effective July 1, 1975) ; Alternative No. 3 § 12.1-20-05
(1973).
968. Alternatives No 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-06 (1973); FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1646;
N.D. CE~NT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (effective July 1, 1975).
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a sentence of up to 15 years. None of the alternatives provide for a
defense or a reduction of maximum sentence under this section for
cases in which the ward may have been the aggressor.9 69
D. MISCELLANEOUS SEXUAL OFFENSES
1. Fornication
Fornication, adultery and unlawful cohabitation were discussed
with diverging views by the state drafters970 who showed a wide
range of opinions. None of these are classified as offenses in the
Proposed Federal Code.
9 7 1
Fornication under the Old Code is punishable by 30 days im-
prisonment.972 Alternative No. 1973 is very similar to the Old Code,
while Alternatives No. 2 and 3 take a middle ground, providing that
fornication is an offense only if done in a public place.9 7 4 Alterna-
969. See Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-09 (1973); Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-06
(1973).
970. Minutes "B". supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 16, 17. One Committee member stated
that " . .. regardless of his personal views, he felt deletion of the crimes of fornication,
adultery and unlawful cohabitation could risk chance of passage of the proposed new Crimi-
nal Code." Id. In response to a similar plea made by Oregon Criminal Law Revision Com-
mission members, Herbert W. Titus stated:
... I came away from the Commission's minutes with the distinct impression
that those Commission members who often argued that the Legislature would
never 'buy' a particular reform measure were camoflaging their real reasons
for opposition. Even if they were not, there can be no question that they were
playing the game 'by ear' since the Commission had made no efforts sys-
tematically to seek opinions of the public on any matter before them. Their
'hunches' may well have been right, but one would hope that a law revision
commission would have eliminated not only as much guesswork as possible but
also would have set for itself a higher goal than simply reflecting current 'pub-
lic opinion.'
Titus, Criminal Law Revision in Oregyn: A New Game Plan? 51 ORE. L. REv. 566 (1972).
Indeed, a plea was made by Professor Lockney, Assistant Professor of Law at the
University of North Dakota and a citizen member of the Committee on Judiciary "B", that
the Committee should draft a resolution which "should also specifically call for a continuing
study of sexual offense definitions, including the possibility of doing attitudinal surveys to
determine the actual feelings of the populous concerning sexual offenses." Minutes "B",
supra note 2, Sept. 21-22, 1972 at 31. No survey, however, was ever conducted.
971. FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 187-193. Withdrawing criminal sanctions against
private sexual conduct between consenting adults has also been recommended in Great
Britain (THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION, 187-191 (Stein and Day, Authorized American Edition 1963)) and in the
United States (MODEL PENAL CODE, Art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)). Karl Men-
ninger states in his introduction to THE WOLFENDEN REPORT that:
Many people assume that what the law calls a crime, the church calls a sin,
and psychiatry calls sickness. But there is, presently, a marked tendency to
to correct this equation. This report is especially valuable, declared the fdrmer
Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, because it makes clear distinction
crime and sin. "Certainly some things are sins," said he, "which need not be
considered crimes." Indeed it is better from many standpoints that they not
be considered crimes. But can an act be both a sin and a sickness even when
no longer a crime? Menninger, Introduction, in THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 6 (Stein and
Day, Authorized American Edition 1963).
For the latest trends in consensual sexual activity see generally PLAYBOY, October,
1973, at 84. For a short, objective review of the PLAYBOY article see TIME, October 1, 1973,
at 63.
972. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-08 (1960).
973. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-11 (1973).
974. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-08 (1973). Note, however, that the protection pro-
vided to the sensibilities of the public is limited, as both an express exemption and the defi-
nition of "sexual act" serve to exclude public intercourse by a married couple from this
prohibition. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 § 12.1-20-01(2), -2(1) (1973).
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tive No. 3 (the New Code) adds a provision which may be some-
what more difficult to enforce, because it provides that it is a Class
B misdemeanor for a minor to engage in a sexual act.975
2. Adultery
Adultery under the Old Code is punishable by up to 3 years im-
prisonment.9 76 Alternatives No. 1 and 3 (the New Code) provide that
it is a class A misdemeanor,9" while Alternative No. 2 and the Pro-
posed Federal Code do not make adultery an offense.978 Under the
Old Code a single man who has intercourse with a married female
is also guilty of adultery. 99 This provision would be removed by all
of the alternatives. No prosecution will be instituted under either
the Old Code or the New Code without a complaint from the spouse
within one year.980
3. Unlawful Cohabitation
Unlawful cohabitation under the New Code is a Class B misde-
meanor,98' while under the Old Code it is punishable by up to one
year imprisonment.8 2 The drafters felt that while there is no in-
trinsic evil in unlawful cohabitation it should remain an offense, be-
cause a couple could hold themselves out as man and wife for the
purpose of committing fraud.9 8 While this may be a valid reason
for not deleting unlawful cohabitation from the law, as the New
Code presently reads there is no mention of fraud, but rather only
the traditional "openly and notoriously. '9 84 While the intent of the
drafters may have been meritorious; the New Code does not pro-
hibit that which they intended.
4. Sodomy & Homosexual Activity
Alternative No. 1 provides that deviate sexual intercourse with
a consenting adult is a Class A misdemeanor. 985 Alternatives No. 2
975. Alternative No. 3 § 12.1-20-08 (1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-0 (effective July
1, 1975). The potential for discriminatory enforcement was pointed out in Committee. Min-
utes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 17.
976. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-11, (1960).
977. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-12 (1973) ; Alternative No. 3 § 12.1-20-09 (1973) ; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (effective July 1, 1975).
978. NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT 94 (1973) ; See Minutes "B", supra note
2, June 20-21, 1972 at 17.
979. N.D. 'CENT. CODE § 12-22-09 (1960). It was brought up in Committee that should the
Old Code provisions on adultery be retained, "a single female who has intercourse with a
married man should also be guilty of the offense." Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21,
1972 at 17.
980. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-10 (1960) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09(2) (effective July
1, 1975).
981. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (effective July 1, 1975).
982. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-12 (1960).
983. Minutes "B", supra note 2, June 20-21, 1972 at 17. For suggestions this be treated as fraud
rather than as a sex offense, see Id. and Minutes "B", supra note 2, Aug. 24-25, 1972 at I5.
984. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (effective July 1, 1975). "A person is guilty of a Class
B misdemeanor if he or she lives openly and notoriously with a person of the opposite sex
as a married couple without being married to the other person." Id.
985. Alternative No. 1 § 12.1-20-07 (1973). Note that conduct with an actor's spouse is
excluded. Alternative No, 1 § 19.1-90-0J(2) (1973).
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and 3 (the New Code) do not prohibit homosexual activity unless
performed in a public place.9 88 The Proposed Federal Code does not
prohibit sodomy.9 87 The Old Code section on sodomy is similar to
Alternative No. 1; the offense is punishable by up to ten years im-
prisonment even when performed between a consenting husband and
wife in their own home.
9 8 8
5. Deviate Sexual Act
Deviate sexual acts are prohibited under the Old Code's sodomy
provision.8 9 The Proposed Federal Code includes any form of sex-
ual intercourse with an animal in its definition of "Deviate Sexual
Intercourse. '" 9 0 All three alternatives would make such a class A
riisdemeanor.191 The alternatives are then a middle ground which
the drafters took for what are sometimes termed victimless crimes.
E. THE ALTERNATIVE CHOSEN
The basic import of the New Code chapter on sexual offenses
is to codify and narrow the interpretation of the sections and pro-
vide for as great or greater punishment for the most serious of-
fenses while deleting or reducing the punishment for those offenses
which are of lesser magnitude. The alternative chosen for the New
Code is basically a middle ground stance between the conservative
Old Code and the Proposed Federal Code.
F. BIGAMY
The New Code provides that a person is guilty of bigamy, a
class C felony, if he marries a person while married to another."
2
This would apparently apply to both heterosexual and homosexual
marriages" s contracted in this state. It would not apply to marriages
contracted in other states with subsequent cohabitation in North Da-
kota, which is an offense under the Old Code.-' The New Code
does not mention the intent of the actor and presumably one could
be convicted under this provision without knowingly committing
bigamy." 5
986. Alternatives No. 2 and 3 §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -08 (1973) ; Minutes "B", supra note 2,
October 26-27, 1972, at Appendix "B"; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -08 (effective
July 1, 1975).
987. II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 869, 872.
988. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-07 (1960). The crime of sodomy as defined by this section
is much broader than the common-law offense and includes carnal knowledge by or with the
mouth. State v. Nelson, 36 N.D. 564, 163 N.W. 278 (1917).
989. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-07 (1960). Provides for up to 10 years Imprisonment for these
acts.
990. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, § 1649(b).
991. Alternative No. 1 §§ 12.1-20-02(4), -15 (1973) ; Alternative No. 2 § 12.1-20-02(8),
-11 (1973) ; Alternative No. 3 § 12.1-20-02(3), -12 (1979).
992. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13 (effective July 1, 1975).
993. Such unisexual marriages are increasing, even with formal ceremony. Homosexuals in
Revolt, LIFE, December 31, 1971 at 62. But see Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 810, 191 N.W.2d
185 (1971), appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
994. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-02 and § 12-22-04 (1960).
995. N.D. CENT. COD § 12.1-20-13 (effective July 1, 1975).
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The New Code provides three affirmative defenses to bigamy.
They are: 1) when the actor believes his spouse to be dead and the
spouse has been absent for five years, 2) where the spouse has vol-
untarily absented himself from the United States for five years and
3) a court's judgment voiding or annulling the former marriage.9"
These defenses are basically the same as those allowed by the Old
Code with the deletion of the defense which is allowed when the
actor's spouse has been sentenced to life imprisonment." 7 This is a
wise change since the fact that one's spouse has been sentenced to
life in prison does not abrogate the laws of divorce. 998 Bigamy is a
class C felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison.
The Proposed Federal Code has no provisions which pertain to
bigamy.
G. INCEST
The New Code" 9 is nearly identical to the Old Code 1000 in pro-
hibiting marriage, cohabitation, and sexual intercourse between:
parents and children including grandparents and grandchildren of
every degree; brothers and sisters of half as well as whole blood;
uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews of half as well as whole
blood; and first cousins of half as well as whole blood. Neither the
Old Code nor the New Code preclude relations with stepchildren.
The Proposed Federal Code does not include a section on incest.
The New Code reduces the maximum penalty for incest from
ten years 0 0 1 to five years1 0 0 2 by making it a class C felony.
A defense is implicit in the New Code,1003 as in the Old Code,10"
in that the actor must have knowledge that the other person is with-
in the said degree of relationship.
H. PROSTITUTION
The New Code'00 5 drawn substantially from the Proposed Feder-
al Code, °10° focuses primarily on those who promote, facilitate or
earn their living by inducing or forcing a person to engage in
prostitution. 007 The offense is explicitly graded so as to provide that
only the owners, managers and supervisors of a brothel or prosti-
996. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13(2) (effective July 1, 1975).
997. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-03(4) (1960).
998. Indeed conviction of a felony is grounds for divorce. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-08(6)
(Supp. 1971).
999. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-11 (effective July 1, 1975).
1000. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-06 (1960), § 14-03-03 (1971).
1001. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-06 (1960).
1002. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-11 (effective July 1, 1975).
1003. Id.
1004. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-06 (1960).
1005. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-29 (effective July 1, 1975).
1006. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, §§ 1841-1843, 1848, 1849.
1007. I WORKING PAPERS, supra note 60, at 1191.
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tution business are guilty of a class C felony.1008 Those who have
lesser roles such as maids and drivers are guilty of only a class
A misdemeanor. 00 9 Such a distinction is necessary to prevent the
complicity provisions of the statute from being used to make all
aiders and abettors guilty of a felony. 01 0 The Old Code'011 delineates
these offenses, although not to the extent found in the New Code.
'The New Code is based on the view that the act of the perpe-
trator of the offense, the prostitute, is deserving of a lesser penalty
than the act of an accomplice. Indeed, the prostitute is often re-
garded as the victim of a victimless crime.
101 2
The New Code provides for a misdemeanor penalty for profes-
sional prostitutes. It is not intended to be applied to promiscuous
women who engage in several love affairs, mistresses who accept
gifts from their boyfriends or women who allow themselves to be
picked up at a bar. It does include call girls who take telephone
calls in their homes or streetwalkers who await an offer for sex-
ual activity. 01 It is also intended to be applied to persons who live
off a prostitute's earnings, thereby encouraging continued prostitu-
tion.101 The New Code classifies prostitution as a class B misde-
meanor 01 5 whereas, under the Old Code it is punishable by up to
five years. 10 16
In accord with the Proposed Federal Code and the Old Code,
the New Code does not classify patronizing a prostitute as a punish-
able offense.
The New Code allows the testimony of a spouse to be received
against his or her spouse, to prove offenses "involving that spouse's
prostitution,' ' 01 7 thereby creating a statutory exception to the general
common law rule and the Old Code.1018 The privilege may still be
invoked by a spouse who is being prosecuted for a crime not in-
volving his spouse.10 19
1008. Id. at 1194.
1009. Id.
1010. Id:.
1011. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-22-14, -15, -22, -28, -25 to -29 (1960).
1012. Minutes "B", supra note 2, July 20-21, 1972 at 22.
1013. Note 3 aupra at 1196.
1014. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-02(1) (d) (effective July 1, 1975).
1015. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-03 (effective July 1, 1975).
1016. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-17 (SuPp. 1973).
1017. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-04 (effective July 1, 1975).
1018. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-01 (1960). It has been held that a wife cannot invoke a
spouse's privilege to refuse to testify concerning her husband's role in prostituting her.
Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530 (1960).
1019. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-04 (effective July 1, 1975). FiNAL REPORT, aupra note
6, at 266.
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